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Many epistemologists equate the rational and the justiﬁed. Those who disagree have
done little to explain the diﬀerence, leading their opponents to suspect that the distinc-
tion is an ad hoc one designed to block counterexamples. The ﬁrst aim of this disser-
tationpursued in the ﬁrst three chaptersis to improve this situation by providing a
detailed, independently motivated account of the distinction. The account is unusual in
being inspired by no particular theoretical tradition in epistemology, but rather by ideas
in the meta-ethical literature on reasons and rationality. The account is also unusual
in proposing that the distinction between rationality and justiﬁcation can be derived
from a reasons-based account of justiﬁcation. Historically, this is a striking claim. In
epistemology, reasons-based accounts of justiﬁcation are standardly treated as paradig-
matically internalist accounts, but this dissertation argues that we should believe the
reverse: given the best views about reasonsagain drawn from meta-ethicswe should
expect reasons-based accounts of justiﬁcation to be strongly externalist.
The ﬁrst half of the dissertation might leave one wondering why rationality matters
from the epistemic point of view. The second aim of the dissertation is to answer this
question. The ﬁnal two chapters argue (1) that we can only explain why rationality
matters from the epistemic point of view if we reject the nearly universal assumption
that all derivative epistemic value is instrumental value, and (2) that there are powerful
ii
reasons to reject this assumption, since it is the true origin of the so-called swamping
problem. It is then argued that if we reject the instrumentalist assumption, we can get
a truth-oriented account of epistemic value that provides a uniﬁed explanation of how
rationality, justiﬁcation, and knowledge matter from the epistemic point of view. This
result is unprecedented: while some epistemologists ﬁnd room for both internalist and
externalist species of epistemic value, virtually all assume that these properties cannot
have a common evaluative ground, and especially not a common truth-oriented one.
The concluding moral of the dissertation is that once we properly understand what it
is to be truth-oriented, we see that this common assumption is mistaken.
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1Introduction
The Goals
The dissertation has two major goals. The ﬁrst is to defend a novel version of the
distinction between rationality and justiﬁcation in epistemology that proﬁts from recent
theorizing about rationality and reasons outside of epistemology. In meta-ethics, it has
become common to separate the question of whether it would be rational for one to φ
from the question of whether one possesses objectively good reasons to φ. Rationality
only requires us to heed the apparent reasons we have and the pressures of coherence
exerted by our attitudes, and both can fail to coincide with objectively good reasons.
My distinction is inspired by this picture. While justiﬁcation does not require one to
heed the objective reasons given by all the facts, it does require one to possess some
objectively good reasons that are not outweighed by other objectively good reasons
that one possesses. Rationality does not require so much: indeed, one can be rationally
required to comply with reasons that aren't objectively good at all.
The second major goal is to explain how epistemic rationality could have any nec-
essary signiﬁcance from the epistemic point of view, given the pressures to divorce
rationality and justiﬁcation. The parallel distinction in meta-ethics has led many to
think that it is an open question whether rationality necessarily has any normative sig-
niﬁcance. Of course, it is intuitive that rationality has this signiﬁcance. But one craves
an explanation. This is so even if we are merely interested in the signiﬁcance of epis-
temic rationality from the epistemic point of view: for as I argue, epistemic rationality
does not necessarily reliably promote fundamental epistemic values like accurate belief
and has no necessary connection to objectively good epistemic reasons.
To explain the necessary signiﬁcance of rationality from the epistemic point of view,
2I argue that we must reject widely assumed views about epistemic value and normativ-
ity. We must deny that all derivative epistemic value is merely instrumental epistemic
value and deny that our epistemic obligations are best understood in consequentialist
terms. To undermine these views, I show that they are the source of long-standing
problems. Indeed, I show we cannot even explain the epistemic value of properties that
are instrumental to truth given a purely instrumentalist model of epistemic value. If
we reject that model, we can get a uniﬁed account of the epistemic value of rationality,
justiﬁcation, and knowledge and solve some long-standing problems. Rationality mat-
ters in the same way that justiﬁcation and knowledge matter: epistemologists have just
been wrong across the board about what it is to matter epistemically.
A striking feature of my view is that it preserves the idea that accurate belief is the
fundamental epistemic value but unpacks this idea in a non-consequentialist way. In
a crude slogan: accuracy is fundamentally to be respected as the norm of belief, not
to be produced as a goal. The way to respect the norm of accuracy just is to form
beliefs in the ways characteristic of epistemic rationality. So, there is a truth-oriented
explanation of why rational belief matters, though it is not a consequentialist one. A
similar kind of explanation, I show, can and should be given of the epistemic value of
justiﬁed belief and knowledge. In this way, we can secure truth-oriented unity in the
theory of epistemic value even though rationality doesn't guarantee reliability.
Epistemologists have so far been unable to grasp this unity because they have made
some optional assumptions about how derivative epistemic value is grounded in funda-
mental epistemic value. While the epistemic value of rationality looks puzzling from an
instrumentalist angle, that fact is evidence that this angle is mistaken. Rationality is not
the exception but the rule: we cannot fully understand the value of any epistemically
signiﬁcant ways of believing from a purely instrumentalist angle.
Chapter Summaries
The dissertation has two parts that fulﬁll my two goals. The ﬁrst consists of three
chapters, and the second consists of two.
3In Chapter 1 (Reasons and the Metaphysics of Epistemology), I defend a reasons-
based account of justiﬁcation that proﬁts from ideas and distinctions from theoriz-
ing about reasons outside of epistemology. I argue that externalists in epistemology
can and should hold a reasons-based account, and that the best general views about
reasons (which I take from meta-ethics) strongly support an externalistindeed reli-
abilistepistemology. This chapter is crucial for the analogies with meta-ethics that
underpin my justiﬁcation/rationality distinction. But the chapter has independent in-
terest: among other things, it shows that it is a mistake to think that the distinction
between internalist and reliabilist theories of justiﬁcation corresponds to the distinction
between reasons-based and non-reasons-based theories.
In Chapter 2 (What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be), I lay the foundations for the
other half of my distinction between justiﬁcation and rationality. Many meta-ethicists
understand rationality as a matter of correctly responding to apparent normative rea-
sons, where apparent normative reasons are not necessarily real normative reasons. I
endorse this general idea, but think that the accounts of apparent reasons that meta-
ethicists have so far oﬀered are ﬂawed, and defend my own account. On my account,
apparent normative reasons are apparent facts that we are competently disposed to treat
like objective normative reasons, where the notion of competence is analyzed indirectly
in terms of objective reasons and a competence/performance distinction is drawn. While
my account allows that apparent reasons can easily fail to be real reasons, it implies
that the two are likely to coincide when the conditions for the exercise of competence
are normal. I defend this as a virtue of my account.
In Chapter 3 (Rationality and Justiﬁcation: Reasons to Divorce?), I defend my dis-
tinction between rationality and justiﬁcation. I also explain its implications for issues
like the possibility of higher-order defeat, the normative impact of perceptual seemings
with checkered etiologies, and several internalism/externalism debates. On my view,
rationality has a structural and a substantive side, and both are separable from justi-
ﬁcation. Structural rationality consists in complying with the pressures of coherence
exerted by our attitudes, which are hypothetical in the sense that one can rationally
4escape these pressures by dropping the relevant attitudes. Substantive rationality con-
sists in heeding the apparent reasons, where these are understood in the way suggested
in Chapter 2. Unlike rational φ-ing, justiﬁed φ-ing requires one to possess an objective
reason to φ that is not outweighed by other objective reasons one possesses.
In Chapter 4 (Veritism without Instrumentalism), I defend a picture of epistemic
value that proves crucial for my second goal. I argue that friends of the view that
true belief is the fundamental epistemic value (Veritism) should reject the idea that
all non-fundamental epistemic value is merely a species of instrumental epistemic value
(Instrumentalism"). Instrumentalism, I argue, is responsible for a generalized version
of the swamping problem, and Veritists can avoid it iﬀ they reject Instrumentalism.
To be concrete, I sketch an alternative version of Veritism that proﬁts from a form of
value derivation that I take from Thomas Hurka's work on virtue. For a toy illustration
outside of epistemology, consider beauty and its proper appreciation. Appreciating
beauty is good because beauty is good. But that `because' signals no instrumental
explanation: appreciating beauty does not reliably cause more beauty to exist, nor is it
the product of anything beauty-conducive. How is this type of value derivation relevant
to epistemology? On my picture, there are certain ways of placing value on accuracy
in thought that are manifested by rational belief, justiﬁed belief, and knowledge. These
forms of belief are epistemically good because they manifest ways of placing value on
accuracy in thought, and the ways of placing value on accuracy in thought are, in turn,
epistemically good because accuracy is epistemically good. But like the `because' in
the earlier example, these are not purely instrumental `because's. This makes a crucial
diﬀerence, I argue, because this form of value derivation is immune from swamping by
the presence of the more fundamental value (unlike instrumental derivation).
In Chapter 5 (Rationality and Fundamental Epistemic Value), I deepen the ob-
jection to the instrumentalist model of epistemic value by arguing that there is no
satisfactory instrumentalist explanation of the worth of epistemic rationality or rational
beliefs. Instrumentalists must deny that epistemic rationality necessarily has any value
from the epistemic point of view. Extending the arguments from Chapter 4, I argue
5that this is really a symptom of a more general problem, and that instrumentalists can-
not even explain the epistemic value of forms of belief (e.g., justiﬁed belief) that are
instrumentally connected to truth! Using the account developed in Chapter 4, I then
show that we can explain why rationality has necessary rather than merely contingent
epistemic value if we reject the instrumentalist model. I conclude with some broader
morals about what is really at stake in the dispute between reliabilists and internalists
in epistemology: the dispute does not, as is almost universally believed, boil down to
a dispute about the place of truth in epistemology. Internalists can also secure a truth
connection just not an instrumental one.
6Chapter 1
Reasons and the Metaphysics of Epistemology
Overview
On one familiar tradition in epistemology, reasons ﬁgure centrally in the analysis of
epistemic justiﬁcation. On the most ambitious version of this traditional view, justiﬁed
belief is nothing over and above belief for all-things-considered good epistemic reasons.
In recent years, this reasons-based view has met with considerable opposition. Some
opponents deny that reasons are necessary for justiﬁcation. Others deny that belief
for all-things-considered good reasons is suﬃcient for justiﬁed belief. In this paper, I
answer these lines of opposition to reasons-based views, though in an untraditional way.
I show how insights from recent meta-ethical literature on reasons can secure reasons-
based views from the opposition, albeit in a novel externalist form. I also show that
a common division of labor in this literature eliminates the apparent rivalry between
reasons-based views and reliabilist views, revealing them to operate at diﬀerent levels
of meta-normative analysis. Along the way, I uncover two neglected ways in which
reliabilist ideas can underpin the traditional viewviz., in analyzing (i) the relation of
possession that one must bear to reasons to get justiﬁed, and (ii) the relation of believing
something because one has a good reason, which matters for doxastic justiﬁcation. These
observations, I argue, resolve other worries.
1.1 The Reasonable Picture
What role should reasons play in the analysis of epistemic justiﬁcation? According to
a traditional view that I will call the Reasonable Picture (RP" for short), they should
play a prominent role. On the most ambitious version of this traditional view, justiﬁed
7belief is nothing over and above belief for all-things-considered good reasons.1 In recent
years, this reasons-based view has encountered considerable opposition, largely from a
sect of externalists I'll label the Resistance. Some members of the Resistance insist that
reasons are unnecessary for justiﬁed belief. Others maintain that belief for all-things-
considered good reasons is insuﬃcient for justiﬁed belief. If they were right, reasons
would do little to illuminate the essence of epistemic justiﬁcation.
But I think they are wrong, and the aim of this paper is to oﬀer a new line of response
to their doubts. The Resistance, I'll argue, crucially overlooks some attractive views
about reasons that have become common in new literature on reasons and rationality
outside of epistemology. They also crucially neglect the fact that friends of RP can
understand both the possession of good reasons and the type of basing that is necessary
for doxastic justiﬁcation as achievements that essentially manifest reliable cognitive
ability.2 If friends of RP invoke reliable cognitive abilities in these ways, they can
undermine key sources of opposition to their view. Admittedly, some members of the
Resistance might take this reply to show that reasons are epiphenomenal in the analysis
of justiﬁcation: reliable cognitive abilities are what really matter, they might say. But
that reply is compelling, I will argue, only if we conﬂate two levels of meta-normative
1Throughout this paper, I will take all-things-considered good reasons for belief to be good reasons
that are not defeated by reasons for other doxastic attitudes (disbelief and suspension), in either the
undercutting or the rebutting way. Following Schroeder (2012) and (Ms), I take reasons to suspend
judgment on whether P to be undercutting defeaters for any reasons that might have counted in favor
of believing that P. As a result, one cannot, as I am using the term, have all-things-considered good
reasons to believe that P if one isn't permitted to judge that P; for if one isn't permitted to judge
that P, one has a conclusive reason to suspend judgment. For this reason, I will also use the term
all-things-considered good reason" interchangeably with suﬃcient reason".
2Here and throughout the paper, I intend the underlying suggestion to be neutral with respect
to diﬀerent versions of reliabilism. I don't mean to place overwhelming weight on an ability-based
formulation, though I do ﬁnd it attractive. The point to be defended is the more abstract one that
there are unanticipated places for reliabilist themes to enter into a reasons-based picture of justiﬁcation
without any sacriﬁce or compromisespeciﬁcally, in the analysis of possession and the analysis of what
it is to believe something because one has a good reason. I am perfectly open to stating everything in
the classic process-based reliabilist framework of Goldman (1979), and use his formulations at various
points. And at certain points, I will also allude to reliable faculties (as they appear, say, in the theories
of Sosa (1991) or Plantinga (1993)) and reliable indicators (as they appear, say, in Alston (1988)). But
I would hope that the point made by this paper is fully general, and that I'm revealing new places
where reliabilist ideas from any particular reliabilist tradition can ﬁgure into a reasons-based account
of justiﬁcation. Of course, that is a substantive claim and one try to argue that my view is only really
capable of accommodating themes from certain reliabilist traditions, to the (misguided) exclusion of
others. But in thinking things through so far, I've discovered no reason to think that the arguments in
what follows are limited to any particular form of reliabilism.
8analysis. Once separated, we see that reasons-ﬁrst epistemology and reliabilism are not
only consistent, but conﬂict no more than the buck-passing account of value conﬂicts
with hedonism.
Before defending these claims, I want to say a bit more about why I am interested in
RP and why it is a signiﬁcant doctrine. Here I will be departing from the concerns that
have often moved epistemologists to embrace RP, and following a new wave of writers
in the meta-ethical literature on reasons and rationality. So, while RP is a traditional
view, I propose to reframe it and defend it in an untraditional wayso much the better,
I will maintain.
The Signiﬁcance of RP: A New Take. As I see it, RP is best viewed as a contribution to
a larger project that has become popular in recent literature on the nature of normativ-
ityviz., the Reasons First project. The aim of this project is to simplify the internal
structure of the normative, by reducing all normative facts to facts about reasons. The
project got started in meta-ethics with the work of people like T. M. Scanlon and Derek
Parﬁt.3 It has made its way into epistemology via the eﬀorts of Mark Schroeder.4 The
project in epistemology consists in trying to reduce all epistemically normative facts to
facts about good epistemic reasons. This project is consistent, of course, with the idea
that normativity can be naturalized. Indeed, it is an orthogonal project: one could think
that reasons are the most fundamental units of normativity while being a naturalist or a
nonnaturalist. And in meta-ethics at least, both sides are represented: Reasons-Firsters
include hardcore naturalists like Schroeder and hardcore nonnaturalists like Parﬁt.
Although the project is neutral on that issue, it remains signiﬁcant. Often we are
interested in considering the internal structure of a domain and asking: What are the
basic elements of the domain? How can other elements be reduced to them?" Some
major issues in the philosophy of mind have this form. Consider discussions about
whether phenomenal states reduce to intentional states, or about whether intentionality
is the mark of the mental; and consider narrower questions, like whether intentions
3See Scanlon (1998) and Parﬁt (2001, 2011).
4See Schroeder (2007, 2008, 2011).
9reduce to belief-desire pairs. The question of whether reasons ground justiﬁcation is
interesting in the same way that these questions are interesting.
Because many epistemologists have been interested in how the epistemic is grounded
in the non-epistemic, they might take RP to be a trivial doctrine. But this would be a
mistake. It would be like thinking that the view that intentions reduce to belief-desire
pairs is trivial because it does not help us to understand how the mental reduces to the
non-mental. Questions of fundamentality within domains are real questions worthy of
focus in their own right.
So, following the meta-ethicists, we should distinguish two questions:
(Q1) What are the most basic units of normativity and how are other normative
facts grounded in facts about these units?
(Q2) How is the normative grounded in the non-normative?
We can clearly address the question What is justiﬁed belief?" in two compatible ways
in line with this distinction.5 If we address that question as part of the larger project of
answering Q1, RP makes an important contribution. Q1 attracts great interest among
a wide array of theorists interested in the nature of normativity. Many of these theorists
are not epistemologists. But epistemologists are missing out.
So, RP is a signiﬁcant doctrine. Nevertheless, one might be left wondering why RP
is supposed to be attractive. Why think that reasons are prior to justiﬁcation rather
than vice versa? Here is one major reason. Being justiﬁed, like being permitted, is
in the ﬁrst instance an overall or all-things-considered status. Reasons, on the other
hand, are contributory.6 They are pro tanto items with weights that can be balanced.
If the contributory is generally more fundamental than the overall, reasons will be more
fundamental than justiﬁcation. Of course, this assumes that reasons modally co-travel
with justiﬁcation. But here I think common sense supports RP: it is a truism that good
5As I will note again toward the end of the paper, Goldman (1979) was explicitly aware of this
distinction from the very ﬁrst page. But the distinction has come to be neglected in the epistemological
literature, and this has caused theorists to see rivalries where there needn't be any.
6The overall vs. contributory contrast and terminology comes from Dancy (2004).
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reasons are necessary for justiﬁed belief. To be sure, the Resistance disagrees and I will
defend the truism from their objections. But the truism has an intuitive upper hand.
Does the argument work, though? Well, epistemologists have introduced the term
`prima facie justiﬁcation' to refer to something contributory, and this might seem to
undermine the argument. Indeed, that term is now entrenched. But that term has
always looked stipulative, like W. D. Ross's term `prima facie duty'. At least Ross
(1930: 20) was honest:
[T]he phrase `prima facie duty' must be apologized for, since it suggests that what
we are speaking of is a certain kind of duty, whereas it is in fact not a kind of
duty, but something related in a certain way to duty. Strictly speaking, what we
want is not a phrase in which `duty' is qualiﬁed by an adjective, but a separate
noun.
The separate noun that slipped Ross's mind was `reason'. Similar thoughts extend to
`prima facie justiﬁcation'. The referent of this expression plausibly just is a norma-
tive reason or set of reasons. To agree that prima facie justiﬁcation is more basic than
justiﬁcation proper is then to agree that reasons are more basic than justiﬁcation proper.
The Neutrality of RP. Why bother explaining why I think RP is signiﬁcant? Partly
because I want to distance myself from common ways of understanding its signiﬁcance.
RP is often associated with other views in epistemology, but I think that RP can and
should be separated from these views. Indeed, once we see that RP is neutral on many
important issues in epistemology, one might naturally wonder why we should care about
it. Hence the foregoing context.
On what familiar epistemological issues is RP neutral? First of all, RP is consistent
with foundationalism. Foundationalists only claim that there is a set of non-inferentially
justiﬁed beliefs from which all of our other beliefs derive their justiﬁcation. We should
not assume that all good epistemic reasons are inferential justiﬁers. Some reasons might
be immediate justiﬁers (e.g., experience-given reasons). A foundationalist can embrace
RP if she is willing to claim that all non-inferentially justiﬁed beliefs are justiﬁed by
reasons of this immediate sort. Certain examples of non-inferentially justiﬁed beliefs
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raise worries for RP, as we will see. But the minimal foundationalist thesis is consistent
with RP.
Secondly, RP is not an essentially internalist thesis for four reasons:
i. One can understand the ontology of good epistemic reasons in externalist ways.
One can, for instance, view reasons as facts and allow these to include extra-mental
facts.7
ii. One can understand the quality of epistemic reasons in externalist ways. One
can, for instance, hold that what makes a consideration R a good epistemic reason
to believe P is that R-type considerations are reliable indicators of the truth of
P-type propositions.8
iii. One can understand the relation of possession that we must bear to reasons
to be poised to receive justiﬁcation from them in externalist ways. One might, for
instance, hold that factive mental states like seeing that R are ways to possess R
as a reason.9
iv. One can understand what it takes to believe that P because one has good
reasons in externalist ways. One might hold that one can only believe that P
because one has good reasons to believe P if one manifests certain reliable cognitive
abilities.10
Finally, RP is not an essentially evidentialist thesis for two reasons. On the one hand,
RP speaks only of good epistemic reasons. It is an open question whether all good
epistemic reasons are evidence. While the clearest examples are pieces of evidence,
there might be other sorts of good epistemic reasons (indeed, I suspect this is true).11
7Cf. Dancy (2000).
8Cf. Alston (1988).
9Cf. McDowell (1995) and Pritchard (2012).
10Reliabilists (e.g., Goldman (2012)) have proposed accounts of proper basing in this spirit. But the
claim being made here is a stronger one, concerning what I take to be the ordinary notion of believing
something because one has a good reason rather than the (arguably) technical notion of proper basing.
11See Schroeder (2012) for arguments.
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On the other hand, evidentialism is often associated with mentalism about evidence
and internalism about justiﬁcation. Conee and Feldman are clear that mentalism is a
further thesis and that the core evidentialist thesis doesn't entail internalism. But many
assume otherwise. This seems to me as mistaken as assuming that consequentialism is
essentially hedonistic just because the fountainhead consequentialists held a hedonistic
version. But I don't want to quibble: what matters is that RP abstracts away from
Conee and Feldman's views about the ontology and quality of good reasons just like
the minimal consequentialist thesis abstracts away from Bentham's views about good
consequences.
The Plan. With these clariﬁcations out of the way, here is the plan. Because I am
defending RP with the help of insights from the meta-ethical literature, I will begin
in 2 by introducing some common distinctions and points from that literature that
will matter throughout the paper. In 3, I turn to address some arguments against the
necessity of reasons for justiﬁcation (propositional or doxastic). In 4, I address some
arguments against the thought that believing something because one has good reasons is
suﬃcient for doxastic justiﬁcation. I address the reply that reasons are epiphenomenal
in the analysis of justiﬁcation in 5. I draw things to a close in 6, explaining how
my positive view diﬀers from recent syntheses of evidentialism and reliabilism, and
answering a few remaining objections to RP.
1.2 Reasons: Some Ontology and Ideology
1.2.1 Normative Reasons and the Relation of Possession
In the broader literature on reasons and rationality, it is widely appreciated that the
concept of a reason can be used in importantly diﬀerent ways.12 The most crucial use for
the purpose of assessing RP is the normative use. Normative reasons are considerations
12I do not mean this to be incompatible with Dancy (2000: 2)'s claim that there are not really
diﬀerent kinds of reasons but rather diﬀerent questions that the concept of a reason can be used to
answer. I agree with Dancy that in good cases, motivating and normative reasons can coincide, which
I take to be the primary reason why he opposes the thought that there are diﬀerent kinds of reasons.
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that count in favor of actions and attitudes. In both ethics and epistemology, normative
reasons divide into two categories. Some are not essentially possessed by anyone. Call
these objective normative reasons. Undiscovered evidence E for some hypothesis H is an
example of an objective epistemic reason. Objective normative reasons alone justify no
attitudes or actsat least not in the way that interests epistemologists. Only normative
reasons that we possess can justify in that way. Call these reasons possessed normative
reasons.
Some view possessed normative reasons as a species of objective reasons: namely,
the ones to which we bear the relation of possession. Others reject this view and see
the reasons that bear on justiﬁcation as belonging to an irreducibly distinct category.13
I favor the ﬁrst view, and I would distinguish between possessed objective reasons and
merely apparent normative reasons. But nothing in this paper will hang on this.
The nature of possession matters greatly for the status of RP. Indeed, I will try to
show that some of the main concerns of the Resistance can be resolved by gaining a
better understanding of this relation. Of course, there is pressure in the other direction.
One might suspect that the relation of possession must be understood in epistemically
normative terms, and on this basis reject RP. After all, one might ﬁnd it implausible
that merely believing that P can enable one to possess P as a good reason to believe
other things.14 If so, one might worry that possession must be understood in terms of
justiﬁed belief. If this worry were apt, RP would be circular.15
But circularity is not inevitable. One could appeal to normative concepts more
primitive than the concept of justiﬁcatione.g., ones drawn from virtue epistemology,
such as competence. Although this view suggests that there is a more basic kind of
epistemic normativity that enables reasons to do their justifying work, this conclusion
alone does not harm RP. Defenders of RP can ground justiﬁcation in possessed reasons
and then ground possessed reasons in facts about competence.
13See Schroeder (2008) for the second view. See Lord (2010) for a defense of the ﬁrst view.
14Schroeder (2011) defends the low bar view and argues that its seemingly implausible consequences
can be explained away by a defeat strategy. I will mention some doubts about this in the next section.
15For a circularity worry in this spirit, see Goldman (2011).
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Another possibility is to appeal to non-normative factors to ground the possession
relation. We can do this without lowering the bar on possession to mere belief. For
example, we might directly appeal to broadly reliabilist ideas to explain the conditions
under which certain mental states enable us to possess normative reasons. I do this
in 3, and this is one crucial move that I will be making to address the Resistance.
There are two important conditions on possession that I analyze reliabilistically: access
and sensitivity to the favoring relation between the reason and the relevant doxastic
attitude.16 Access gets analyzed in terms of apt seemings and sensitivity in terms of apt
treatings of considerations like objective reasons with certain favoring proﬁles. Aptness
in both cases is deﬁned in terms of manifestations of certain cognitive abilities.
We will get clearer on the details in 3. For now, note that we are not forced
to analyze possession in normative terms even if we dislike low bars on possession.
The account I develop is not the only option. Another option would be to pursue a
McDowellian view on which factive but non-doxastic mental states like seeing that P,
remembering that P, intuiting that P, etc., are the pathways to possession.17 One could
also adopt a Williamsonian view on which knowledge is a mental state and possession
gets analyzed in terms of knowledge. Ambitious knowledge-ﬁrsters will certainly claim
to avoid circularity.
1.2.2 The Ontology of Normative Reasons
Another important issue for the status of RP is the ontology of normative reasons. In
contemporary meta-ethics, it is common to deny that normative reasons are mental
states. The preferred view is that objective normative reasons are facts and possessed
normative reasons are facts or apparent facts to which we stand in partly mental rela-
tions. I will call this view factualism, but for simplicity count as factualist a view on
which possessed normative reasons can be merely apparent facts (like Schroeder (2008)'s
16By `sensitivity', I don't mean anything that can be captured by a Nozickian counterfactual.
As we will see in 3, I mean something dispositional. Dispositions are not analyzable in terms of
counterfactuals.
17See McDowell (2002) for arguments that seeing that P is non-doxastic and can precede knowledge.
Bernecker (2007) makes the same points about remembering that P.
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view).
The facts that constitute normative reasons are often extra-mental, though facts
about one's mental life can be normative reasons. The reasons that support introspective
beliefs, for example, are mental facts. And although the facts we perceive can constitute
reasons for perceptual beliefs, they are not the only reasons for perceptual beliefs. In a
happy world, perceptual appearances are reliable indicators of reality. In such a world,
the fact that things perceptually appear some way is an objective reason to believe
things are that way.
I favor factualism. It is, I believe, crucial for defending RP. Epistemologists often
spurn factualismbut for unconvincing reasons. Let's correct some misconceptions.
Factualism about normative reasons does not make justiﬁcation factive.18 This is so
even if one requires possessed normative reasons to be real rather than possibly merely
apparent facts. One might make a competent inductive inference from nothing but facts
and arrive at falsehood. A strong factualist view only requires the ultimate inputs to
justiﬁed inferences to be facts, not the outputs. Since the view does not entail that
mental facts cannot be good reasons, it also allows for false justiﬁed perceptual beliefs.
Factualism by itself has no bad implications about demon worlds even if it takes the
strong form. It might have bad implications if one adds further commitmentse.g., if
one holds that F is a good reason to believe P only if F-type facts are reliable indicators
of P-type facts or if one thinks that only extra-mental facts can be normative reasons.
But charitably deﬁned, factualism entails neither claim. Indeed, no one has ever believed
the second claim, which makes obvious nonsense of introspective justiﬁcation. Anyway,
remember that some proponents of the ontology at issue allow possessed normative
reasons to include merely apparent facts. These people face no prima facie worries
here.
Another objection to the factualist ontology is that normative reasons that are
merely out there are irrelevant to justiﬁcation. The response is (i) to agree that
normative reasons must be possessed to justify and (ii) to agree that mental states help
18Justiﬁcation for believing P is factive in the sense I have in mind here when it entails that P.
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us to possess (or provide) these reasons, but (iii) to deny that mental states are the
reasons. Williamson (2000: 197) put it well: Experiences provide evidence; they do not
consist of propositions. So much is obvious. But to provide something is not to consist
of it.
We can view mental states as things that help us to possess and reason with norma-
tive reasons, while viewing the normative reasons that are possessed as facts or apparent
facts. This picture secures the advantages of factualism while allowing us to honor the
role of mental states in providing reasons and in good reasoning.
1.2.3 Motivating Reasons
The concept of a reason can be used to pick out some phenomena that are not essen-
tially normative. Explanatory reasons provide one example. An explanatory reason
for someone's thinking or acting in some way is a factor that explains why this person
thinks or acts in this way. Not all the factors that explain why we act or think are the
reasons for which we think or act: the fact that someone is depressed might explain
why this person tends to draw certain pessimistic conclusions, but it would be unusual
for someone to have as their reason for drawing these pessimistic conclusions the fact
that they are depressed.
This brings out a second use of the concept of a reason that is not essentially nor-
mative. This second use will matter more for our discussion of RP. Motivating reasons
are the reasons that help to explain why people think or act by being the reasons for
which they think or act. Motivating reasons are not essentially good reasons: we often
act and think for bad ones. In using the term `motivating' in the epistemic domain, I
don't assume doxastic voluntarism. A motivating epistemic reason is just a reason for
which someone thinks. Still, to save words and avoid misunderstanding, I will often use
the term `rationale'.
Many meta-ethicists view rationales as apparent facts or propositions rather than
mental states.19 This view receives support from linguistic phenomenology. We often
19See Dancy (2000) for the apparent facts view; see Lord (2008) for a defense of the propositional
view.
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say things like: Her rationale for being an atheist is that there is unnecessary suﬀering
or His rationale for going to the party is that there is dancing. The view also receives
support from the phenomenology of motivation: we rarely navel-gaze at our mental
states when reasoning. Another source of support is the need to understand how we
could act for good reasons. In ethics, good reasons routinely include facts about the
world. If we can act for these good reasons, it arguably must be possible for them to be
our motivating reasons.20
I favor this non-statist view, though I am neutral about which version is correct.
Sometimes I will talk as if the propositional version is correct but only for linguistic
ease.
Resistance to this view tends to rest on misunderstandings or uncharitable interpre-
tations. Clearly, mental states matter for motivation. But the non-statist view does
not say otherwise. By being in certain mental states, certain considerations become our
rationales. But our rationales are not themselves mental states: mental states enable
diﬀerent considerations to be our rationales. This is not to deny that our rationales can
be considerations about our mental states. That is possible, especially in epistemology.
Sometimes it might look circular to think of one's rationale for belief as a proposition
or apparent fact. But this rests on a misunderstanding. Notice that it is not circular
to have as one's reason for believing that one is in pain the sheer fact that one is in
pain. That fact is a great reason to believe that one is in painnone better! Circularity
is a property of inferences, and not all rationales are inferential. Sometimes rationales
are direct ones on which our beliefs are based non-inferentially. When we are directly
acquainted with certain facts, for example, they can serve as direct rationales. This
happens in the pain case. There is no circularity there, since there is no inference.21
20See Dancy (2000) for this argument. Lord (2008) and Turri (2009) oﬀer some responses.
21This answers one of Turri (2009)'s objections to non-statism. Turri also raises a problem from
reasons for withholding. But Turri does not notice some options. He considers a case where Nevil
withholds on whether there is unnecessary suﬀering in the world, believes that God exists only if there
is not, and so withholds on whether God exists. What is Nevil's reason for the second instance of
withholding on the non-statist view? Turri thinks the non-statist must say it includes <that there
is unnecessary suﬀering in the world>. This makes Nevil look irrational. But non-statists are not
forced to say this. The obvious thing to say is that Nevil's ultimate rationale for withholding is <that
the evidence he possesses for thinking that there is unnecessary suﬀering in the world is insuﬃcient>.
This is just another proposition or apparent fact. If Nevil is rational, this fact is surely the one that
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Rationales matter for doxastic justiﬁcation. To get doxastically justiﬁed, it is not
enough that one possesses good reasons: one must also believe what one believes because
one has these good reasons. For that to happen, rationales must enter the picture. How
so?
Virtually everyone assumes that the following is the whole story:
(Coincident Rationale) S believes that P because S has a good epistemic reason
to believe that P iﬀ (i) S has a rationale r for believing that P and (ii) r happens
to correspond to a good epistemic reason that there is for S to believe that P.
It is not the whole story. Believing something because you have a good reason is an
achievement. If Coincident Rationale were the whole story, believing something because
you have a good reason would be no achievement. You could pull it oﬀ by incompetent
luck, by accidentally landing on a rationale that happens to coincide with a good reason.
But it isn't so easy. To believe something because you have a good reason, the fact that
your reason is a good reason must help to explain why you believe as you do. For that
fact to play that explanatory role, it must trigger certain reliable cognitive abilities of
yours.22
As we will see, the Resistance crucially assumes Coincident Rationale and uses ex-
amples of incompetent basing against RP's account of doxastic justiﬁcation. But their
examples of incompetent basing undermine Coincident Rationale, not RP. I defend this
verdict in 4 and a similar verdict about possession in 3.
motivates Nevil's ﬁrst instance of withholding! There is no reason why a non-statist cannot appeal to
this fact unless the view is deﬁned uncharitably.
22Again, reliabilists such as Goldman (2012) have recommended similar accounts of what they call
proper basing. But the claim being made here is a stronger claim that, if true, would show that RP does
not need to be modiﬁed at all. If one could only appeal to proper basing, RP could not be vindicated
in its pure form. But I'm claiming that it can be vindicated in that form, so long as the defender of RP
has the correct account of believing something because one has a good reason. Or, equivalently, I'm
claiming that there is no diﬀerence between believing something because you have a good reason and
proper basingwhich I take to be an interesting claim that reveals a new avenue for friends of RP.
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1.3 Are Reasons Necessary for Justiﬁed Belief?
Let's turn to consider the arguments of the Resistance, beginning with some arguments
against the necessity of reasons for epistemic justiﬁcation (propositional and doxastic).
The arguments have a common aim. They try to show that certain examples of non-
inferentially justiﬁed belief cannot be understood as RP suggests. In reply, I will make
the following points. Rather than showing that we can have justiﬁed beliefs without
good reasons, these examples reinforce (i) the virtues of a factualist ontology of reasons
and (ii) the need for a better view about the relation of possession, which I will provide.
Following Sosa (2007), I will introduce this worry with basic a priori beliefs. After
sketching my reply, I will oﬀer a theory about the relation of possession that gets the
right verdict in non-inferential cases, and generalize the view to inferential cases. Having
done this, I'll show how the same points address Lyons (2009a)'s version of the worry.
1.3.1 Examples against the Necessity of Reasons: Obvious Math
Consider simple arithmetic beliefs, like your belief that the proposition <1 + 1 = 2> is
true.23 Plausibly, your belief is non-inferentially justiﬁed.
What reason justiﬁes your belief? Some believe that intuition can provide reasons
for such a priori beliefs. But what reason does intuition provide in our case, given the
distinction between providing and being a reason? Just the introspective fact that one
has the intuition? If that fact is the candidate, members of the Resistance will raise two
objections.
To see the ﬁrst objection, note that members of the Resistance are often reductionists
about intuitions and other seemings, taking them to consist in epistemically evaluable
states. Ernest Sosa, for example, argues that intuitions are just a species of attractions
to assent.24 The mere fact that one is attracted assent to <P> is not a serious reason
to believe <P>. People with no mathematical competence might ﬁnd obvious" many
23Only because the diﬀerence will now prove crucial, I will use expressions like `<P>' for propositions
and expressions like `the (apparent) fact that P' for their (apparent) truth-makers.
24See Sosa (2007: Ch.3).
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abstruse mathematical truths that they aren't justiﬁed in believing. They may also be
self-deceived or introspectively incompetent, unable to notice the ﬁrst-order incompe-
tence that explains why they are unjustiﬁed. By a sheer ﬂuke, they may land on only
truths. If so, they will possess no defeaters. By hypothesis, they lack the second-order
competence to see their ﬁrst-order incompetence. But they are also lucky, landing by
chance on truths.25
Might one appeal to unpossessed objective defeaters to explain away the intuitions?
Not plausibly. There can be unpossessed objective defeaters for perfectly justiﬁed beliefs
(e.g., in many Gettier cases), but our cases are not remotely like these cases. It is
plausible in our cases that doxastic justiﬁcation is lacking, and implausible that it is
lacking in standard cases involving unpossessed defeating evidence.
There is a second objection: viewing the relevant reasons as introspective facts
about our intuitions is an overintellectualization. If the apparent fact that P is one's
rationale for believing that Q, one plausibly needs the concepts necessary to grasp the
proposition <P>. Yet young children can justiﬁedly believe that 1 + 1 = 2 without
having the concept of an intuition or being in a position to engage in any second-order
reﬂection.
It is true that children may believe that 1 + 1 = 2 because it strikes them as intuitively
obvious. But that `because' does not signal that this introspective fact is their rationale.
By comparison, if one infers <P> from <Q>, one will believe <P> because one believes
<Q>. But one's rationale for believing <P> is <Q>, not <I believe that Q>. Belief in
<Q> simply enables <Q> to serve as one's rationale for believing <P>. Similar points
apply to the intuition that P. This is clear with children, who lack the ability to exploit
the proposition that they intuit that P as a rationale.
So, the Resistance may doubt on other grounds that the justifying reason is that one
has the intuition. Yet, the Resistance will ask, if this isn't the reason, what is it? Is
it just the sheer fact that 1 + 1 = 2 which makes true the proposition <1 + 1 = 2>?
25This is a problem for Schroeder (2011)'s defense of a low bar on possessing reasons. Schroeder is
right that our intuitions about whether someone has no reason are unreliable. He is also right that
an appeal to defeat can often explain away these intuitions. But the strategy is harder to defend in
extended cases involving both ﬁrst-order incompetence and higher-order competence.
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Surely, they will insist, that isn't right. One can be attracted to treat any fact as given
if one is suﬃciently incompetent. And wouldn't it be circular to have as one's reason
for believing <1 + 1 = 2> the sheer fact that 1 + 1 = 2? Discarding the idea, the
Resistance spurns RP.
1.3.2 The Slip
This conclusion is hasty. First, recall that we can sometimes be justiﬁed in believing
<P> on the basis of the clear fact that makes <P> true. One can be justiﬁed in
believing that one is in pain on the basis of the clear fact that one is in pain. There
is no circularity here. It would be circular if one tried to infer <I am in pain> from
<I am in pain>. But our case is non-inferential. The proper response to the relevant
reason is not an inferential response. Since circularity is a property of inferences, it is
wrong to dismiss as circular this case of believing that P on the basis of the fact that
makes P true.
The proper conclusion to draw is that we can sometimes possess the sheer fact that
P as a direct license to believe the proposition that this sheer fact makes true.26 So,
why not apply this model in the basic intuitive case, and say that in virtue of reliable
intuition (or a reliable intuitive process), one can possess the sheer fact that 1 + 1 = 2
as a reason to believe what this fact makes true?27
I cannot see why not. Sure, not just any old intuition can put us into contact with
facts so as to enable these facts to serve as direct licenses to believe what they make
true. One can incompetently ﬁnd anything intuitive. But this reveals nothing special
about the case of intuition. Similar points apply even to introspection. Consider:
(FRED) Fred contemplates his visual ﬁeld and the number of ﬂoaters in it. He
has weak subitizing ability and cannot reliably discriminate more than 4 ﬂoaters
without long focus. Yet he is self-deceived, fancying himself like Rain Man. Faced
26Parallel remarks hold for apparent facts, which are apparent truth-makers.
27Again, I'm hoping the core point here to be neutral between the process reliabilist themes of
Goldman (1979), the faculty reliabilist themes of Sosa (1991), the virtue reliabilist themes of Greco
(1999) and Sosa (2007), and other reliabilist themes. I don't see a strong reason to think that the point
couldn't equally well be hosted by any of these traditions.
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now with 16 ﬂoaters in his visual ﬁeld, he ﬁnds himself attracted to assent to the
correct answer by incompetent luck, and then judges that there are 16.
Fred's belief is unjustiﬁedboth propositionally and doxastically. Why? Because he
lacks certain discriminatory abilities.28 So, not even all conscious mental facts can serve
as non-inferential licenses without the help of ability. Yet the no reasons needed con-
clusion is implausible here. Imagine Sally, a more discriminating subject who glimpses
the fact that there are 16 ﬂoaters in her visual ﬁeld and then judges that there are
16. That fact is clearly relevant to why her judgment is justiﬁed. The key is just that
Sally, unlike Fred, possesses that fact as a non-inferential reason in virtue of her greater
abilities.
We can say the same things in the intuitive case. One can possess intuitively obvious
facts as direct licenses to believe what they make true when the underlying intuitions
manifest cognitive ability. Reasons are hardly unnecessary. In happy introspective and
intuitive cases, we have the best reason we could possibly have by exercising cognitive
ability!
1.3.3 Possession: An Achievement
What we learn is that possessing normative reasons is itself an achievement. It is
the achievement of getting reasons in one's grip for justifying use in virtue of certain
cognitive abilities. This recommends a bi-level picture that grounds non-inferential
justiﬁcation in possessed non-inferential reasons and the possession of such reasons in
manifestations of cognitive ability by the attractions to assent that constitute intuitive
and other seemings.29 I will make some revisions, but we can start with:
28Goldman (1976), of course, invoked such abilities in his classic relevant alternatives account of
perceptual knowledge. Here I'm suggesting that the usefulness of the notion extends to one's account
of justiﬁcation by way of one's account of reason-possession. What's original here is not, of course,
the appeal to discriminatory abilities period in an account of justiﬁcation (which one can trace back
to Goldman, and ﬁnd in current forms of virtue epistemology such as Greco (2009)'s view), but rather
the thought that these abilities should play an essential role in our account of possession. The original
claim is that there is already a natural place within a reasons-based frameworknamely, the crucial
notion of possessionwhere we should invoke these reliabilist themes and thereby bring them into our
account of justiﬁcation.
29I will assume with Sosa (2007) that attractions to assent are the things to which seemings reduce.
But all that matters is that we have some reductionist picture of seemings that entails that seemings
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(L1) S is non-inferentially propositionally justiﬁed in believing <P> iﬀ S possesses
some (apparent) fact F as a non-inferential reason to believe <P> and no defeating
reasons, and S is non-inferentially doxastically justiﬁed in believing <P> iﬀ S
believes <P> because S has that good non-inferential reason and no defeating
reasons.
(L2) S possesses F as a good non-inferential reason to believe <P> iﬀ
(i) F is a good epistemic reason to believe <P>,
(ii) F makes it non-doxastically seem to S that <P>, and by no inferential route,
(iii) the attraction to assent that constitutes the seeming in (ii) manifests a dispo-
sition of S's to be attracted to assent non-inferentially to <P>-type propositions
upon considering them only if they are true.
I'll call dispositions like the one in (iii) `competences', but this is a useful term of art for
something non-normativethough it is something epistemically good, like true belief.
To avoid misunderstandings, mark two facts. First, competences can be fallible. A
competence to φ does not give one the ability to infallibly φ. This doesn't mean that
the competence is a competence to do something weaker than φ-ing. It just means that
it is a less than infallible competence to φ. So, if one has the disposition in (iii), it does
not follow that one will infallibly be attracted to assent only to truths.
Second, there is a competence/performance distinction. Competences are disposi-
tions. Like other dispositions, there is a set of favorable conditions for their manifesta-
tion. Unfavorable conditions do not remove competence. An archer in a hurricane isn't
deprived of her archery skill. Competences can even be displayedthough not strictly
manifestedin abnormal conditions, like cars in a display room. So, while competences
are reliable in favorable conditions, they are not reliable period.30
are epistemically evaluable states. So, the reader should not think I place too much weight on the
attractions ideology.
30See Sosa (2010) for discussions of the metaphysics of competence, and Sosa (1992, 1993) for classic
discussions of how the second point addresses the new evil demon problem.
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The bi-level picture of non-inferential justiﬁcation is general, applying to perceptual
and introspective cases as well as intuitive cases. It leaves open how exactly we are to
understand cases of false non-inferentially justiﬁed belief. Here one could view F as a
real fact but not the fact that makes <P> true. If so, one ends up with a Williamsonian
model on which the relevant reasons diﬀer in good and bad cases. But one could instead
view F as a merely apparent fact and hold the weaker version of factualism.
1.3.4 The Achievement in More Detail: Two Kinds of Competence
We do not yet have a general account of possessing a good reason R to believe <P>. We
want an account that applies to inferential cases. To extend the account to these cases,
we must distinguish two achievements: the achievement of access to reasons and the
achievement of sensitivity to the favoring relations between reasons and beliefs. Both
are generally necessary, but they are easier to separate in inferential cases.
Consider an inferential case to ﬁx ideas. Suppose <P> follows deductively from
<Q> and <R>. The existence of this deductive relation ensures that the truth of <Q>
and <R> is an objective reason to believe <P>. Clearly, the mere existence of this
objective reason doesn't justify anyone in believing <P>. To be justiﬁed in believing
<P>, one must also possess this objective reason to believe <P>. So, what does this
involve?
Access as Apt Seeming
Plausibly, part of it is having access to the apparent facts that Q and that R. What is
access? We can give a direct account of access in terms of seemings and cognitive ability.
Seemings and the attractions to assent that constitute them can display a familiar trio
of properties. We can say that a subject's attraction to assent to <P> is
right, if <P> is true,
competent, if the attraction manifests a disposition of the subject's to be attracted
to assent to propositions of some kind only if they are true,31 and
31My earlier notes about fallibility and the competence/performance distinction extend here.
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apt, if the attraction is right because competent.
With this pattern in mind, we can understand accessing a fact as hosting an apt seeming
that the fact obtainsi.e., an apt attraction to assent to the proposition made true by
the fact. Of course, to require a subject in possession of R to be currently accessing R
is too demanding. We should only demand that the subject be in a position to access
R. What does `in a position' mean? This is vague, but so is the notion of possessing a
reason and the notion of propositional justiﬁcation. So this is no objection.
Some might object that the account is still too strong. Can we not possess merely
apparent facts as good epistemic reasons for belief? My own inclination is to say that
we just possess diﬀerent facts in these cases. But if one ﬁnds this intolerable, it is easy
to weaken the account. Just replace `apt' with `competent', and `fact' with `apparent
fact'.
Some might insist that we are conceding the failure of the Reasons First program.
Isn't the ideology from Sosa normative? If so, aren't we conceding that there are more
basic normative facts than facts about reasons? No. Competence and aptness can
be stipulatively deﬁned in non-normative terms, and so they are not really normative
notions.
We can now understand part of what is required for one to possess the relevant
objective reason in our inferential example. One must be poised to host an apt seeming
that Q and R if one considers <Q> and <R>or a competent seeming, if one prefers.
Sensitivity as Apt Treating
This is not all a subject needs to possess <Q> and <R> as good reasons to believe
<P>. Suppose that the proof of <P> from <Q> and <R> is arcane. Unless our
subject has godlike acumen, she will not have propositional justiﬁcation to believe <P>
simply in virtue of being aptly attracted to assent to <Q> and <R>. So, mere access
to facts that constitute objective reasons for belief isn't enough for possessing these
reasons for belief.
What else does possession require? A subject also must be sensitive to the favoring
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relation between the facts that Q and that R and the belief that P. What does such sen-
sitivity involve? Some might require that the subject be in a position to see that <Q>
and <R> constitute a deductive reason to believe <P>. But this is an overintellectual-
ization. To possess reasons, subjects don't need the concept of a reason. Even subjects
who have this concept do not need to deploy it to possess reasons. Some subjects are
competent enough to cleave reliably to good deductive patterns without representing
these patterns to themselves.
This observation recommends a better approach to understanding sensitivity to fa-
voring relations. It is possible to treat a consideration like a normative reason of some
kind without having or deploying the concept of a normative reason. To treat a con-
sideration like a normative reason of some kind is to be disposed to think in all or at
least most of the ways that would be appropriate if this consideration were a normative
reason of that kind.32 Like attractions to assent, treatings can display a familiar triadic
pattern of properties. A subject's treating a consideration R like a good reason of kind
K to believe <P> is
right, if R is a normative reason of kind K to believe <P>,
competent, if the treating manifests a disposition of the subject's to treat R-type
considerations like normative reasons of kind K to believe P-type propositions only
if they are normative reasons of kind K to believe P-type propositions, and
apt, if the treating is right because competent.
Another thing that our subject needs to possess the deductive reason constituted by <Q
& R> to believe <P> is to be disposed to aptly treat <Q & R> as a deductive reason
to believe <P>. This is an example of the kind of sensitivity that possession requires.
32Why `all/most' rather than `some'? To address pretense and supposition. If you suppose or pretend
for the sake of argument that P is a conclusive objective reason to φ, you are not irrational if you don't
φ given the appearance that P. But if you competently treat P like a conclusive objective reason to φ
in the sense relevant to rationality, you are irrational if you fail to φ given the appearance that P. The
diﬀerence between treating and supposition or pretense seems clear. If you merely pretend or suppose
that P is a conclusive objective reason to φ, there will be many ways that you are not disposed to
respond to the appearance that P which would be correct P if P were a conclusive objective reason to
φ.
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So, we can understand possessing a good reason R to believe <P> as involving both
access to R and sensitivity to the favoring relation between R and <P>.
Why require an apt treating disposition rather than a merely competent one? My
reason for preferring aptness is to explain cases like:
(MISFIRE) Bill is a competent but not infallible logician who can immediately
grasp many sophisticated entailments. It strikes him tonight that there is a proof
of <Q> from <P> involving certain steps, which he seems to see by exercising
his competence. Alas, his fallible competence misﬁres and yields a mistaken im-
pression: there is not that kind of proof of <Q> from <P>. There is a proof of
<Q> from <P>, but it is far more diﬃcult and beyond Bill's direct acumen.
<P> is a perfect deductive reason to believe <Q>, since there is a proof of <Q>
from <P>. Bill is competently attracted to treat <P> like a perfect deductive reason
to believe <Q>, since his logical vision manifests his competence. This vision just
misﬁres, as fallible vision can. So Bill does not possess the reason to believe <Q>
that <P> actually constitutes, since he does not grasp the proof.33 The apt treating
requirement explains why.
Non-Inferential Cases Again
It is clear enough now why a general theory of possessing R as a good reason to believe
that P requires more than access to R. Access and sensitivity can come apart: one can
have access to a fact that is an objective inferential reason to believe <P> while having
no grip on the inferential relation between this fact and <P>.
One might doubt whether access and sensitivity can come apart in non-inferential
cases. Consider arithmetic again. We saw that a person can possess the sheer fact that
makes <1 + 1 = 2> true as a non-inferential reason to believe <1 + 1 = 2>. Here
the ground of the favoring relation is the truth-making relation. It is hard to see how a
subject could have access to the fact that 1 + 1 = 2 without being aware of this relation!
33This isn't to say that Bill has no reason to believe <Q>. Just not the one actually constituted by
<P>.
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Not all non-inferential cases are like this, however. In our nice world, perceptual
experience reliably indicates reality. So, the fact that one has a perceptual experience
can constitute an objective reason for beliefs about what that experience indicates. Yet
this kind of perceptual case diﬀers from the case of believing <1 + 1 = 2> on the basis
of the sheer fact that 1 + 1 = 2. Access and sensitivity can come apart in this kind of
case.
Speckled hens aﬀord an illustration. Upon seeing a speckled hen, one is not auto-
matically sensitive to the relation of support between one's having the experience and
all the propositions represented by the experience. And so one doesn't possess all the
objective reasons that exist in virtue of the experience. Only equivocation could make
one think otherwise. One might say: Look, you have the experience, and the fact that
you're having the experience is an objective reason to believe those precise propositions.
So, you have that reason. `Have' means crucially diﬀerent things in those sentences.
1.3.5 The Extended Account
We are now in a position to revise the account sketched in 3.3 to get a general theory
of what it takes to possess a normative reason R to believe that P. The account is:
(L1+) S is propositionally justiﬁed in believing <P> iﬀ S possesses some fact F as
a good epistemic reason to believe <P> and possesses no defeating reasons, and
S is doxastically justiﬁed iﬀ S also believes <P> because S has that good reason.
(L2+) S possesses some fact F as a good reason to believe <P> iﬀ:
(Access) S is in a position to host an apt seeming that F obtains,
(Sensitivity) S is disposed to aptly treat F like an objective reason to believe <P>.
One could weaken the account by replacing `aptly' with `competently', and `fact' with
`apparent fact'. But remember: this is not necessary to avoid making justiﬁcation
factive. This is obvious in inferential cases where the inference rule is fallible: one
can easily move from facts to non-facts. And in cases of non-veridical experience, one
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could adopt the Williamsonian view that one does not possess the same reasons as in
a case of veridical experience. Alternatively, one could distinguish between possessing
objective reasons and possessing merely apparent reasons, and divorce justiﬁcation and
rationality.
1.3.6 Further Applications: Lyons on Perceptual Justiﬁcation
Our account suggests an answer to another member of the Resistance: Jack Lyons
(2009a). Lyons argues that reasons are unnecessary for justiﬁed perceptual beliefs. But
like Sosa, what Lyons really shows is that we should reject a statist ontology of reasons
and understand possession as an achievement grounded in cognitive ability.
Lyons begins by noting that there are two phenomena that talk of experiences can
pick out: sensations and percepts. Sensations are what a Lockean tabula rasa would
experience, while percepts are the result of the mind's unconscious and involuntary
attempt to make sense of the world.34 Necker's cube brings out the supposed distinction:
In one sense, the cube can appear as if viewed from above and to the right or appear as
if viewed from below and to the left. Yet it is tempting to think that there is another
level of appearance that remains constant. For Lyons, sensation is this constant level of
appearance. One sensation is, he says, compatible with many distinct percepts.
Given this distinction, Lyons constructs a Sellarsian dilemma. Assuming that the
defender of RP must identify reasons for perceptual beliefs with experiences (experi-
entialism), she has two options: she can identify them with sensations or percepts.
Sensations, Lyons insists, lack the right kind of content to be suitable for grounding all
34Lyons (2009a: 42).
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justiﬁed perceptual beliefs. This content is too low-level, and it is not clearly proposi-
tional. Percepts, on the other hand, do have the right kind of content. But percepts
cannot, Lyons believes, provide good epistemic reasons for perceptual beliefs. For per-
cepts, he argues, are too belief-like.
Indeed, Lyons thinks that percepts occupy the same functional role as perceptual
beliefs when perceptual beliefs are formed. And even when perceptual beliefs are not
formed, perceptual seemings are plausibly viewed as attractions to assent. Here Sosa's
thought applies: attractions cannot justify unless they independently qualify from the
epistemic point of view. Given these observations, Lyons reasons as follows:
1. Experiences cannot be good epistemic reasons.
2. If (1), then only beliefs can be good epistemic reasons.
3. But not all beliefs are justiﬁed by other beliefs.
4. So, not all beliefs are justiﬁed by reasons.
But Lyons is wrong to assume that good reasons are either experiences or beliefs. That
is compulsory only assuming that good reasons are mental states rather than facts or
apparent facts provided as good reasons by mental states. This is not a trivial diﬀerence.
To think you can justify a belief by appealing to its apparent truth-maker is not to think
your belief can be self-justifying. Yet Lyons's argument for (1) rests on the thought that
percepts in good cases are beliefs and the thought that beliefs cannot be self-justifying.
Lyons could reframe his argument. Even if we view normative reasons as facts or
apparent facts, we still view their providers as states. So Lyons could instead argue:
I. A percept with the content <P> cannot provide the apparent fact that P as a
reason to believe <P> unless this percept qualiﬁes epistemically.
II. But the story about how the percept qualiﬁes cannot be reason-based: after all,
apparent facts cannot justify beliefs unless they are possessed as good epistemic
reasons, but they are possessed as good epistemic reasons in virtue of percepts!
III. If (II), RP is false.
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IV. So, RP is false.
This argument fails for a more interesting reason: (III) is false.
We can adopt the following view. A percept cannot provide a reason unless it
manifests perceptual ability. Still, perceptual beliefs are justiﬁed wholly by being based
on reasons. What reasons? The facts or apparent facts provided as reasons by percepts
that manifest perceptual ability. The percepts remain distinct from beliefs: percepts
are attractions to assent that cause beliefs, when unresisted. This is all consistent with
RP.
Lyons cannot respond without undermining his own view. He agrees that it is a
truism that how things look helps to explain why our perceptual beliefs are justiﬁed.35
He just gives a non-experientialist explanation of this truism: the epistemologically
relevant looks are outputs of reliable perceptual systems, and a belief's being grounded
in such a look makes it non-inferentially justiﬁed. Here Lyons eﬀectively concedes that
RP could be true as long as experientialism is dropped.
1.3.7 Taking Stock
Let's take stock. We considered one of the major objections to RP: namely, that reasons
are unnecessary in certain cases of non-inferential justiﬁcation. The objection rested
essentially on two bad views: (i) a statist ontology of normative reasons, and (ii) a weak
account of possession. By viewing normative reasons as facts or apparent facts and
possession as an achievement that essentially manifests cognitive ability, we avoided the
objection. En route, we saw that there are two achievements involved in possessing a
normative reason: access and sensitivity to support relations. They boil down to diﬀerent
kinds of aptness: access amounts to apt seeming, and sensitivity to apt treating.
35See Ch. 4 of Lyons (2009a).
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1.4 Is Belief for Suﬃcient Reasons Enough?
The objection in the last section is not the only objection to RP in epistemology. Many
epistemologists worry that believing something because one has good reasons is insuﬃ-
cient for doxastic justiﬁcation. If correct, this would undermine the following implication
of RP:
(*) Believing that P in an epistemically justiﬁed way simply consists in believing
that P because one has a suﬃcient epistemic reason to believe that P.
The lesson of this section will resemble the lesson of the last. The Resistance assumes
a ﬂawed picture of what it takes to believe something because one has good reasons
to do so. In particular, the Resistance assumes that believing something because one
has good reasons is something one can pull oﬀ by incompetent luck. If that assumption
were true, (*) would be false. But that assumption is not true. That is the real lesson
of their cases.
1.4.1 The Insuﬃciency Argument
To see why the Resistance rejects (*), consider the following case from Turri (2010):
(SPURS WIN) Mr. Ponens and Mr. F. A. Lacy know that the Spurs will win if
they play the Pistons, and know that the Spurs will play the Pistons. Thus, they
both possess suﬃcient epistemic reasons to believe that the Spurs will win. And
they both infer that the Spurs will win from those two propositions. But Ponens
uses modus ponens, while Lacy uses the wildly invalid modus profusus rule: for
any P, Q, and R, infer R from P & Q.36
Ponens is doxastically justiﬁed. Lacy isn't. So, some members of the Resistance reason:
36Goldman (2012: 7) discusses a similar example and defends a similar claim on the basis of it.
These sorts of examples predate both Turri and Goldman, and can be found in Armstrong (1973: 98),
Swain (1988: 467), and Millar (1991: 57). While all of those examples are inferential, there are also
non-inferential examples that are supposed to establish the same pointmost notably, the case of the
speckled hen, originally found in Chisholm (1942) but revived in an attack on reasons-based accounts
in Sosa's contribution to Sosa and BonJour (2003).
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1. Lacy believes the Spurs will win because he has a certain rationaleviz., <the
Spurs will win if they play the Pistons> and <the Spurs will play the Pistons>.
2. This rationale happens to correspond to a suﬃcient epistemic reason to believe
that the Spurs will win.
3. So, Lacy believes that the Spurs will win because he has this suﬃcient epistemic
reason.
4. But Lacy's belief that the Spurs will win is doxastically unjustiﬁed.
5. So, RP is false.
This can sound compelling, but the move from (1) and (2) to (3) is invalid.
1.4.2 Believing Something Because You Have Good Reasons
The move works only if we accept the following view about what it takes to believe
something because you have a good epistemic reason to believe it:
(Coincident Rationale) S believes that P because S has a good epistemic reason
to believe that P iﬀ (i) S has a rationale r for believing that P and (ii) r happens
to correspond to a good epistemic reason that S has to believe that P.
This view is false. Believing something because you have a good epistemic reason to
believe it is an achievement. If Coincident Rationale were true, it would be not be.
In order to believe something because one has a good reason to believe it, it isn't
enough that one's rationale merely corresponds to that good reason. The fact that one
has a good reason must also play an explanatory role.37 While the idea of a normative
37Notice how this diﬀers from the suggestion that Turri (2010: 316) brieﬂy considers. He considers
a view that requires for doxastic justiﬁcation that one believe something on the basis of good evidence
as good evidence. But it becomes clear that what Turri means is merely that the subject views that
evidence as good evidence. This is weaker than what I am requiring. I am requiring that the actual
goodness of the reason play an explanatory role. This, I will maintain, is incompatible with incompetent
basing when understood correctly. Merely requiring that someone view the reason as a good reason is
compatible with incompetent basing, since people can incompetently view certain evidence as good. So
there is a key diﬀerence between my proposal and the one Turri rightly dismisses as unhelpful. I require
not that we merely view our reasons as good reasons, but that the actual goodness of these reasons
play an explanatory role by triggering an exercise of competence.
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fact's playing an explanatory role may sound wild, we can understand it unremark-
ably. Good reasons qua good reasons can play this role by triggering certain cognitive
abilities.38
Here we again ﬁnd a role for a familiar triadic pattern of properties. We can say
that a subject's having some rationale for believing that P is
right, if the rationale corresponds to a suﬃcient epistemic reason to believe P,
competent, if her having this rationale manifests a reliable disposition of hers to
have a rationale for believing something only if it is a right rationale, and
apt, if the subject's having the rationale is right because competent
Given these ideas, the following is a natural way to understand the achievement:
(Apt Rationale) S believes that P because S has a suﬃcient epistemic reason to
believe that P iﬀ S has an apt rationale for believing that P.
We can now explain what is amiss in SPURS WIN. Lacy does not believe that the
Spurs will win because he has good reasons to believe that the Spurs will win. Why?
Because his rationale for believing that the Spurs will win is not apt. It manifests wild
incompetence!
The explanation is consistent with RP. RP implies that a subject is doxastically
justiﬁed in believing that P if she believes that P because she has suﬃcient reasons to
believe that P. SPURS WIN does not undermine this implication of RP. It supports
this implication. Lacy is not doxastically justiﬁed in believing that the Spurs will win
for a straightforward reason: he fails to believe that the Spurs will win because he has
suﬃcient reasons to believe that the Spurs will win. One could disagree only if one
38Once again, reliabilists such as Goldman (2012) have recommended similar accounts of what they
call proper basing. But the claim being made here is a stronger claim that, if true, would show that
RP does not need to be modiﬁed at all. If one could only appeal to proper basing, RP could not be
vindicated in its pure form. But I'm claiming that it can be vindicated in that form, so long as the
defender of RP has the correct account of believing something because one has a good reason. Or,
equivalently, I'm claiming that there is no diﬀerence between believing something because you have a
good reason and proper basingwhich I take to be an interesting claim that reveals a new avenue for
friends of RP.
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presupposed Coincident Rationale. But cases like SPURS WIN are counterexamples to
Coincident Rationale, not to RP.
We can now precisify RP's story about doxastic justiﬁcation:
(**) Believing that P in an epistemically justiﬁed way consists in believing that
P on the basis of an apt rationale.
(**) explains why Lacy is doxastically unjustiﬁed. As far as I can see, it also explains
all other cases resembling SPURS WIN that Turri and others have advanced.
1.4.3 Other Reasons to Reject RP's Account of Doxastic Justiﬁca-
tion?
Not all the cases that lead the Resistance to reject RP's account of doxastic justiﬁcation
clearly resemble SPURS WIN. Cases of epistemically culpable ignorance raise a further
worry.39 Consider:
(IGNORER) At t, Sebastian has only good epistemic reasons to believe P. Be-
tween t and t+, Sebastian receives a mass of counterevidence, but ignores it all.
By t++, he has forgotten it, remembers only the original good reasons, and so
believes P.
Some ﬁnd it clear that Sebastian is doxastically unjustiﬁed in believing P at t++. They
also ﬁnd it clear that he believes that P because he has good epistemic reasons at t++.
How can the defender of RP respond? If we agree that Sebastian had suﬃcient
epistemic reasons at t, it is hard to deny that he has suﬃcient epistemic reasons at
t++. After all, quantitatively speaking, he has the same reasons. If so, then in the
intermediate time, Sebastian could have insuﬃcient reasons only because he has more
reasons. If he lacks these further reasons at t++, and has at t++ all the reasons he had
at t, it is plausible that his reasons were suﬃcient at t iﬀ they are suﬃcient at t++.
But note: Sebastian's behavior at t+ suggests that he lacks the disposition that Apt
Rationale requires. At t+, Sebastian is not disposed to have a rationale only if that
39See Greco (2005) and Goldman (2009).
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rationale corresponds to a suﬃcient epistemic reason. He is radically negligent, after all.
Yet this disposition is required for Sebastian's rationale to be apt. If so, a proponent
of RP might agree that Sebastian has suﬃcient reasons at t++, but deny that he holds
the belief because he has suﬃcient reasons. If so, (**) can explain why he is unjustiﬁed.
Compare a more vivid case. Suppose Salvatore is honest about his aversion to
counterevidence: I don't care whether there is counterevidence. I'll believe anyway.
Suppose he ignores countervailing reasons, forgets them, and now only possesses good
epistemic reasons for his beliefs. He does not believe as he does because he has suﬃcient
epistemic reasons. If so, (**) explains why he is unjustiﬁed.
If Sebastian is like Salvatore, the friend of RP can use (**) to deny that Sebastian
believes for suﬃcient reasons at t++. We might deny that he does at t as well, if he
lacks the dispositions necessary for having an apt rationale at t. If Sebastian is not
relevantly like Salvatore, I lose my intuition that he is doxastically unjustiﬁed. Suppose
he ignored the counterevidence just because he was too distracted. Suppose he would
have responded if he had the attentional resources. If so, Sebastian strikes me as justiﬁed
at t++.
I conclude that the defender of RP can either directly explain cases like IGNORER
or dismiss the intuitions about them as not probative (because the cases are underspec-
iﬁed).
1.5 Two Levels of Explanation
I have addressed the main challenges to RP that I hear from externalists in epistemol-
ogy. The challenges only reinforce (i) the virtues of the factualist ontology of normative
reasons, and (ii) the plausibility of viewing the possession of good epistemic reasons and
the business of believing something because one has good epistemic reasons as manifes-
tations of ability.
Sometimes I hear this reply: Your defense of RP just illustrates that reasons are
epiphenomenal in the analysis of justiﬁed belief. Cognitive ability is what really mat-
ters. As I said earlier, I think that this reply conﬂates two levels of theorizing. In this
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section, I deepen this theme by explaining why reasons-ﬁrst epistemology and reliabilism
contribute to the two diﬀerent levels of explanation, and so cannot directly conﬂict.
1.5.1 Examples of the Two Levels: Buck-Passing and Hedonism
To appreciate the two levels of explanation, remember that there are two questions to
ask about the nature of normativity. One question is:
(Q1) What are the fundamental units of normativity, and how are other normative
facts grounded in facts about these units?
Q1 attracts great interest in meta-ethics. This owes partly to interest in:
(Reasons First) Facts about reasons ground all other normative facts.
Scanlon (1998) prompted interest in Reasons First. One of his contributions to Reasons
First was his account of how facts about value are grounded in facts about reasons:
(Buck-Passing) For any valuable X, X's being valuable is grounded in X's having
descriptive properties that give suﬃcient reasons for having a pro-attitude to X.
This view is compatible with views like:
(Hedonism) X's being valuable is grounded in X's being pleasure-conducive.
Views like Hedonism partly answer the other question I mentioned at the outset:
(Q2) How, if at all, are normative facts grounded in non-normative facts?
Q1 and Q2 both concern the metaphysics of normativity. But they can be independently
answered without conﬂict. This is for a simple reason. One thing can be either directly
or indirectly grounded in another. If X grounds Y and Y grounds Z, X can thereby
ground Zjust indirectly. We can accept both Buck-Passing and Hedonism by taking
the former to give us the ﬁrst step in the grounding of value and the latter to summarize
the ﬁnal step. For any valuable X, we might say (where the `because' is metaphysical):
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X is valuable because X is reasonable to desire (a Buck-Passer's claim)
and
X is reasonable to desire because X is pleasure-conducive
And we can thereby say:
X is valuable because X is pleasure-conducive (a Hedonist's claim)
So, Buck-Passing and Hedonism are compatible. They conﬂict if we replace `is grounded
in' with `is directly grounded in' Hedonism. But we should not do this. This commits
Hedonists to the claim that facts about value are normatively basic. For then no other
normative facts would intervene between facts about value and facts about pleasure-
conducivity in the grounding chain. Hedonism should have no such implications, since
it only concerns the non-normative grounds of value.
1.5.2 Reliabilism : RP :: Hedonism : Buck-Passing
RP is similar in point to Buck-Passing, and reliabilism is similar in point to Hedonism. If
so, it is a mistake to think that there is a debate between reliabilism and RP. Moreover,
we can use broadly reliabilist ideas to explain in descriptive terms what it takes to
possess good reasons for belief and to believe things because one possesses good reasons
for belief. This is no blow to RP, just as the truth of Hedonism would be no blow to
Buck-Passing. In parallel to the grounding chain for value, we can say:
S's belief that P is justiﬁed because [insert RP's story]
and
RP's story is true because [insert sophisticated reliabilist story]
And we can thereby say:
S's belief that P is justiﬁed because [insert sophisticated reliabilist story]
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We should not be surprised. RP is a view about the priority of certain normative
units over others. Reliabilism is not a view of this kind. Reliabilism grounds epistemic
normativity in the non-normative. Goldman (1979: 1) was clear from the start:
Any correct deﬁnition [of `justiﬁed'] would also feature evaluative terms, but I am
not interested in them. I want a set of substantive conditions that specify when a
belief is justiﬁed. Compare the moral term `right'. This might be deﬁned in other
ethical terms or phrases, a task appropriate to metaethics. The task of normative
ethics, on the other hand, is to state substantive conditions for the rightness of
actions. [. . . ] I want a theory of justiﬁed belief to specify in non-epistemic terms
when a belief is justiﬁed. This is not the only kind of theory of justiﬁedness one
might seek, but it is one important kind and the kind sought here.
Reliabilism, then, resembles Hedonism. Hedonism and the buck-passing account are
not rivals. They answer diﬀerent questions about the nature of value. Reliabilism and
RP are not rivals either. They simply answer diﬀerent questions about the nature of
justiﬁcation.
1.5.3 Against the Deﬂationary Response
This undermines a deﬂationary response to the foregoing sectionsviz., that reasons are
epiphenomenal and reliability does the real work. That might be plausible if reliabilism
and RP were rivals. But they are not rivals. RP contributes to the project of answering
Q1, whereas reliabilism has always been a contribution to the project of answering Q2.
RP has upshots for Q2 if conjoined with particular substantive groundings of the
reasons ideology. So, it is crucial to show that RP can jibe with the best views about
how epistemic normativity is grounded in the non-normative. But once that is done,
we must remember that Q2 takes us to a level of metaphysical explanation on which
RP is silent. RP can guide our thinking about that level, by suggesting that we ﬁnd
the non-normative grounds of justiﬁcation by ﬁnding the non-normative grounds of the
reasons ideology. But that's it.
1.6 Conclusion
Recap. We have covered a lot of ground, so let's brieﬂy review the highlights.
40
I answered two kinds of objections to RP. According to the ﬁrst, reasons cannot
explain why some foundational beliefs are justiﬁed. Members of the Resistance point to
examples like the belief that 1 + 1 = 2, and maintain that there are only two candidate
justifying reasons: (a) the intuitive seeming that 1 + 1 = 2 and (b) the sheer fact
that 1 + 1 = 2. They dismiss (a) as unhelpful. Seemings reduce to attractions to
assent. Attractions can manifest incompetence, and the people who host them may
be incompetent at the second order, failing to possess any relevant defeaters. After
dismissing (a), the Resistance insists that (b) not a serious option and leads to circularity
problems.
There are two mistakes here. The ﬁrst is to dismiss (b) as a serious option. The
apparent truth-maker of one's belief is the perfect reason for that belief if one possesses
that apparent truth-maker in the right way. This is illustrated by introspective examples,
like believing that one is in pain on the basis of the clear fact that one is in pain. There
is no circularity here. The basing is not inferential, and only inferences can be circular.
Of course, we cannot possess any old fact as a direct license to believe what it makes
true. Indeed, we cannot possess the apparent fact that P as a direct license to believe
<P> just by ﬁnding <P> intuitive, if our intuitive attraction is incompetent. But
the intuitive case is not special! Not all introspective facts can be possessed in this
way either. This is revealing, because reasons are clearly doing justifying work in good
introspective cases: the trouble with people like Fred from 3.2 is that they don't possess
the relevant reasons. What we need to possess intuitive facts as direct licenses is what
Fred needed: ability.
The second mistake is to assume that defenders of RP must embrace low bar ac-
counts of possession on pain of circularity. Defenders of RP can appeal directly to
non-normative factors to explain when certain mental states can enable one to possess
an apparent fact as a good epistemic reason for belief. I demonstrated this in 3.4, by
giving an ability-based account of the two achievements involved in possession.
That account did not address the second major objection to RP. Some say cases
like SPURS WIN show that a subject can believe P because she has good epistemic
reasons to believe P and yet lack doxastic justiﬁcation. We saw, however, that these
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cases just refute an overly permissive account believing something because one has good
epistemic reasonsviz., Coincident Rationale. I oﬀered a better account: to believe that
P because one has good epistemic reasons to believe that P, one needs an apt rationale.
These responses address the major objections I have heard from externalist crowds
in epistemology. The Resistance might reply that this shows that reasons aren't doing
the real explanatory work: aptness does that work. But this, I argued, is a mistake.
It ignores the question that RP is designed to answer. The point of RP is to show
how one normative property reduces to a more fundamental normative property. RP
is unattractive if RP cannot mesh with the best non-normative grounding stories in
epistemology. But once we have shown how RP can mesh, we must recognize that RP
is not itself such a story. It is an account like the buck-passing account of value. It is
in a diﬀerent ballpark than reliabilism.
Contrasts with Evidentialism/Reliabilism Syntheses. That observation highlights one
reason why I have not been reinventing the wheel forged by recent syntheses of eviden-
tialism and reliabilism.40 It is wrong to speak of a synthesis of reasons-ﬁrst epistemology
and reliabilism, just like it is wrong to speak of a synthesis of the buck-passing account
of value and hedonism. These accounts operate at diﬀerent levels: one contributes to
a picture of the internal structure of the normative, whereas the other contributes to a
picture of how the normative is grounded in the natural.
If I had the space, I would argue for a bolder conclusion: the idea of a debate
between evidentialism and reliabilism involves the same mistake, since the concept of
evidence is normative. There are real debates between evidentialists and reliabiists:
Conee and Feldman's substantive views are clearly not Goldman's. But Conee and
Feldman's substantive disagreements with Goldman go beyond the minimal evidentialist
thesis, which is just a thesis like RP. Conee and Feldman would not disagree. From the
beginning, they stressed that evidentialism was not a substantive theory so much as an
indication of the kind of justiﬁcation we take to be characteristically epistemic".41 And
40See Comesaña (2010) and Goldman (2011). Alston (1988) is a precursor.
41Conee and Feldman (1985: 15).
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they agreed that a reliabilist analysis of well-foundedness is conceptually possible (just
false).42
Here is not the place to defend this bolder conclusion. What matters is that I have
not engaged in the same project that synthesizers of evidentialism and reliabilism take
themselves to be engaged in. I did sketch substantive accounts of what it takes to
possess good epistemic reasons and to believe something because one possesses good
epistemic reasons. But I did this only to show that RP makes no bad predictions per se
about cases. Only if a defender of RP embraces certain speciﬁc views will she get bad
predictions about cases.
But my substantive views are preferable to existing evidentialism/reliabilism synthe-
ses. For one thing, synthesizers frame their views by presupposing a statist rather than
a factualist ontology of reasons, which invites all the problems that my view avoids. For
another, existing syntheses neglect the second condition on possession that my account
highlights (i.e., sensitivity to favoring relations). This is why they face problems with
cases like:
(KOPLIK SPOTS) Albert lives in a period long before it was discovered that
Koplik spots reliably indicate the presence of measles. Albert sees the spots for
the ﬁrst time ever in Bertrand's mouth and spontaneously believes on the basis of
the appearance that Bertrand has measles without performing any inference.
The fact that there appear to be these spots in Bertrand's mouth is an objective epis-
temic reason to believe that Bertrand has measles. But Albert does not possess this
reason.
Why not? Standard syntheses of evidentialism and reliabilism will have a hard time
giving a satisfactory answer. For they agree that (i) experiences are possessed evidence
for spontaneous, non-inferential beliefs when (ii) there is an objective probabilistic re-
lation between the experience and the truth of the belief. But as we saw, having access
42These certainly are conceptually diﬀerent accounts of the grounds of well-founded beliefs. In spite
of this conceptual diﬀerence, reliabilism and WF [the evidentialist account of well-foundedness] may be
extensionally equivalent" (1985: 25). Also noteworthy: [R]eliabilism may not even be a rival to WF"
(27).
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to something that is an objectively good reason for belief is not suﬃcient for possessing
a good reason for belief: one must also be sensitive to the relevant favoring relation. By
honoring this constraint, my view explains why Albert doesn't possess the reason.
Other Objections? One might be left wondering whether I have addressed all the main
worries in epistemology about RP. One might, for example, wonder about stored beliefs
for which the original evidence has been forgotten. Many of our justiﬁed beliefs are like
this. Aren't these obvious examples of justiﬁed beliefs that are based on no reasons?
They are not. One could claim that the fact that one seems to remember that P is
a good reason to believe that P when this seeming manifests competence. Since RP is
not an essentially internalist view, this strategy is available to the defender of RP. If one
wants to avoid overintellectualization, one could instead say that memory seemings can
sometimes put one into contact with (apparent) facts just as perception and intuition
can, enabling them to serve as licenses for believing what they (apparently) make true.
I just remember!" feels a lot like I just see!"
There are other cases that worry people. Jack Lyons has pressed two other putative
counterexamples. One case involves justiﬁed but false introspective belief, and the other
involves beings that lack phenomenal consciousness. Lyons (2009b: 255)'s ﬁrst example:
[T]here is no obvious way to make sense of justiﬁed but false introspective beliefs
consistently with [RP]. Obviously our other beliefs fail to determine whether or not
we are justiﬁed in some particular introspective belief.... So if we are to have any
ground for the introspective belief, it would have to be a nondoxastic state. But
which state? Suppose I am standing at the refrigerator because I have mistaken my
boredom for hunger. What justiﬁes my belief that I'm hungry? Not my hunger,
since, by hypothesis, I'm not actually hungry. Not my boredom, surely?
I am unconvinced. Other beliefs alone can rarely if ever justify introspective beliefs.
But some introspective beliefs could be justiﬁed by a combination of (i) introspectible
facts, and (ii) facts about what other states we are typically in when these facts obtain.
In Lyons's case, one might reason as follows, if rapidly or subconsciously: (1) I am in
state X (=wanting to go to the fridge); (2) Whenever I am, I am typically in state
Y (=being hungry); (3) So, I am probably in state Y. There must be something that
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prompts one's belief. The prompt alone may not justify one's belief. But it could given
certain background factors.
Lyons's other worry concerns zombies (i.e., beings that lack phenomenal conscious-
ness). He thinks it is obvious that zombies can have beliefs and. . . that some can have
justiﬁed beliefs.43 But he worries that a zombie's non-inferential beliefs about the
world could not be justiﬁed according to RP, because he assumes that the only reasons
to which a defender of RP could appeal would be experiences or beliefs.
This is wrong. Lyons is again assuming the statist ontology of reasons. If Lyons
deﬁned `grounds' to mean `beliefs or experiential states', he would have an argument
against a stipulative version of RP. But not against mine. Someone who rejects expe-
rientialism can accommodate zombies. My view simply appealed to apt seemings as
providers of reasons. There is no reason to think that zombies cannot have apt seem-
ings.44
Envoi. I am doubtful about counterexample-based cases against RP. Since RP is an-
tecedently attractive, I think we have suﬃcient reasons to remain attracted. At any
rate, I have done what the epistemologist qua epistemologist can do. Work remains for
Reasons Firsters. But I hope to have cleared the way by addressing the Resistance in
epistemology.
43Lyons (2009b).
44There are other problems. What Lyons ﬁnds clear isn't clear. I agree that zombies might have
justiﬁed external world beliefs. But many will lack Lyons's intuitions. One might deny that the zombies
are justiﬁed but hold that they are excusable or structurally rational. And there is a big step from the
claim that the zombies are not unjustiﬁed to the claim that they are as justiﬁed as us. Zombies could
have weak reasons by having coherent doxastic systems. The isolation objection to coherentism does
not show that coherence generates no reasonsjust not good enough reasons to explain ordinary cases.
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Chapter 2
What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be
Overview
Many meta-ethicists think that rationality only requires us to heed apparent normative
reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? One hears
two kinds of answer. On de dicto views, p is an apparent reason for S to φ when it
appears to S that p is an objective reason to φ. On de re views, p is an apparent
reason for S to φ when (i) p's truth would provide an objective reason to φ and (ii)
it appears to S that p. De re views are currently more popular because they avoid
overintellectualizing rationality. But they face problems owing to the way in which they
do so. Some assume we can escape the problems by requiring more descriptive facts
to be apparent or by appealing to defeat. But these strategies fail. So I defend a new
view that is closer in spirit to de dicto views but less demanding (at least granting the
assumptions needed to support overintellectualization worries). On this view, apparent
reasons are apparent facts that agents are competently attracted to treating like objec-
tive reasons, where competence is indirectly deﬁned in terms of objective reasons and a
competence/performance distinction is drawn.
2.1 Reasons and Apparent Reasons
Meta-ethicists often view normative reasons as objective facts that count in favor of
actions and attitudes. These facts include ones to which we do not necessarily have
privileged access. For example, the fact that the lemonade is arsenic-laced is a conclusive
reason for you not to drink it. This fact remains a conclusive reason for you not to drink
the lemonade even if you are in no position to see that the lemonade is arsenic-laced.
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Clearly, however, you need not be irrational in drinking the lemonade if you are
in no position to appreciate this fact. So, meta-ethicists like to separate rational φ-
ing from φ-ing that is supported by all the objective normative reasons. Rationality
retains an indirect connection to objective normative reasons: it requires responding to
apparent objective reasons. On many views, the `apparent' is not a success term. There
may appear to be suﬃcient objective reasons to φ even if there are conclusive objective
reasons not to φ. The lemonade case illustrates this fact. Moreover, there may be no
apparent reason to φ even if there is an objective reason to φ. The same case illustrates
this fact: while there is no apparent reason to refuse to drink the lemonade, there is an
objective reason to refuse (viz., that the lemonade is lethal).
Now, many meta-ethicists who draw this distinction believe that rationality is just
coherence.1 Accordingly, they assume that apparent reasons are apparent in a belief-
relative sense. But we can understand `apparent' more broadly without collapsing ra-
tionality into objective correctness. Epistemic rationality requires responding to the
recommendations of perceptual appearance even if this appearance is radically non-
veridical (e.g., in the Matrix or other skeptical scenarios). It does not require responding
to all the objective evidence out in the world. Many epistemologists who embrace these
thoughts would not cash them out in coherentist terms (e.g., by treating perceptual
appearances as beliefs).
As an epistemologist, I am predisposed to see the requirement to respond to apparent
normative reasons as stronger than any coherence requirement. One could try to reduce
this requirement to a coherence requirement. I independently ﬁnd this project suspect,
but what matters for our purposes is that even on non-coherentist views rationality is
weaker than the kind of correctness that goes with doing what the totality of objective
facts would favor. For not all objective facts are apparent, and not all apparent facts
are real.
The focus of this paper is on what it takes for a consideration to be an apparent
reason. I think the main ways in which meta-ethicists answer this question are ﬂawed,
1See, for example, Scanlon (1998), Broome (1999, 2005, 2007, 2013), and Kolodny (2005).
47
and I will oﬀer a new answer. In 2, I introduce two main types of view that meta-
ethicists have endorsed: de dicto views and de re views. De re views are currently more
popular because many worry that de dicto views overintellectualize rationality. While I
agree about this worry, I think moving to standard de re views is a mistake. In 3, I pose
some problems for de re views and show how potential responses fail. I then turn to
my own view in 4, explaining how it avoids the problems for de re and de dicto views.
Finally, I answer an objection to my viewand to all other views discussed earlierin
5.
I will stress in advance that my real foe in this paper is the de re theorist. While
I don't accept the de dicto view, I also don't reject it. Non-acceptance is weaker than
rejection: I merely don't want to commit to the views in the philosophy of mind that
the de dicto view would force us to accept on pain of overintellectualization. While
many important features distinguish my view from the de dicto views in the literature,
my view would entail a (new) version of the de dicto view if certain extreme views
about concept possession that I reject were true. My view simply doesn't require these
extreme views to succeed. So, while it is less demanding (granting the assumptions
about concept possession that drive the overintellectualization worry), my view is closer
in spirit to the de dicto tradition. I will explain these nuances further in the next section.
2.2 Apparent Reasons De Dicto and De Re
2.2.1 De Dicto Views
When meta-ethicists ﬁrst began to distinguish between rationality and correctness, ap-
parent reasons were understood very narrowly. For example, Scanlon (1998: 25) held
that irrationality in its clearest sense occurs when someone judges that something is a
reason but fails to be aﬀected by it in one of the relevant ways. Kolodny (2005) echoed
him, holding that the core requirements of rationality are requirements to respond to
our de dicto beliefs about normative reasons. These views are examples of a broader
view:
de dicto: R is an apparent normative reason for S to φ iﬀ it appears to S that
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R is an objective normative reason to φ.
While Scanlon and Kolodny take the relevant sense of `appears' to be belief-relative,
it is not compulsory to do so. We have known at least since Chisholm (1957) that
appearance words can be used in many ways. Besides the doxastic use, there are non-
doxastic uses of `appears'. Even if you fail to take any doxastic stance on whether P, it
can still perceptually appear to you that P. Non-doxastic appearances are not conﬁned
to perceptual cases. Propositions in a priori domains can appear true in this way too:
consider inconsistent triads of a priori plausible claims.
Normative propositions can appear true in this way too. So, if one agrees that
rationality demands less than conformity with all the objective normative reasons but
dislikes coherentism, one could preserve DE DICTO but understand the `appears' less
narrowly. One could agree that there is a more restricted kind of rationality that is
belief-relativeviz., structural rather than substantive rationality. But one could deny
that it is the only kind of rationality to be distinguished from fact-relative statuses
like objective correctness. Substantivity and fact-relativity are orthogonal: apparent
reasons are a clear illustration!
2.2.2 Understanding the Overintellectualization Objection
Even understood in this wider way, many meta-ethicists would reject DE DICTO. A
major reason concerns overintellectualization. Parﬁt (2011: 118) expresses the concern
well:
We can have rational beliefs and desires, and act rationally, without having any
beliefs about reasons. Young children respond rationally to certain reasons or
apparent reasons, though they do not yet have the concept of a reason. Dogs,
cats, and some other animals respond to some kinds of reason...though they will
never have the concept of a reason. And some rational adults seem to lack this
concept....
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Parﬁt's thoughts are plausible, carefully understood.2 But there are two unequally
plausible ways to extract a challenge to DE DICTO. The most ambitious is a knock-
down argument:
The Strong Overintellectualization Argument
1. Rational subjects must possess the concept of a normative reason if DE DICTO
is true, since in order to host appearances with contents of the form R is an
objective normative reason to φ one must have this concept.
2. But rational subjects need not possess the concept of a normative reason.
3. So, DE DICTO is false.
While there is a version of the overintellectualization objection worth taking seriously,
the Strong Overintellectualization Argument is not it. Defenders of DE DICTO could
easily reject (1) or (2). Doing so just requires some burdensome commitments on which
a general theory of apparent reasons and the nature of rationality would ideally be
neutral.
For example, one might insist that possessing the concept of a normative reason is
easier than Parﬁt and others suppose. One need not be able to articulate one's thoughts
involving a concept to possess it, or be able to use the words that express the concept.
But perhaps all that is clear is that infants, toddlers, and animals cannot articulate any
beliefs about normative reasons. Perhaps, one might insist, they still have these beliefs.
Obviously, a burden remains: friends of DE DICTO must oﬀer a positive story about
how it is that children and animals possess the concept of a normative reason. Friends
of DE DICTO might maintain that possessing the concept simply consists in having
2Might it be insisted that while infants, toddlers and animals lack the concept of a normative
reason, they have a related proto-concept? Isn't it plausible that even infants can believe that certain
considerations count in favor? The concept of favoring may seem less sophisticated. But note that
it is a relational concept: considerations count in favor of attitudes and acts. For us to explain the
rationality of their beliefs, desires, etc., on the revised de dicto view, children must not only have the
concept of favoring, but also the concepts of these attitudes. One cannot view the incomplete content
<R counts in favor> as the relevant object of children's thoughts and seemings. The content would
have the form <R counts in favor of φ-ing>, where φ-ing could be believing, desiring, etc. Yet it is
even more doubtful that infants and some toddlers have these mental state concepts. Many animals
certainly lack them. So a problem remains.
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certain dispositions to treat considerations in ways that would be appropriate if they
were real normative reasons. Proponents of the representational theory of mind (e.g.,
Fodor (1998)) will ﬁnd this an implausible view about concept possession. Being in
favor of the representational theory of mind myself, I would prefer a theory that does
not force us to accept a purely dispositional account of concept possession.
One might take a diﬀerent tack. One might deny that possessing the concept of a
normative reason is necessary for hosting appearances with the content R is a normative
reason to φ. For example, one might insist that one can host an appearance with the
content X is F simply by being attracted to treat X like an F. I would ﬁnd this an
unattractive hypothesis in the theory of content. Does it really seem to a dog that its
owners are vending machines simply because this dog treats its owners like vending
machines? On many views, this idea would be implausible if the content attribution is
intended seriouslyas it must, if the view is a de dicto view. I would prefer a view that
doesn't raise these worries.
Friends of DE DICTO can surely defend their view to their own satisfaction by
adopting burdensome views in the philosophy of mind or theory of content. But this
highlights a diﬀerent way to understand the objection. The objection is not that one
can obviously be rational without having normative concepts. Instead, we can put it as
follows:
The Modest Overintellectualization Argument
1. A view about rationality that is defensible without invoking burdensome views
in the philosophy of mind or theory of content is ceteris paribus preferable to a
view that is indefensible on pain of overintellectualization if such views fail.
2. DE DICTO avoids overintellectualizing only if some burdensome views in the
philosophy of mind or theory of content are true.
3. So, unless there is no defensible view of rationality that can avoid invoking
these views, we should not endorse DE DICTO.
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The conclusion does not tell us to deny DE DICTO. It just tells us to withhold belief
and search for a view that does not make it compulsory to endorse burdensome views in
the philosophy of mind or theory of content. The view I will oﬀer in 4 is such a view.
The conjunction of my view and these burdensome views view might entail DE DICTO.
But the plausibility of my view does not depend upon the truth of these burdensome
views.
A comparison vindicates the point. Consider the early literature on the Gettier
problem. Clark (1963) thought that we could ﬁx the justiﬁed true belief account of
knowledge by suggesting that subjects who know that P do not essentially rely on
inferences from falsehoods in arriving at their justiﬁed true beliefs that P. According
to this picture, what is going awry in Gettier cases is that subjects are arriving at
their justiﬁed true beliefs by essentially relying on inferences from falsehoods. The
obvious worry about this proposal is that there are Gettier cases where subjects do not
seem to perform inferences at all in arriving at their Gettiered beliefs (e.g., Fake Barn
Country). One could try to attribute intricate subconscious inferences to these subjects,
as Harman (1973) did. And if one did this, one could arguably explain all Gettier cases
with a sophisticated Clarkean theory.
But today, virtually no one accepts this as a solution to the Gettier problem. This
is not because everyone ﬁnds it obvious that subjects perform no relevant subconscious
inferences in cases like Fake Barn Country. It is because an ideal solution to the Gettier
problem would not require views in the philosophy of mind that few epistemologists
would embrace. Hence the greater popularity in the later 1970s of defeasibility theories.
These theories subsumed the good predictions of Clarkean theories without appealing
to any controversial views in the philosophy of mind. The two kinds of theory would
be extensionally equivalent if we accepted these controversial views. But defeasibility
theories seemed preferable, since they did not require these controversial views to work.
The view that I will be developing in 4 stands to DE DICTO as defeasibility theories
stand to theories in the Clarkean tradition. Again, my view would be extensionally
equivalent to some version of DE DICTO if certain highly controversial views about
concepts and content were true. But the plausibility of my view does not depend upon
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the truth of these views, and for this reason stands a better chance of survival.
This is my main reason for not aﬃrming DE DICTO. Again, I do not reject DE
DICTO. But I will only aﬃrm a theory that can get the right predictions without
relying on any strong views in the philosophy of mind or theory of content. If I believed
these strong views, I might embrace DE DICTO in my heart of hearts. But it is not a
view that I want to assert: I want to assert something more modest, at least in certain
respects.
2.2.3 Other Concepts?
Before setting aside de dicto views, it is worth considering a ﬁnal response. I have
only discussed de dicto views that invoke the concept of a normative reason. But there
are other normative concepts that might not raise such stark overintellectualization
worries. Besides the concept of a normative reason, there are thin evaluative concepts
like goodness. There are also thick concepts, like gross, delightful, terrifying, and so on.
Isn't it more plausible that even animals can conceputalize things in these ways?
Perhaps. I would still prefer a theory that did not require us to attribute any such
concepts to all beings that can act and believe rationally. But the analogy with Clarkean
responses to the Gettier problem is less obvious with these possibilities on the table.
So, why can't we just relax? Because the worries return when we look carefully. My
worries concern the implications for epistemology. Suppose that Alpha is competent
with some valid pattern of ﬁrst-order inferencesay, modus ponens. And suppose that
it appears to Alpha that P and that Alpha knows that if P then Q. This is a paradigm
case of having an apparent reason to believe Q. How can a de dicto theorist explain
this case? The theorist must suppose that it also appears to Alpha that believing Q
would be positively evaluable in some way. But must any subject in Alpha's position be
capable of hosting an appearance with this content, in order to gain an apparent reason
to believe Q?
Not plausibly. This proposal involves a new overintellectualization. This time, the
overintellectualization has nothing to do with requiring the possession of certain nor-
mative concepts. The problem lies in requiring the possession of certain mental state
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concepts. The de dicto theorist must say that Alpha conceptualizes the doxastic re-
sponse of believing Q in a positive light. But mental state concepts are sophisticated.
Subjects do not need to be able to think about their own beliefs in order to perform
rational ﬁrst-order inferences as elementary as modus ponens.
One might again try to retreat to lax views about concept possession or otherwise
argue that it is easier than it looks to think about one's mental states. But now the
analogy with Clarkean theories is vivid. It is better to avoid making these strong claims
in the philosophy of mind to save the de dicto theory. My view will have this advantage.
2.2.4 The De Re View
But the view that I will oﬀer is not the usual reaction to the overintellectualization
objection. The usual reaction is to move from DE DICTO to a view of this form:
de re: R is an apparent reason for S to φ when (i) R's truth would give S an
objective normative reason to φ, and (ii) it appears to S that R.3
This view is embraced by theorists like Parﬁt (2001, 2011), Schroeder (2007), and Way
(2009). Like Scanlon and Kolodny, they often unpack `appears' in a belief-relative
manner. For example, Parﬁt (2011: 111) writes:
While reasons are given by facts, what we rationally want or do depends on our
beliefs. If we have certain beliefs about the relevant, reason-giving facts, and what
we believe would, if it were true, give us some reason, I am calling these beliefs
whose truth would give us this reason. Such beliefs give us an apparent reason.
When such beliefs are true, this apparent reason is also a real reason.... We ought
rationally to respond to apparent reasons even if...these reasons are not real.
And Schroeder (2007: 14) says the following, where `subjective reason' = `apparent
reason': For R to be a subjective reason for X to do A is for X to believe R, and for it
to be the case that R is the kind of thing, if true, to be an objective reason for X to do
A."
3This is formulated in a way that makes it sound like I am assuming that reasons are propositions.
But this assumption is not essential to anything in this paper. It just makes certain formulations
verbally simpler. If one prefers, one can rewrite everything in terms of states of aﬀairs a la Dancy
(2000). Indeed, I prefer the Dancyean picture. It would just lead to clunkier formulations in this
context.
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Once again, the belief-relative formulations are not mandatory. The `appears' in
DE RE could be understood in a non-doxastic sense of the sort mentioned earlier.
Indeed, when it comes to stating his epistemological views, Schroeder abandons the
belief-relative formulation and requires only that R be the content of some presenta-
tional mental state.4 Such states include things like perceptual experiences and intuitive
seemings. If DE RE is to be taken seriously by epistemologists, it should be formulated
in this less narrow way.
However formulated, DE RE avoids the overintellectualization of DE DICTO. It does
not entail that rational subjects must possess any normative concepts, or that subjects
must represent apparent reasons as reasons. So, given the Modest Overintellectualiza-
tion Argument, it might seem that we should pursue DE RE.
2.3 The Failure of De Re Views
2.3.1 The Problem of Unapparent Reasons
But only if DE RE is plausible along other dimensions. It is not. Ironically, DE RE's
ﬂaws stem from the way in which it reacts to the overintellectualization of DE DICTO.
Notice that DE RE does not merely suggest that rational subjects need not represent
apparent reasons as objective reasons. If DE RE is true, R can be an apparent reason
for a subject to φ even if it would not be rational for her to treat R like an objective
reason to φ. For even if it is not rational for a subject to treat R like an objective
reason to φ, it might remain apparent to her that R is the case, and R might still be
a consideration that would be an objective reason to φ if it were the case. And this is
that all DE RE requires for R to be an apparent reason to φ!
Worries about overintellectualization do not support this feature of DE RE. One can
treat something like an F without representing it as an F or having the concept of an F.
Some cat might treat its owners like vending machines without having the concept of
a vending machine or representing its owners as vending machines. So the requirement
that apparent reasons be considerations that it is rational to treat like good reasons
4See Schroeder (2011).
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is not overly intellectual. This requirement is plausible. How could we be rationally
required to respond to considerations that it is not rational for us to treat like good
reasons?
Yet DE RE implies that we could. This is a serious problem. I call it the Problem
of Unapparent Reasons, since the problem is that DE RE classiﬁes as apparent reasons
considerations that are not apparent reasons.
Many possible cases ﬁt this bill. Even if we know all the relevant descriptive facts,
there might be objective reasons given by these facts that it would not be rational for
us to treat like objective reasons. Our sensitivity to normative reality is limited. For
those of us with normative concepts, this limitation can manifest in our inability to
rationally settle certain normative questions. In such cases, (i) and (ii) in DE RE can
easily be satisﬁed with respect to some consideration while the consideration fails to be
an apparent reason.
The fundamental limitation clearly does not extend only to those of us who possess
normative concepts. It might be true that any rational being has the ability to correctly
respond to some would-be objective reasons. But this ability has bounds. Even given
perfect descriptive knowledge, an ordinary rational being's competence only goes so far.
It may not reach so far as to enable this being to rationally treat like objective reasons
all the apparent facts that would be objective reasons if these facts were real. When
the bounds of competence are surpassed, conditions (i) and (ii) in DE RE can easily
be satisﬁed with respect to some consideration while the consideration fails to be an
apparent reason.
One can construct simple counterexamples to DE RE without appreciating these
deeper points. But I prefer putting the deeper points ﬁrst, because they allow us to see
how to forestall the main responses to simple counterexamples.
Let's consider these simple counterexamples. Here is one drawn from epistemology.
Suppose it appears to Jones that Pindeed, suppose Jones knows that P. And suppose
that P logically entails Q. So P is an objective reason to believe Q. Both clauses of DE
RE are satisﬁed: the relevant consideration is apparent, and this consideration would
be an objective reason to believe Q if true (indeed, it is one). Compatibly with all this,
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Jones's inferential abilities might be too limited for him to be sensitive to the logical
relation between P and Q. Indeed, the entailment might be arcane, visible only to the
greatest logicians. If so, Jones cannot rationally treat P like an objective reason to
believe Q. And if so, it is wrong to view Jones as having P as an apparent normative
reason to believe Q.
Notice that this diﬀers from a standard objection to the view that believing that
P is suﬃcient for possessing P as a normative reason. The standard objection to that
view is that irrationally believing that P cannot put one in a better epistemic position
with respect to P's consequences.5 But we stipulated that Jones knows that P. So the
problem has nothing to do with his epistemic position with respect to P. The problem
lies in his inability to rationally treat P like an objective reason to believe Q.
Defeat?
The problem is not plausibly addressed by an appeal to defeat. In the relevant sense of
`defeated', apparent reasons have to be defeated by other apparent reasons. In our case,
the fact that explains why Jones cannot rationally treat P as a reason to believe Q is
the fact that Jones's competence is limited. But this fact isn't one that itself must be
apparent to Jones to prevent him from possessing P as an apparent reason to believe Q.
People can be deceived about their own abilities. They can regard themselves as
geniuses when they are fools. If their incompetence is not apparent to them, it is
not the sort of thing that could serve to defeat another apparent reason. Will they
have other apparent defeaters owing to the mistakes their incompetence makes likely?
Not necessarily. Some fools may arrive at mostly correct results by ﬂuke. If so, they
will not possess indirect evidence for believing themselves to be incompetent. So a
defeat strategy will be inapplicable in some of these cases. Yet it is plausible that their
incompetence prevents them from possessing apparent reasons of the sort that bear on
substantive rationality.
5Schroeder (2011) addresses that standard objection, but not the one at issue here.
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Obviously, there is defeat in an objective sense in these cases. But that fact is ir-
relevant. In the sense of `defeated' relevant to rationality, apparent reasons have to be
defeated by other apparent reasons. Might our intuitions be confused, conﬂating objec-
tive and apparent defeat? Not plausibly. There can be unpossessed objective defeaters
for perfectly rational beliefs. Many Gettier cases are like this, and our intuitions do
not lead us astray in these cases. Intuitively, our case is nothing like these cases. It is
plausible in our case that it is not rational for Jones to believe that Q on the basis of
P, but implausible that rationality is lacking in standard cases of unpossessed objective
defeaters.
Let's put a nail in this coﬃn. Imagine again that P entails Q, but that the entailment
is an arcane one beyond Jones's competence. But now imagine that Jones treats P as
a reason to believe Q by means of an overgeneralizing incompetence that has, by sheer
luck, yielded correct results so far. Imagine that he lacks the second-order competence
to appreciate his ﬁrst-order incompetence. According to DE RE, he has an apparent
reason to believe Q. By stipulation, he also has no apparent defeaters. Now suppose
Jones believes Q, and that Q is true. By the lights of DE RE, Jones has a rational true
belief that Q. Clearly, Jones does not know Q. DE RE thus suggests that this case is a
kind of Gettier casea case of rational true belief without knowledge. This is absurd.
This case is nothing like a Gettier case. The obvious reason is that Jones's belief in Q
is not rational.
Finally, notice that the basic intuition in the ﬁrst case is that Jones cannot rationally
treat P like an objective reason to believe Q, from which we infer that P is not an
apparent reason for him to believe Q. So we are not committing the fallacy of assuming
that there is no reason when there is a weak one.6 We are not assuming this but
concluding it.
These matters of degree can be made explicit. Given Jones's limited abilities, it
is not rational to any degree for him to treat P like an objective reason to believe Q.
6Schroeder (2007, Ms) calls this the `negative existential reasons fallacy'. I agree that it is a fallacy.
I just do not see how this fallacy is driving the present argument. I also do not see how Schroeder's
usual strategy for explaining away the negative existential reasons intuition works here.
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Might he have an apparent reason to believe Q of zero weight? This diﬀers from our
conclusion only verbally. A reason with no weight is not a normative reason.
Why Not Demand the Enablers To Be Apparent?
The friend of DE RE could instead try to revise the view by requiring more descriptive
information to be apparent to the subject. But while this strategy can help to address
some cases, it cannot solve the fundamental problem.
To bring this out, let us consider the main version of this strategy. Notice that in
the case involving Jones, P's truth would be an objective reason to believe Q because
P logically entails Q. Facts about what is a reason for what are not brute facts. P
will generally be a reason for some attitude toward Q because further descriptive facts
obtain. This is not to say that these extra descriptive facts are further reasons to have
the attitude toward Q. They are enabling conditions.7 So one might revise DE RE thus:
enabled de re: R is an apparent reason for S to φ iﬀ (i) R's truth would be an
objective normative reason to φ given enabling conditions C, (ii) it appears to S
that R, and (iii) it appears to S that C.
But this view also fails: it is both too strong and too weak.
The view is clearly too strong for perceptually apparent epistemic reasons. Either
intrinsic or relational features of perceptual experiences enable them to provide reasons
for belief. Intrinsic features might include the presentational character of perceptual
experience; relational features might include the reliable links between experience and
reality. We do not need to represent these enabling conditions to form rational percep-
tual beliefs. This would be a serious overintellectualization of the very sort that DE RE
was designed to avoid. Children and animals do not form beliefs about these features
of perceptual experience. Even adults with the relevant concepts need not do so.
ENABLED DE RE is too strong even for apparent deductive reasons. Having beliefs
about entailments is one way to be sensitive to logical relations between propositions.
7Cf. Dancy (2004).
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But it is not the only way. Another way is to have the ability to competently infer one
proposition from another by following an inference rule. Instead of reasoning
(i) ¬(P ∨ Q)
(ii) If ¬(P ∨ Q), then ¬P ∧ ¬Q
(iii) So, by modus ponens, ¬P ∧ ¬Q,
one could directly infer (iii) from (i) by relying on one of the DeMorgan rules.
We cannot replace all rules by extra premises. Even axiomatic systems need some
rules. And most people simply do not reason axiomatically. People often use rules
rather than conditionals that express logical truths plus modus ponens. Admittedly,
most people are not so logically competent that they can use any potential rules as
easily as they use modus ponens. But equally clearly, there is a spectrum of acumen.
Some people do have the native logical abilities to cleave reliably to far more intricate
patterns.
If we accept ENABLED DE RE, we could not describe all the apparent reasons
these people can acquire. Competent inferrers need not represent the patterns to which
they cleave to possess premises as apparent reasons for conclusions. Yet ENABLED DE
RE entails that the premises fail to be apparent reasons for these subjects' conclusion
beliefs.
So, it cannot be claimed that what Jones is missing must be a further conditional
belief. Such a belief could help. But that is not the only way his situation could improve.
Rather than gaining a new conditional belief, Jones could acquire a new ability. DE
RE and ENABLED DE RE fail to accommodate this possibility. This is a problem.
These theories all represent a subject's set of apparent reasons by a set of descriptive
considerations that are apparent to the subject. ENABLED DE RE diﬀers from DE
RE only in requiring more descriptive considerations to be apparent. This strategy is
clearly misguided.
While too strong in one respect, ENABLED DE RE is too weak in another. What
fundamentally matters is not how much descriptive knowledge an agent possesses.
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Agents might have equal descriptive knowledge, yet more considerations might be ap-
parent reasons for one than for another. Among subjects with normative concepts, the
diﬀerence can manifest in one's having greater normative knowledge. Among subjects
without normative concepts, the diﬀerence can manifest in one's being in a position
to rationally treat more considerations like objective reasons. And that may owe to a
diﬀerence in competence.
As we trace beings down the spectrum of competence, fewer considerations will be
apparent reasons for them. But what diminishes down the spectrum is not necessarily
the number of apparent descriptive facts. We can imagine beings who grasp as many
descriptive facts as us but for whom fewer reasons are apparent owing to their lesser
abilities. ENABLED DE RE cannot capture these cases. It predicts that the range of
apparent reasons for a subject is simply a function of the number of apparent descrip-
tive facts for that subject. By neglecting the role of competence, it makes many bad
predictions.
Morals
I think the proper response to these observations is to abandon the approach represented
by standard de re theories, and to ﬁnd a theory that explicitly captures the role of
competence. This should not involve a retreat to DE DICTO. Given some controversial
views in the philosophy of mind, this better theory might entail DE DICTO. But there
is no obligation to commit to these views. We can choose a strictly weaker theory.
Might defenders of DE RE have another way to capture the role of competence?
Perhaps they could try to weaken the link between apparent reasons and rationality.
They might claim that it is rational for S to φ iﬀ (i) there are suﬃcient apparent reasons
for S to φ and (ii) S is in a position to competently treat them like objective reasons to
φ.
But this would be unsatisfying. Does someone with little mathematical ability have
apparent reasons to believe the most abstruse theorems of mathematics simply in virtue
of knowing the axioms? Not plausibly: owing to this person's limited abilities, he cannot
rationally treat these axioms like reasons to believe the theorems. It is better to place
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the competence constraint directly on the having of apparent normative reasons to φ.
2.3.2 The Problem of Wouldn't-Be Reasons
So far the objection has been that the conditions in de re theories are insuﬃcient for a
consideration to be an apparent reason. Are these conditions even necessary?
While its importance can be overstated, condition (ii) is necessary: R cannot be
an apparent reason for S to φ if it is not apparent to S that R. But we should doubt
condition (i), which entails:
(i*) R is an apparent normative reason for S to φ only if R's truth would give S
an objective normative reason to φ.
(i*) is stronger than it might seem. Notice, for example, that it entails:
(i**) If R is true, R is an apparent normative reason for S to φ only if R is an
objective normative reason for S to φ.
To see this, suppose that R is true. (i*) entails that R is an apparent reason to φ only
if its truth would be an objective reason to φ. Since R is true, it follows that R is an
objective reason to φ. So, (i*) entails that true apparent reasons to φ are objective
reasons to φ.
But we should reject this claim. Suppose that it appears to some scientists that it
is a law of nature that Fs are Gs, but this appearance is misleading. Every time an F
appeared to be a G involved an illusion; in reality, Fs are nomically guaranteed not to
be Gs. Now suppose that the scientists have been correctly told that X is an F, but
nothing more. The fact that X is an F is an apparent reason for the scientists to believe
that X is a G. But the fact that X is an F is not an objectively good reason to believe
that X is a G. Objectively speaking, the fact that X is an F is a conclusive reason to
believe that X is not a G.
There is a more general problem. We can state it as an argument against DE RE:
The Argument From Wouldn't-Be Reasons
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1. It is possible to rationally treat a consideration R like an objective reason to φ
even if R would not in fact be an objective reason to φ if true.
2. If it is rational for one to treat R like an objective reason to φ, R is an apparent
reason for one to φ.
3. So, it is possible for there to be apparent reasons for one to φ that wouldn't in
fact be objective reasons for one to φ if true.
4. If (3), DE RE is false (because condition (i) is false).
5. So, DE RE is false (because condition (i) is false).
Cases like the two just mentioned support premise (1). Premise (2) seems like a truism.
The rest of the argument is straightforward. This is a serious problem for DE RE, which
we might call the Problem of Wouldn't-Be Reasons.
This problem undermines DE RE's central explanatory resource. It is obvious that
not just any apparent fact is an apparent reason to φ. So, we ask, what makes an
apparent fact into an apparent reason to φ? If a theory of apparent reasons cannot
answer this question, it is defective. But the only answer that de re theorists give is
that this apparent fact must be one which would be an objective reason to φ if it were
real. The Argument from Wouldn't-Be Reasons suggests that this answer cannot answer
our central question.
How can a de re theorist respond? The only options are to (A) question premise
(2)'s status as a truism, or (B) deny that cases like the case of the misled scientists
support (1).
Against Strategy (A). Consider strategy (A) ﬁrst. One might complain that all that
is clear in the case of the misled scientists is that they would be rational to believe that
X is a G. One might claim that this belief would be rational not because the fact that
X is F is an apparent reason for them to believe that X is a G. It would be rational
simply because it is rational for them to treat X's being F like an objective reason to
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believe X is a G. And that treatment would be rational on de re grounds: so far every
F has appeared to be G.
I doubt that this saves DE RE. DE RE still implies that the fact that X is F is not
an apparent reason for the scientists to believe that X is a G. This is itself an intolerable
implication. So the starting point is ﬂawed: it simply isn't true that all that is clear in
the case of the misled scientists is that it would be rational for them to believe that X
is a G.
Still, the second part of strategy (A) needs to be addressedi.e., the suggestion that
it is rational for the scientists to treat X's being F like an objective reason to believe
that X is a G on purely de re grounds. For this suggestion contradicts a broader moral
I drew.
It can sound plausible that there are de re reasons why it is rational for the scientists
to treat X's being F like an objective reason to believe X is a G. Isn't the fact that all Fs
have appeared to be Gs an apparent reason to treat X's being F like an objective reason
to believe that X is a G? If so, the explanation of rational treating at least remains de
re.
My worry about this response is that it trades on tacitly assuming the presence of
something beyond mere de re appearanceviz., competence. The crucial question is
whether any beings to whom (a) all Fs have appeared to be Gs would be (b) at least
prima facie rational to treat the apparent fact that X is F like an objective reason to
believe that X is a G, where (b) is explained wholly by (a). The answer to this question
is `no'. There are surely possible beings who lack the competence to project inductively
from past experience. For such beings, all Fs could appear to be Gs, and yet it could
fail to be even prima facie rational for these beings to treat the fact that a new X is F
like an objective reason to believe that X is a G. The explanation is that they lack a
kind of competence.
This echoes an earlier point. Any adequate theory of apparent reasons must honor
the role of competence. Apppealing to de re appearances of objective reasons cannot
alone secure this desideratum. Hence, the deeper moral from the Problem of Wouldn't-
Be Reasons stands.
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Against Strategy (B). Strategy (A) fails. What about strategy (B), which involves
denying that the case of the misled scientists supports premise (1)? This strategy is
even less plausible. There are only two ways to pursue it. One way is to deny that it is
rational for the scientists to treat the fact that X is F like an objective reason to believe
that X is a G. This is clearly wrong. Another way would be to hold that the fact that
X is F is, after all, an objective reason to believe that X is a G. But this is false by
stipulation!
One might try to dispute the stipulation. But once we get clear on what it does not
exclude, there is no clear reason to do so. We did not stipulate that there is no other
objective reason for the scientists to believe that X is a G. The claim was that the fact
that X is an F is not an objective reason to believe that X is G. This is the only claim
that needs to be made. It entails that an apparent fact can be an apparent reason even
if this apparent fact would not be an objective reason if it were real. We could still
agree that the fact that all Fs have appeared to be Gs is a non-trivial objective reason
to believe that X is a G. But this does not undermine my point, which concerned the
fact that X is an F.8
There is no good solution, then, to the Problem of Wouldn't-Be Reasons. Given this
problem and the Problem of Unapparent Reasons, I doubt any pure de re theory will
do.
2.4 Competence, Appearance, and Treating
2.4.1 A Key Ingredient: Treating
A better theory is worth seeking. An ideal theory would avoid the problems for de re
theories without regressing to the excesses of de dicto theories.
How can one walk this ﬁne line? Well, remember that it is possible to treat a
consideration like an objective reason without having any normative concepts or beliefs.
A natural thought is to invoke this less demanding idea in a new theory. We could
8This forestalls application of the strategy from Lord (2010).
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construct a theory that is structurally like DE DICTO, but replace beliefs about objective
reasons with competent attractions to treat considerations like objective reasons.
The Problem of Unapparent Reasons recommends this approach. The problem arose
because it is possible for a proposition whose truth would provide an objective reason
to appear true without one's being in a position to rationally treat its apparent truth
like an objective reason. It makes sense to construct a theory that honors this thought.
It would, however, be hasty to construct a theory just on the basis of this thought. The
following theory will not do:
rationally attracted to treat (rat): R is an apparent normative reason
for S to φ iﬀ (i) it appears to S that R, and (ii) S is rationally attracted to treating
R like an objective normative reason to φ.9
As a necessary biconditional, RAT is plausible. But as a substantive theory, it is unsat-
isfying. Like other theorists, I want to explain rationality in terms of apparent reasons.
RAT looks circular from this perspective.
Still, RAT is extensionally plausible. So it would be nice to ﬁnd an extensionally
equivalent theory that does not appeal to rationality.
2.4.2 Another Key Ingredient: Competence
To see what such a theory would look like, remember the role of competence. If Jones's
logical competence is limited, then even if it is apparent to Jones that P and P logically
entails Q, it will not follow that P is an apparent reason for him to believe Q. As I have
stressed, what is at bottom needed to gain apparent reasons is greater competence, not
just further descriptive beliefs or appearances.
How is competence here to be understood? If objective reasons are the basic nor-
mative itemsas I've assumed with Parﬁt, Scanlon, et al.competence here must be
analyzed in terms of objective reasons and non-normative items. I think the competence
to invoke is a competence
9Here and elsewhere, being attracted to treat X like an F = feeling the pull to treat X like an F.
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to treat considerations like objective reasons of some relevant kind
only if
these considerations would, if true, be objective reasons of this kind
Call dispositions with this structure objective reasons-sensitive competences. Such com-
petences need not be infallible. Something might have a disposition to φ even if it does
not always φ. This does not mean that the disposition is a disposition to do something
weaker than φ-ing. It just means that it is a less than infallible disposition to φ.
To see why such competences matter, consider again the beings that lack the com-
petence to inductively generalize from experience. Even if P's truth would inductively
support believing Q and it is apparent to one of these beings that P, this being does not
ipso facto have an apparent inductive reason to believe Q. To gain P as an apparent
inductive reason to believe Q, what else does this being need? What this being needs
is a disposition
to treat considerations like objective inductive reasons for belief
only if
these considerations would, if true, be objective inductive reasons for belief
Together with the appearance that P, is this competence all that one needs to gain P
as an apparent inductive reason to believe Q?
Not quite. To see this, consider Julia. Julia is highly inductively competent. Right
now, the appearance that R is attracting Julia to inductively infer that S. But on this
rare occasion, Julia's attraction does not manifest her inductive competence. While
Julia is biased only with respect to a single topic, R and S concern this topic. We can
even suppose that Julia's bias by sheer luck gets it right here: totally unbeknownst to
Julia, R does greatly raise the objective probability that S. Still, the mere fact that
Julia (a) is attracted to inductively infer S on the basis of the apparent fact that R and
(b) possesses inductive competence doesn't (c) convert R into an apparent normative
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reason for Julia to believe S. What is needed for (c) is for Julia's attraction to manifest
her competence.
We can generalize from this point and earlier points to get a better theory:
competently attracted to treat (cat): R is an apparent reason for S to φ
iﬀ (i) it appears to S that R, (ii) S is attracted to treating R like an objective reason
to φ, and (iii) this attraction manifests S's relevant reasons-sensitive competence,
where a relevant reasons-sensitive competence is a competence to treat R-like
considerations like objective reasons to do φ-like things only if they are objective
reasons to do φ-like things.10
CAT is attractive. It avoids the Problem of Unapparent Reasons with its appeal to
treating and competence, and hence captures the main advantage that DE DICTO has
over DE RE. But it does so without any overintellectualizations.
2.4.3 CAT and the Problem of Wouldn't-Be Reasons
It is worth pausing, however, to explain why CAT also does not invite the Problem of
Wouldn't-Be Reasons. There are two reasons why it does not.
Reason 1: The Fallibility of Competence. First, CAT does not assume that com-
petences are infallible. One might be competently attracted to treat some consideration
like an objective reason to φ even if the truth of this consideration would not be an
objective reason to φ. This does not mean that the competence is a competence to do
something weaker than φ-ing. It is just a less than fallible competence to φ.
10I use `do' in a broad sense here to refer to attitudes as well as actions.
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Reason 2: The Competence/Performance Distinction. Secondly and more im-
portantly, there is a deeper competence/performance distinction.11 Having the compe-
tence to succeed does not entail being in a position to reliably succeed if one tries. A
competence is a disposition to succeed. Just like other dispositions, there are favorable
and unfavorable conditions for its successful manifestation.
Unfavorable conditions do not destroy competence. An archer retains the compe-
tence to hit the bull's-eye even when surprise gusts prevent her from being in a position
to do so. An agent with the same competence could be relocated to a systematically
unfavorable environment and be hoodwinked about its favorableness by a trickster.
Consider a color expert who is systematically tricked by unusual lighting induced by a
trickster. Her expertise is not destroyed, though she will be unreliable. The expertise
may even be displayed in a sense weaker than proper manifestation. Compare how a
car can exhibit its virtues for the road even in a display room.
All these points apply to objective reasons-sensitive competences. We ﬁnd an initial
illustration in the case from Williams (1981) where Bernie gets duped in his favorite
bar, receiving a glass of petrol and tonic that is visually indiscriminable from the gin
and tonic that he typically orders. Bernie's prudence is not undermined by the fact
that he is about to drink some petrol. Indeed, assuming that Bernie would beneﬁt from
the drink that he requested, his prudence is displayed, though not strictly manifested.
Conditions are simply unfavorable: through no fault of his own, he does something bad
for him.
It is easy to imagine an agent who systematically lands in unlucky circumstances
through no fault of her own. Like other dispositions to succeed, reasons-sensitive com-
petences may not even guarantee actual reliability. One could competently treat a vast
range of apparent considerations like objective reasons even if they wouldn't be objec-
tive reasons if true. All we need is for the circumstances to be both unfavorable and
misleading.
11In what follows, I am indebted to Ernest Sosain particular, to Sosa (2010)'s illuminating dis-
cussion of competence, and Sosa (1991, 1993)'s inﬂuential take on the new evil demon problem for
externalist accounts of justiﬁcation. What I will say simply generalizes what Sosa has already said in
epistemology.
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Appreciating these divergences between competence and reliability simpliciter lets
us avoid the Problem of Wouldn't-Be Reasons. We see that it is possible for one to
competently treat many considerations like objective reasons even if they would not be
objective reasons if true. This is why many apparent reasons need not be objective
reasons if true.
Although CAT nicely avoids the Problem of Wouldn't-Be Reasons, it does establish a
stronger connection between rationality and objective reasons than many have assumed.
While it correctly denies that all apparent reasons are would-be objective reasons, it
does entail a weaker conditionalviz., that:
if conditions for the exercise of competence are favorable, then considerations that
are competently treated like objective reasons are likely to be objective reasons
Since competences are not infallible even in favorable circumstances, it does not follow
that any consideration that is competently treated like an objective reason is an objec-
tive reason. But it is likely to be, in an objective sense: in favorable conditions, the
competence has a propensity to yield treatings that are correct.
There would be a problem if it were possible for (i) a consideration R to satisfy the
conditions in CAT while (ii) it is not rational for the subject to treat R like an objective
reason. But there is no compelling reason to believe this is possible. In every case in
which it is not rational to treat R like an objective reason, it will be implausible that
one's treating it like an objective reason can display the relevant competence. Consider
an archer who is rationally misled into thinking there will be gusts that require shooting
at a bizarre angle. If the archer did not shoot at this angle given this evidence, it would
be implausible to think that she would display her competence. Still, there are conclusive
objective reasons for her not to take the angle shot. After all, there will not be gusts!
I say the stronger connection with objective reasons that CAT establishes is a virtue.
While rationality does not guarantee reliability, the capacities that rational subjects
exercise in bad cases are the same capacities that actually reliable people exercise. The
diﬀerences lie in the favorableness of the circumstances and our sensitivity to them.
While we must recognize a notion of rationality that falls in between coherence and
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correctness, rationality is not intelligible independently of correctness. It is a competence
to achieve correctness, however fallible and unhelpful in unfavorable circumstances.
2.4.4 Further Analysis of Key Ingredients
CAT is the best theory we've seen. It steals the virtues of DE RE and DE DICTO while
avoiding their vices. But crucial concepts of the theory deserve further elucidation.
More on Treating and Attraction
Consider treating again. It is, I have stressed, intuitive that we can treat considerations
like objective reasons without having any normative concepts. Still, what exactly is it
to treat P like an objective normative reason to φ?
To treat P like an objective normative reason to φ is to be disposed to respond to
the appearance that P in all or at least most of the ways that would be favored if P were
an objective normative reason to φ. Why `all/most' rather than `some'? My reason for
imposing this stronger requirement is to get the right results in cases of supposition and
pretense. We do not want the relevant kind of treating to be compatible with pretense.
If you pretend for the sake of argument that P is a conclusive objective reason to φ,
you are not irrational if you fail to φ given the appearance that P. But if you competently
treat P like a conclusive objective reason to φ in the sense relevant to rationality, you
are irrational if you fail to φ given the appearance that P. The fundamental diﬀerence
is straightforward. If you merely pretend or suppose for the sake of argument that P is
a conclusive objective reason to φ, there will be many ways that you are not disposed
to respond to the appearance that P which would be correct P if P were a conclusive
objective reason to φ. You will not, for example, be disposed to adopt the stable
attitudes that would be appropriate if P were a conclusive objective reason to φ.
If this is what treating involves, why does CAT say only that apparent reasons are
considerations that one is attracted to treating like objective reasons? Why not require
that apparent reasons be considerations that one actually treats like objective reasons?
Here is the main reason for requiring less. Plausibly, weak-willed agents can have
conclusive apparent reasons to φ and yet fail to be motivated to φ. If CAT required
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actual treating, it would imply that such agents are impossible. Since this kind of agent
seems possible, we want to require less. Nevertheless, when one is weak-willed in the
face of an apparent reason, one is not left entirely cold. Real akratic agents will at least
feel some pull to treat the apparent reason like an objective reason, if it really is an
apparent reason for them. The trouble with the akratic agent is that her feeling this
pull is not suﬃcient to make her treat the relevant consideration like an objective reason
to φ.
So the weaker requirement is apt. Why does CAT require even this much? Couldn't
there be a sociopath who has conclusive apparent reasons to φ but who is left entirely
cold, failing even to feel the pull to treat these considerations as normative reasons to
φ?
I ﬁnd it implausible that this particular kind of sociopath is possible. Obviously,
there are conclusive objective reasons for these sociopaths not to act as they do. But
we are talking about apparent normative reasons. I don't see how a consideration
could be an apparent normative reason for someone to φ if the apparent truth of this
consideration doesn't even make her attracted to treat her situation like one in which
there is an objective reason to φ.12 It seems better to describe sociopaths as lacking the
ability to acquire certain objective reasons as apparent reasonsjust as CAT implies.
But can't it be apparent to sociopaths that what they are doing is morally wrong?"
Of course. But CAT doesn't imply otherwise. What it implies is that the appearance
that something is morally wrong fails to give the sociopath an apparent normative rea-
son. What is apparently immoral needn't be equally apparently disfavored by objective
reasons. Morality may seem to the sociopath just like etiquette seems to the enlight-
ened. Indeed, even in the more substantive sense of `rational' that falls in between
coherence and correctness, it sounds clearly false to deem sociopaths irrational.13 Yet
this kind of rationality consists in correctly responding to apparent normative reasons.
What sociopaths lack are, precisely, conclusive apparent normative reasons not to do
12Once again, `is attracted to φ' just means `feels the pull to φ'. It can sound odd to use talk of
attraction in the context of sociopaths and morality. But given what the language means, this is no
objection.
13Cf. Williams (1981).
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what they do. CAT's predictions here are plausible.
More on Competence
Another crucial notion in CAT that deserves further comment is the notion of compe-
tence. Earlier I said that the competence needed is a competence to:
to treat considerations like objective reasons of some relevant kind
only if
these considerations would, if true, be objective reasons of this kind
I have already talked at length about why requiring objective reasons-sensitive com-
petences in a theory of apparent reasons does not lead to a version of the Problem of
Wouldn't-Be Reasons. Still, questions remain about these competences.
A central question concerns their individuation. It is clear that to have an apparent
deductive reason to believe Q, it is not necessary that a subject be competent with
every kind of deductive inference. But if `reasons of the relevant kind' is understood in
a coarse-grained way, CAT might seem to make this crazy demand: the relevant kind
of reason might then just be deductive reason for belief.
Accordingly, we should want a more ﬁne-grained picture. But we don't want too
much ﬁneness of grain. Consider the disposition to:
(a) treat the apparent conjunctive fact that Bob is 6 feet tall and Mary is 5 feet
tall like an objective reason to believe that Bob is taller than Mary
This disposition is a competence: the reality of the apparent fact in question would be
an objective reason to believe that Bob is taller than Mary. But we can imagine possible
people who have this disposition but lack related dispositions, such as the disposition
to:
(b) treat the apparent conjunctive fact that Sally is 5 feet tall and Billy is 4 feet
tall like an objective reason to believe that Sally is taller than Billy
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Consider, indeed, a subject who has no further dispositions of this form. Call him
Weirdo. The only disposition Weirdo has is (a). Weirdo has the reverse of disposition
(b): he will treat the apparent conjunctive fact mentioned in (b) like an objective reason
to disbelieve that Sally is taller than Billy. Weirdo fails to manifest any grip on why
the apparent conjunctive fact in (a) would be an objective reason to believe that Bob
is taller than Mary.
We do not want to respond to this observation by requiring that a subject must
have beliefs about why a consideration would be an objective reason in order to possess
it as an apparent reason. This would be a gross overintellectualization. We can have
competences to respond to certain sorts of reasons without having detailed knowledge
of what makes them good reasons. So, what we want to require is that a subject have
competence beyond the trivially narrow competence to treat one highly speciﬁc reason
like an objective reason.
How should we require more? Note that there is a broader inferential pattern to
which Weirdo fails to be sensitive:
(A) X is m units tall.
(B) Y is n > m units tall
(C) Y is taller than X.
Of course, not all objective epistemic reasons qualify as such in virtue of being subsumed
under necessarily truth-preserving inference patterns. But even ampliative epistemic
reasons and non-epistemic reasons sometimes ﬁt into patterns. The fact that all observed
ravens are black is an objective reason to believe that all ravens are black precisely
because facts of the form all observed Fs are Gs are generally objective reasons to believe
conclusions of the form all Fs are Gs. The fact that it is healthy to eat vegetables is an
objective reason to intend to eat them precisely because facts of the form it is healthy
to eat X are generally objective reasons to form intentions with contents of the form I
eat X.
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When reasons fall into patterns, we can better understand the competences invoked
by CAT. When there is a good pattern of reasoning that subsumes the subject's reason-
ing, the competences will be competences to treat considerations like objective reasons
in accordance with some relevant pattern.14 Not all such reasoning must be inferential.
Suppose that I see that there is a red sphere before me. If I form the belief that there
is a red sphere before me in response to this visual experience, I believe for a reason.
But this instance of believing for a reason is not inferential. Clearly, though, there is a
general pattern of good reasoning that my transition instantiates: namely, treating the
fact that I have an experience with a certain content like an objective reason to believe
that content.
So CAT can be modiﬁed:
(cat*) R is an apparent reason for S to φ iﬀ
(i) it appears to S that R,
(ii) S is attracted to treating R like an objective reason to φ,
(iii) this attraction manifests S's competence to treat considerations like objective
reasons to do φ-like things only if they are objective reasons to do φ-like things,
and
(iv) if there are patterns of good reasoning that subsume the favoring relation
between R and φ-ing, S is competent with some and manifests this competence.
CAT* only requires that the subject be competent with some general pattern of rea-
soning if there is any such pattern. To see why this is right, note that there are often
are several good patterns of reasoning from R to φ-ing. The fact that the glass contains
orange juice is an objective reason to drink on two counts: it would be healthy, and
it would be delicious. If I am attracted to treat this fact like an objective reason to
drink only as a manifestation of my disposition to drink healthy beverages, I still have
an apparent reason to drink if I see that this glass contains orange juice. Accordingly,
if my reasoning instantiates only one pattern of competent reasoning, that is enough.
14Here and elsewhere, I use `reasoning' in a broad sense to mean responding to (possibly bad) reasons.
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Some might wonder whether there will always be broader patterns of good reasoning
to which we can appeal. But I have not assumed that there always will be broader
patterns. I have only assumed that when there are broader patterns, the subject must be
competent with some of them. Sure, not every good piece of reasoning will be subsumed
by some interesting broader pattern. But it would be implausible to deny that there are
ever any interesting broader patterns. When there are, competence requires proﬁciency
with some of them. How else can we explain what Weirdo was missing, for example?
2.4.5 Taking Stock
With these clariﬁcations in place, I think we should treat CAT* like what it is: a superior
theory to the others on oﬀer. Let us brieﬂy take stock of why.
CAT* avoids overintellectualization without inviting the Problem of Unapparent
Reasons. This is achieved by its appeal to the notion of treating something like an
objective reason. CAT* avoids overintellectualization because such treating does not
require the possession of any normative concepts. But it still avoids the Problem of
Unapparent Reasons, because it is natural to think that if one is attracted to treat R
like an objective reason, R is an apparent reason and not merely a frictionless apparent
fact.
We do not want just any considerations that subjects are attracted to treat like ob-
jective reasons to count as apparent normative reasons. Suppose I am attracted to treat
P like an objective reason to believe Q via some wildly overgeneralizing incompetence,
where I am unaware that I have this incompetence. I do not gain a serious apparent
reason to believe Q. CAT*'s appeal to competence addresses this problem for DE RE.
Moreover, it does so without appealing to further primitive normative concepts beyond
the concept of an objective reason. After all, we analyzed the competences to which
CAT* appeals in terms of dispositions to treat objective reasons like objective reasons.
Once again, this does not lead us back to the Problem of Wouldn't-Be Reasons.
There is a gap between competence and performance. If one is excusably misled about
the favorableness of one's circumstances, one might retain a competence to φ but not be
in a position to reliably φ. This oﬀers a way to diagnose what is happening in the cases
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that support distinguishing between rationality and correctness. Consider Williams's
petrol and tonic case. Bernie does possess an objective reasons-sensitive competence:
he is just excusably misled about his circumstances, like the great archer who receives
strong misleading evidence that there will not be gusts each time she tries to shoot.
Certainly, the connection between apparent reasons and objective reasons is stronger
according to CAT* than according to theories like DE DICTO. But this is a virtue, not
a vice. It is true that rationality does not guarantee actual reliability. But it is not
true that the capacities that rational subjects exercise are diﬀerent from the capacities
that many actually reliable subjects exercise. The capacities are the same: what diﬀer
are the favorableness of the circumstances and the subject's sensitivity to them. Even
if we recognize a notion of rationality that falls between coherence and correctness, we
do not need to think that rationality is divorced from correctness: it is a competence to
achieve correctness, however fallible and unhelpful in unfortunate circumstances.
2.5 But Don't Envelopes Slice All the Theories?
CAT* fares better than DE DICTO and DE RE. It does, however, share with both
a feature that some ﬁnd objectionable. Speciﬁcally, all three theories entail that ap-
parent reasons are apparently objective reasons. These theories simply understand the
`apparently' in diﬀerent ways. Call this the Thesis of Apparent Objectivity (TAO).
Some believe there is a decisive reason to reject TAO: namely, that we can rationally
do what we know there is not most objective reason to do. This objection to TAO can
be illustrated with a case from Jacob Ross:
Three Envelopes. Chester can choose one of three envelopes. He is correctly told
by a reliable informant that there is $800 in Envelope 1. He is also correctly
told there is $1000 in either Envelope 2 or 3, and that the envelope that lacks it
is empty. But he cannot learn anything else about which might contain it (and
knows this).15
15See Ross (2012).
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Cases like Three Envelopes can seem to pose a problem for TAO. Chester ought ratio-
nally to pick Envelope 1. But Chester can know that there is more objective reason
for him to do otherwise. For he can know that either (i) there is more objective reason
to choose Envelope 2 or (ii) that there is more objective reason to choose Envelope 3.
After all, there is $200 more in one of them. So, Chester ought rationally to make a
choice that there is apparently insuﬃcient objective reason to make.
Is that inconsistent with TAO? Many automatically assume that it is. But it is not.
We have only discussed theories about what it is for a consideration to be an apparent
normative reason to φ. They are not theories about the comparative weight of apparent
reasons. Maybe, then, there are ways of weighing apparent reasons that (i) preserve
the thought that all apparent reasons are apparently objective (i.e., TAO), but also (ii)
aﬃrm that there is suﬃcient apparent reason for Chester to choose Envelope 1.
Consider:
no specific dominance (nsd): R is a suﬃcient apparent reason to φ iﬀ
(i) R is an apparently objective reason to φ,
and
(ii) there is no consideration other than R that is apparently a stronger ob-
jective reason to pursue any speciﬁc alternative to φ-ing,
* where speciﬁc alternatives include things like taking Envelope 2 but not
things like not taking Envelope 1.
NSD is compatible with TAO. NSD entails that a suﬃcient apparent reason must be an
apparently objective reason, and hence entails TAO.
NSD is plausible. Suppose that I am φ-ing, and I know that I could never discover a
better objective reason to pursue some speciﬁc alternative to φ-ing. Suppose moreover
that I know that there is a good objective reason to φ. It seems natural for me to
conclude that I am rationally permitted to continue to φ. What else am I supposed
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to do? I cannot rationalize pursuing any speciﬁc alternative to φ-ing, because I lack
any apparently stronger objective reason to pursue any speciﬁc alternative. Moreover,
I know that there is at least an objective reason to φ. This is all compatible with my
knowing generically that there is something better I could do, if I cannot discover the
speciﬁc thing that is better.
Similar points apply to Three Envelopes. The fact that there is $800 in Envelope
1 is a strong objective reason for Chester to choose it. This fact is apparent to him.
Moreover, the generic fact that there is an envelope that contains $1000 fails to be
an apparent objective reason for Chester to pursue any speciﬁc alternative to choosing
Envelope 1. Not choosing Envelope 1 is not a speciﬁc alternative. There are two ways
not to choose, and no apparent objective basis for discriminating. If Chester's apparent
reason to choose Envelope 1 is insuﬃcient, there must be an apparent objective basis
for discrimination.
This is plausible, and it supports NSD. Isn't withholding from choosing any envelope
a speciﬁc available alternative? Yes. But there are decisive objective reasons not to
withhold: viz., the fact that there is $800 within Chester's reach which he will lack
if he withholds forever and the fact that he cannot know before acting which of the
other two envelopes contains the $1000. These are not just apparent facts. They are
objective facts. The second fact is a fact only because Chester is ignorant. But it is still
an objective fact!16
So NSD predicts that Chester has a suﬃcient apparent reason to choose Envelope
1. This is because Chester's apparent objective reason to choose Envelope 1 is not
outweighed by any apparent objective reason for any speciﬁc alternative to Envelope 1.
16The fact that ignorance has objective eﬀects is often ignored. But it matters: it destroys the
tendency to assume that real rather than merely apparent reasons must be ones we would have if
we knew all the facts. Dancy (2000: 69) anticipated this point: Assessing rationality relative to
incomplete information does not require us to think that the rationality we are assessing is subjective
in any damaging sense. . . . It is worth remembering in this connection that the fact that I do not know
something can itself be a reason. Suppose that my information is limited, and I know this, and that
I have no time to make further enquiries. The action I have most reason to do might not be the one
that I would have had most reason to do if I had had more time to ﬁnd out more of what I needed
to know. This should remind us of Prichard's example of slowing down at a junction. In that case,
the objectivist seemed perfectly able to say that the main reason for slowing down is that one does not
know whether any traﬃc is coming. If one had known that there was no traﬃc coming, perhaps one
would have had no reason to slow down.
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This prediction is plausible. And it is compatible with TAO.
Cases like Three Envelopes do not undermine TAO. Since TAO is plausible and
CAT* is the best theory on oﬀer that entails it, we can retain our conﬁdence in CAT*.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
I turn to some loose ends and concluding remarks.
I have argued against two major types of views about apparent reasons and presented
an alternative that absorbs their virtues while avoiding their vices. I have also showed
that the larger family to which all these theories belongnamely, theories that entail
TAOare not undermined by cases like Three Envelopes.
One might be left wondering whether there are even better theories that fall outside
this class. As far as I know, the only other obvious alternative is a dualist one that takes
as normatively primitive both objective reasons and apparent reasons (or something
in the ballpark).17 According to such theories, the best that we can do is point to
connections that apparent reasons bear to other subjectively normative" phenomena
like rationality. Since we ought to avoid multiplying normative primitives, my approach
is preferable.
Another kind of theory that I have not explicitly considered is a theory on which
rationality is to be analyzed in terms of possessed normative reasons. The status of this
theory depends upon the status of what Schroeder (2008) calls the Factoring Account.
On the Factoring Account, possessing a normative reason is a matter of (i) there ob-
jectively existing a normative reason and (ii) one's bearing some possession relation to
this pre-existing reason. Schroeder rejects this account and takes the idea of a possessed
reason as a further normative primitive. This is, of course, just a form of dualism.
But if the Factoring Account is true, the possessed reasons theory does diverge from
all the theories discussed so far. Originally I suggested that the `apparent' in `apparent
reasons' is not a success term: something can be an apparently objective reason in spite
of not being an objective reason. But if both the Factoring Account and the possessed
17See Ross (2006).
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reasons theory are true, the `apparent' is a success term.
This is a vice. Apparent reasons need not be objective reasons or would-be objective
reasons. This was the lesson of the Problem of Wouldn't-Be Reasons. Recall again the
case of the misled scientists. It appears to the scientists that it is a law that Fs are Gs,
but this appearance is misleading. Every time an F appeared to be a G involved an
illusion; in reality, Fs are nomically guaranteed to be non-Gs. The scientists have been
correctly told that X is an F, but nothing more. The fact that X is an F is an apparent
reason for the scientists to believe that X is a G. But the fact that X is an F is not an
objective reason to believe that X is a G. That fact is an objective reason to believe
that X is not a G.
This is compatible with aﬃrming that there is an objective reason for the scientists
to believe that X is a G. The claim was only that the fact that X is an F is not the
objective reason. This is the only claim that needs to be made: it alone shows that
there can be apparent reasons that would not be objective reasons if true.18 After all,
it is true that X is an F in this case, but this truth is not an objective reason to believe
that X is a G.
Compatibly with all this, one might say that the fact that all Fs have appeared to be
Gs is itself an objective reason to believe that X is a G. I see no need to resist this claim
in worlds where there is an otherwise generally reliable connection between appearance
and reality. This doesn't undermine the point, which concerned the status of the fact
that X is F. Anyhow, we could always imagine skeptical scenarios where appearances
are not reliably connected with the facts. In these worlds, there need not be decent
objective reasons for beliefs or other attitudes that are perfectly rational.
We might also agree that possessed objective reasons have a role to play other than
analyzing rationality. Indeed, I think this is true. I think we ought to distinguish be-
tween justiﬁcation and rationality. Justiﬁcation also falls short of objective rightness,
but it is stronger than rationality: truly justifying reasons must be objective reasons.
18Lord (2010) does not address this worry.
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This leads to a picture on which three reason-involving phenomena must be distin-
guished:
Correct φ-ing, which consists in φ-ing in conformity with all objective reasons.
Justiﬁed φ-ing, which consists in φ-ing in compliance with the objective reasons
that one possesses.
Rational φ-ing, which is φ-ing in compliance with all one's apparent reasons.
Assuming that possession can itself be analyzed without appeal to any normative items
other than objective reasons, this threefold distinction violates no canons of parsimony.
Possession can be so analyzed. Indeed, I would recommend an account of possession
that exploits some of the same concepts used in CAT*. Following Ernest Sosa, we
should distinguish between competence and aptness. One φs competently when one's
φ-ing manifests a competence to succeed, relative to some standard of success. One can
succeed and possess competence, but fail to succeed due to one's competence. Apt φ-ing
is then φ-ing whose success manifests competence. We have considered attractions to
treat considerations like objective reasons, and the competences at issue will be deﬁned
just with objective reasons and dispositions. The attractions will be:
right, when the considerations that attract are in fact objective reasons
competent, when they manifest dispositions to treat only objective reasons like
objective reasons, and
apt, when their rightness manifests competence (in the earlier senses).
If being competently attracted to treat things like objective reasons is what we need to
analyze apparent reasons, being aptly attracted to treat things like objective reasons is
what we need to analyze possessed objective reasons. Aptness entails competence, so
all possessed normative reasons are objective reasons. This sits well with the Factoring
Account.
This is an extension of the approach that I lack space to further develop here.
Apparent reasons were the focus, and there are powerful reasons to doubt that apparent
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reasons are possessed objective reasons. But it is a virtue of my overall approach that it
extends naturally to help us understand possessed objective reasons. Even if one does
not accept my view, this is more evidence that my overall approach is worth taking
seriously.
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Chapter 3
Rationality and Justiﬁcation: Reasons to Divorce?
Overview
Many epistemologists treat rationality and justiﬁcation as the same thing. Those who
don't lack detailed accounts of the diﬀerence, leading their opponents to suspect that
the distinction is an ad hoc attempt to safeguard their theories of justiﬁcation. In this
paper, I oﬀer a new and detailed account of the distinction. The account is inspired
by no particular views in epistemology, but rather by insights from the literature on
reasons and rationality outside of epistemology. Speciﬁcally, it turns on a version of
the familiar distinction in meta-ethics between possessing apparent normative reasons
(which may be merely apparent) and possessing objective normative reasons. The paper
proceeds as follows. In 1, I discuss the history of indiﬀerence to the distinction between
rationality and justiﬁcation in epistemology and the striking contrast with meta-ethics.
I introduce the distinction between apparent reasons and possessed objective reasons in
2 and provide a deeper basis for it in 3. I explain how the ideas extend to epistemology
in 4 and explore the upshots for some central issues in 5.
3.1 Indiﬀerence
3.1.1 A History of Indiﬀerence
Examples abound of epistemologists treating rationality and justiﬁcation as the same
thing. In a classic attack on reliabilism, Stewart Cohen tells us:
`[R]easonable' and `rational' are virtual synonyms for `justiﬁed'.1
1Cohen (1984: 283).
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Michael Huemer writes:
Another word for what is justiﬁed...is `rational'.2
Somewhat more cautiously, Richard Fumerton says:
The metaepistemological project I am interested in concerns the concept of jus-
tiﬁed or rational belief.... [T]he expression `rational' might be somewhat less
misleading than the expression `justiﬁed', but I will continue to use the two terms
interchangeably....3
Laurence BonJour aﬀords another example in discussing Samantha the unwitting clair-
voyant: [Her] irrationality...prevent[s] her belief from being epistemically justiﬁed.4
There are more recent examples. Sinan Dogramaci writes in a forthcoming paper:
Rationality, justiﬁcation, reasonableness: same thing. Use whichever word you
like.5
And in a recent defense of the accessibility of justiﬁcation, Declan Smithies tells us:
To say that one has justiﬁcation to believe a proposition is to say that it is rational
or reasonable for one to believe it.6
The indiﬀerence also arises in less explicit ways. Often it surfaces in expressions like
`rationality or justiﬁcation', as used in the following sentence from Ralph Wedgwood:
I propose that it is a necessary condition on the rationality or justiﬁcation of
your current enduring belief-states that they should meet certain conditions of
coherence.7
2Huemer (2001: 22).
3Fumerton (1995: 19); a search for `rational' in the index yields: `Rational belief. See justiﬁed
belief'.
4BonJour (1985: 39)
5Dogramaci (forthcoming: 3).
6Smithies (2012: 274).
7Wedgwood (2012: 280).
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Just do a Google search for `rationality or justiﬁcation' or `justiﬁcation or rationality'.
You get many hits. Revealingly, most are from epistemologists in diﬀerent generations
who are treating the verbal diﬀerence as marking no real distinction.
3.1.2 Why Indiﬀerence Is Striking
The indiﬀerence would be unremarkable if it were paralleled in other normative sub-
disciplines. But it isn't. In ethics, many doubt whether the fact that it is rational
for S to φ entails that there are truly good reasons for S to φ. Many defend views on
which the entailment fails. Derek Parﬁt, for example, holds that rationality consists in
correctly responding to apparent normative reasons, where `apparent' is not a success
term: We ought rationally to respond to apparent reasons even if...these reasons are
not real.8 And Parﬁt's view is just one member of a family of views that analyze ra-
tionality in terms of apparent or subjective normative reasons, in contrast to objective
normative reasons.9 On many views, an apparent normative reason is not a special kind
of objective normative reason.10
Other meta-ethicists doubt that there are always genuine reasons to comply with
requirements of rationality. John Broome writes: I doubt that, necessarily, we ought
to satisfy each of the individual requirements of rationality. Indeed, I doubt that, nec-
essarily, we have any reason to satisfy each of these requirements.11 And Niko Kolodny
argues that there is no genuine reason to be rational as such, debunking intuitions to
the contrary with an error theory. This error theory rests essentially on an account of
rationality on which it consists in heeding what appear to be good reasons.12
Admittedly, no discontinuity between epistemology and ethics follows immediately
from these observations. This is because talk of justiﬁcation is somewhat uncommon
in contemporary ethics. Normative reasons have become the most popular currency for
8Parﬁt (2011: 111).
9See also Parﬁt (2001), Schroeder (2008, 2009, 2011) and Way (2009).
10One exception is Lord (2010), whose view I'll discuss in 2. Reﬂections on Lord's view provide the
basis for my distinction between apparent reasons and possessed objective reasons.
11Broome (2005: 321).
12See Kolodny (2005), whose view was inspired by Scanlon (1998).
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cashing out normative claims. When one asks what normative reasons are supposed
to be, one usually hears that they are considerations that count in favor of acts or
attitudes.
Still, many ethicists would regard justiﬁcation as going hand in hand with the posses-
sion of real rather than merely apparent normative reasons. Normative reasons are often
explicitly agreed to be the kinds of things which can help to justify our attitudes and
acts if we possess them. Indeed, many people use the motivating/normative distinction
interchangeably with the motivating/justifying distinction.13
Moreover, the main context in which talk of justiﬁcation arises in contemporary
ethics is when people are distinguishing between justiﬁcations and excuses. In recent
work, distinctions involving reasons draw the line. John Gardner, for example, treats
justiﬁcations for φ-ing as consisting in normative reasons to φ and excuses for φ-ing as
consisting not in normative reasons to φ but rather in the appearance that there were
reasons to φ.14
Now, there was a time when excuses were understood merely as denials of respon-
sibility.15 But this was a mistake. Excuses can express our responsibility, by showing
that we rationally reacted to the sadly misleading appearance that there were justifying
reasons. As Gardner writes, in this respect the action remains rational, and the agent
who oﬀers it claims rational competence. And this, in turn, is where an excuse dif-
fers fundamentally from a denial of responsibility.16 But a diﬀerence with justiﬁcation
remains, because
it is one thing to have a reason to defend oneself and quite another to have every
reason to believe that one has a reason to defend oneself that in reality one does
not have (e.g. because one strayed accidentally and without warning onto the set
of an action movie).... In that case the most we can hope for is an excuse.17
13Lenman (2009) provides an overview of the literature on the motivating/normative contrast that
uses the term `justifying reason' instead of `normative reason'. Before the 2000s, this was more common.
Dancy (2000: 67) takes exception to the identiﬁcation of normative and justifying reasons, but he seems
to be relying on the dialectical sense of `justify' in this passagea sense that epistemologists often avoid.
14Gardner (2007).
15See, e.g., Hart (1968).
16Gardner (2007: 86).
17Gardner (2007: 87).
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Gardner's points address internalists who insist that the distinction between justiﬁcation
and blamelessness cannot explain away their intuitions.18 Crucially, excusability is more
than blamelessness. It is a positive statusindeed, a product of the same competences
that enable us to correctly respond to objective normative reasons when conditions are
favorable. But it can fall short of a real justiﬁcation, since the fact that one's reason
appears to be objectively good doesn't always guarantee that it is objectively good.
3.1.3 Why Resisting Indiﬀerence Matters
The mismatch between ethics and epistemology might be worth ignoring if nothing in
epistemology turned on it. But this is not the case. Among other things, the distinction
proves important for debates between internalists and externalists about justiﬁcation in
epistemology just as it proved important for debates between internalists and external-
ists about normative reasons in meta-ethics.
Consider a watershed moment in meta-ethics to see the resemblance. T. M. Scanlon
was one of the ﬁrst to distinguish between rationality and correctly responding to genuine
normative reasons. The distinction played a signiﬁcant role in his response to Bernard
Williams's rejection of externalism about normative reasons. Williams famously said:
There are...many things that a speaker may say to one who is not disposed to φ
when the speaker thinks that he should be, as that he is inconsiderate, or cruel,
or selﬁsh, or imprudent; or that things, and he, would be a lot nicer if he were
so motivated.... But one who makes a great deal out of putting the criticism in
the form of an external reason statement seems concerned to say that what is
particularly wrong with the agent is that he is irrational.
Scanlon replied: Williams is quite right that this claim would be implausible, but
wrong...to hold that his opponent is committed to it.19 Wrong, Scanlon insists, because
it needn't be irrational to fail to respond to good reasons if the quality of these reasons
is not apparent. Williams's internalist strictures might apply to factors that it would
be irrational not to heed. But the externalist's theory need not concern these factors.
18See especially Pryor (2001).
19Scanlon (1998: 27).
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This thought has become common among externalists in meta-ethics. It is no surprise
that the resurgence of externalism has been matched by a wave of skepticism about the
signiﬁcance of rationality. One way to put a nail in the internalist coﬃn is to agree that
internalists are right about rationality but to deny that rationality matters as such. The
absence of similar thoughts in epistemology is strikingespecially striking if we recall
the passage that follows my opening quote from Cohen:
If the Reliabilist wants to distinguish `justiﬁed' from `reasonable' or `rational' he
may do so. But clearly the important epistemic concept, the one epistemologists
have been concerned with, is what the Reliabilist would call `reasonability' or
`rationality'.
Reliabilists would do well to mimic Scanlon and dispute both parts of the last sentence.
Grant to Cohen that rationality can come apart from reliability, and that it can thwart
the fundamental epistemic goal of believing truly. One could then ask: Why not take
this to show that rationality lacks importance as such from the epistemic point of view?
One could push further: Why think this concept is `the one epistemologists have been
concerned with' in giving theories of justiﬁcation? `Justiﬁcation' is often stipulatively
deﬁned by its role in JTB+ theories of knowledge. It is hardly clear that rationality
will be ﬁt to play this role if we understand it on its own terms.
So, the distinction between rationality and justiﬁcation is not merely a pedantic one.
It matters if it resembles the distinction drawn in meta-ethics. The parallel distinction in
meta-ethics marked a triumph for externalists. If externalists are right about normative
reasons, the internalists' idée ﬁxe arguably has derivative signiﬁcance at best. Apparent
reasons should attract as much underivative interest as apparent wealth. Externalists in
epistemology could reasonably claim that internalists are looking for fool's gold unless
they somehow merge clarity and distinctness of appearance with truth-conducivity.
3.1.4 Antecedents and the Need for Detail
Some epistemologists have been more careful than the ones I quoted at the outset. The
only trouble is that these epistemologists have not given detailed accounts of what the
rationality/justiﬁcation distinction is supposed to be. This invites Cohen's worry that
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the distinction is merely a way to save their theories of justiﬁcation from counterexam-
ples.
Goldman (1986: 27), for example, writes:
I will not attempt to analyze...all terms of epistemic evaluation. The salient omis-
sion here is rationality, which has ﬁgured prominently in epistemology.
Since Goldman spends several chapters giving a process reliabilist account of justiﬁca-
tion, he clearly acknowledges a distinction between justiﬁcation and rationality. More
recently, Alex Jackson (2011) and Clayton Littlejohn (2012) have relied on the dis-
tinction. Jackson relies on it in critiquing seemings internalism about justiﬁcation.
Littlejohn's project requires such a distinction, since he denies that there are justiﬁed
false beliefs! Jackson and Littlejohn are aware of the meta-ethics literature on which
I'm drawing. But neither oﬀers a detailed account of how rationality and justiﬁcation
diﬀer.
Greater detail is needed. One reason is that the most common distinction in meta-
ethics is between correctly responding to apparent reasons and correctly responding to
all the objective reasons in the world. But justiﬁcation is not a function of all the
objective reasons, if we follow meta-ethicists in taking these to include virtually any
facts. It is at most a function of the objective reasons that one possesses. We need an
argument that possessed objective reasons and apparent reasons are distinct.
Another reason why more care is needed is that many meta-ethicists understand
rationality very narrowly. While they hold that rationality requires correctly responding
to apparent reasons, many will understand `apparent' in a belief-relative way and view
this requirement as a coherence requirement. Epistemologists are unlikely to ﬁnd this
interesting. Coherentism about anything other than coherence is now widely rejected.
This does not show that the meta-ethics literature is irrelevant or that the distinction
can't be drawn. It just shows the need for greater detail and carewhich I'll provide.
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3.1.5 The Plan
Here is the plan. In 2, I explain which concepts from meta-ethics should be imported
into epistemology. I use the distinction between apparent reasons and possessed objec-
tive reasons to explain the distinction between substantive rationality and justiﬁcation,
and I separate both of these statuses from structural rationality. In 3, I provide a deeper
account of the distinction between apparent and possessed objective reasons that falls
directly out of an account I've elsewhere given of the nature of apparent reasons. In 4,
I explain how my distinctions extend to epistemology and improve on prior attempts
to bifurcate epistemic evaluation. In 5, I explore the implications for major issues in
epistemology.
3.2 Objective Reasons, Possession, and Apparent Reasons
3.2.1 Objective Reasons and the Early Distinction
Much of the conceptual progress in recent meta-ethics owes to the way meta-ethicists
have come to understand normative reasons. Since the late 1990s, it has been popular
to view normative reasons as objective facts that count in favor of acts and attitudes.
Such facts are not ones to which we necessarily have access. For example, the fact that
the lemonade is arsenic-laced is a conclusive normative reason for one not to drink it
even if one is unaware of this fact. Call reasons of this sort objective reasons.
What is the connection between these reasons and rationality? There is clearly no
direct connection. It is not irrational to drink the lemonade if one cannot see that it
is arsenic-laced. And it may be irrational for one to drink some lemonade even if it is
not arsenic-laced but merely appears to be. So, a consideration P's being an objective
reason to φ seems neither necessary nor suﬃcient for P to exert rational pressure to φ.
This fact initially led people in meta-ethics to distinguish between rational φ-ing
and φ-ing that is supported by all the objective normative reasons. And when this
distinction was ﬁrst drawn, many meta-ethicists understood rationality very narrowly.
The requirements of rationality got identiﬁed with coherence requirements such as:
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(Enkrasia) Rationality requires that if you believe you ought to φ, you φ.20
(Means-End) Rationality requires that if you intend to E and believe that M-ing
is a necessary means for E-ing, you intend to M.
In the early 2000s, it was popular to view `rationality requires' as taking wide scope over
the conditionals, so that these requirements could be complied with in several ways.21
On this wide scope view, one could comply with Enkrasia by φ-ing or by dropping one's
belief that one ought to φ. Even those who rejected the wide scope account agreed that
the pressures of coherence are essentially hypothetical and rationally escapable, and diﬀer
from substantive pressures in this respect.22 This picture led meta-ethicists to regard
the key distinction as a distinction between structural and substantive evaluations.
The distinction between structural and substantive evaluations is important. But the
contrast between the pressures of rationality and the pressures of objective reasons isn't
fully captured by this distinction. For we cannot ground the pressures of all apparent
reasons by appeal to coherence requirements. Consider:
(*) If it appears to you that there is arsenic in the glass, the apparent fact that
there is arsenic in the glass is an apparent reason for you not to plan to drink from
it.
Even if the perceptual appearance is misleading, it is prima facie irrational to ignore
the apparent reason it provides. That is true regardless of whether one takes a doxastic
stance on the presence of arsenic in the glass. So, (*) is not merely a descendant of
Enkrasia.
Might one claim that appearances can always give objective reasons strong enough
to explain the relevant rational pressure? Not plausibly. You might reside in an empty
world being fed pure illusion by some demon. The appearances here bear no objective
probabilistic relation to extra-mental facts. If so, they cannot provide serious objective
reasons for beliefs about these facts in these worlds.
20`Enkrasia' is John Broome's term; see, e.g., Broome (2013).
21Thanks to Broome (1999)'s inﬂuence. Schroeder (2004) and Kolodny (2005) marked a departure.
22See Lord (2011) for a lucid explanation of how a narrow scoper can capture these features.
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Call the rationality that consists in heeding these apparent reasons `substantive' if
you like. If you like, deny that it has anything in common with the structural rationality
exhibited by compliance with Enkrasia and Means-End. Still, the rational pressure
exerted by these apparent reasons is just as divorceable from the presence of objective
reasons as the rational pressure exerted by coherence requirements.
3.2.2 Apparent Reasons vs. Possessed Objective Reasons
Some recent writers have appreciated this fact. Mark Schroeder has drawn attention
to subjective normative reasons, which are the same things I am calling apparent rea-
sons.23 And Schroeder allows presentational mental states other than beliefs to ground
possession of these reasons.24 But he has also argued that these reasons are not just
objective normative reasons to which we bear some privileged relation.25
Not everyone agrees with Schroeder. Some argue that apparent reasons are a proper
subset of the objective reasons: they are the objective reasons possessed by the agent.26
We have already seen one reason to worry about this view. It is hard to see how it can
explain distant demon worlds where the reliable links between appearance and reality
are wholly broken. We'll see presently how the view falters in practical cases. But as
we will also see, it does not follow that possessed objective reasons have no important
role to play.
To see the problem in the practical case, consider cases of objective undercutting
defeat. Suppose Benedict promised to pick Margaret up from the airport tomorrow.
Unbeknownst to him, some maniacs ensure that it will be impossible for him to pick
up Margaret tomorrow by creating an impenetrable forceﬁeld around his house tonight.
Plausibly, the fact that one promised to φ at t can constitute an objective reason for
one to plan to φ at t only if it is not impossible for one to φ at t. A fact of impossibility
undercuts whatever objective reasons might have been provided by the good properties
23See Schroeder (2007: Ch. 1) and (2008).
24See Schroeder (2011).
25See Schroeder (2008).
26See Lord (2010).
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of some imagined choice. This is why there is no objective reason to plan to travel
back in time to prevent the crusades, slavery, and World War II.27 But before Benedict
discovers the forceﬁeld, the fact that he promised to pick Margaret up tomorrow remains
an apparent reason for him to plan to go tomorrow. So, not all apparent reasons are
objective reasons.
Some might insist that even if the consideration that explicitly motivates an agent
to φ is not an objective reason to φ, the agent will possess other objective reasons
to φ. But this strategy is inapplicable here. Any other reasons Benedict might have
had to plan to go to the airport tomorrow are also objectively undercut by the fact of
impossibility. Might it be claimed that there is a weak objective reason for Benedict to
plan to go to the airport tomorrow? Not plausibly. The fact of impossibility is a total
undercutting defeater. There is not even a weak objective reason to plan to travel back
in time to prevent the crusades. Might Benedict have an objective reason to plan to go
to the airport with zero weight? It is hard to see how this diﬀers from our conclusion.
A reason with no objective weight is not an objective reason. Accordingly, we should
reject:
(The Factoring Account of Apparent Reasons) R is an apparent reason for S to φ
iﬀ R is an objective reason for S to φ, and it is apparent to S that R.28
Crucially, however, this does not show that there is nothing important that defenders of
the Factoring Account are tracking. It only shows that possessing an apparent reason
is not the same thing as possessing an objective reason.
We care about possessing objective reasons. It is not enough if there merely exists
something that could objectively support us. We want to receive this support and be
poised to act on the basis of it. And even if our acts and attitudes fall short of ideal
correctness, we can have more than excuses. Imperfect conduct is not always unjustiﬁed.
Possessing objective reasons matters because justiﬁcation matters.
27This is Bart Streumer's great example. See Streumer (forthcoming) for a defense of this plausible
idea.
28Factoring Account is Schroeder (2008)'s term for this type of view.
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Now, possessing some objective reason to φ is not enough to have justiﬁcation to
φ. One might possess stronger objective reasons on the other side. The fact that
these objective reasons outweigh the objective reason to φ does not destroy that reason.
Undercutting defeaters can destroy objective support relations, but to outweigh is not
to destroy. So what does justiﬁcation require? I suggest that to be justiﬁed in φ-ing is
to possess an objective reason to φ and to possess no stronger objective reason for any
speciﬁc alternative to φ-ing. This is less than ideal correctness but more than rationality.
The distinctness of justiﬁcation and ideal correctness is illustrated by this case:
Three Envelopes. You are correctly told by a reliable authority that you can take
one of three envelopes. You are also correctly told that there is $800 in Envelope
1. Finally, you are correctly told there is $1000 in either Envelope 2 or 3, and that
the envelope that doesn't have the $1000 is empty. But you are told nothing to
indicate which envelope might contain it, nor can you ﬁnd out before choosing.29
The fact that there is $800 in Envelope 1 is a strong objective reason to take it. Since
you know that there is $800 in this envelope, you possess this objective reason. You
do know that you are not doing the ideal thing, since you know that there is more
objective reason to choose either Envelope 2 or 3. But note that the disjunctive fact
that either Envelope 2 or Envelope 3 contains $1000 is not an objective reason to choose
one rather than the other. Yet this is the only objective reason not to take Envelope 1
that you possess. So, you possess an objective reason to choose Envelope 1 and possess
no objective reason that favors a speciﬁc alternative to Envelope 1. This is why choosing
Envelope 1 is justiﬁed.
Having justiﬁcation remains distinct from having merely apparent reasons to φ. To
see this, make some inaccessible changes to Three Envelopes. Suppose the reliable au-
thority got things wrong: a sneaky trickster replaced all the money with Monopoly
money. Moreover, unbeknownst to you, all the envelopes are surrounded by impene-
trable force ﬁelds. Suppose you reach out and burn your hands in the force ﬁeld. It
29Ross (2012) introduced this case. I reject Ross's own diagnosis of this case for reasons that will
soon become clear.
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becomes clear that the envelopes are inaccessible: the forceﬁeld boundaries light up as
you get burned. If you encounter the trickster, what can you say? He may say: There
could be no objective reason to try to accomplish something you couldn't possibly have
accomplished!
While the trickster's exclamation is apt, you can show that you were not crazy
by telling the story about the authority who was wrong about the accessibility of the
envelopes. The story shows that you had apparent normative reasons to try to pick
Envelope 1. These apparent reasons excuse you in the best way, by showing that your
rationality was in working order. But you could reasonably wish that you had been in
the original Three Envelopes case. If you do, what you wish for is a real justiﬁcation.
So, there are two phenomena, signiﬁcant in diﬀerent ways. Possessed objective
reasons matter for justiﬁcation. Apparent reasons matter for rationality. The objective
reason given by the $800 in Envelope 1 in the original case partly explains why you
were justiﬁed in choosing Envelope 1. But while you did not do the ideal thing here,
this case is diﬀerent from the revised case. You had less by way of a defense there.
3.2.3 Taking Stock: A Spectrum of Reason-Based Evaluations
The last two subsections bring out a spectrum of useful reason-based evaluations:
the evaluation involves complying with
ideal correctness balance of all existing objective reasons
justification balance of possessed objective reasons
substantive rationality balance of apparent reasons
structural rationality balance of believed reasons
The early meta-ethics literature focused on the distinction between the ﬁrst and the last
entries. The need for an intermediate evaluation is clear. But as we have seen, there is
actually need for more than one intermediate evaluation.
I will discuss how these distinctions extend to epistemology in 4 and 5. Given
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my goals, the distinction between justiﬁcation and substantive rationality is the most
important. It has the greatest implications for epistemology. Still, the distinction
between structural rationality and justiﬁcation gets blurred in epistemology too, with
some striking results. So, I will also push for greater recognition of that distinction.
3.3 A Deeper Rationale for the Distinction
First, I want to provide a deeper basis for the distinction between apparent and possessed
objective reasons. To reveal this basis, I will rehearse a framework for understanding
apparent reasons that I've developed in work in meta-ethics. Part of the reason for
rehearsing it is that the distinction between apparent reasons and possessed objective
reasons falls directly out of the framework. Since my framework is independently de-
fensible, this further illustrates that my distinction is not ad hoc.
My distinction is a new instance of a pattern familiar from the work of Ernest
Sosa. Apparent reasons, I will suggest, are apparent facts that we competently treat like
objective reasons, where competence is indirectly deﬁned in terms of objective reasons
and a competence/performance distinction is honored. Possessed objective reasons are
apparent facts that we aptly treat like objective reasons. Since one can aptly treat a
consideration like an objective reason only if it is one, these apparent facts are also real.
This basis for the distinction clariﬁes the relationship between rationality and jus-
tiﬁcation. While not all apparent reasons are possessed objective reasons, all possessed
objective reasons are apparent reasons, since aptness entails competence. So, while
substantive rationality does not entail justiﬁcation, justiﬁcation entails substantive ra-
tionality. This is important: I want to vindicate the thought that subjects in demon
worlds may not be justiﬁed, but I deny that unenlightened clairvoyants are justiﬁed.
3.3.1 Apparent Reasons: Two Views
Let's turn to consider what apparent reasons might be. Some meta-ethicists have sug-
gested that for R to be an apparent reason for S to φ is for it to appear to S that R is
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an objective reason to φ.30 Call this view the de dicto view.
One worry about this view is that it overintellectualizes rationality.31 Children and
animals can be evaluated for rationality. But it is doubtful that they have the concept
of a normative reason. If they lack that concept, it cannot strike them de dicto that
anything is a normative reason. This is a reason to avoid de dicto views. Of course,
de dicto theorists could retreat to permissive accounts of concept possession. Or they
might say that it can appear to someone that X is an F even if this person lacks the
concept of an F. But these burdensome commitments are worth avoiding if possible.
So we should not accept the de dicto view unless forced. This is not to say that we
should reject the de dicto view. Non-acceptance is weaker than rejection. My own view
would be a de dicto view if permissive accounts of concept possession were true. But
my view does not require these accounts to succeed. This is why it is preferable.
But my view is not the standard alternative. The standard alternative regards
apparent reasons as apparent facts that would be objective reasons if they were real
facts.32 Call this the de re view. We can state it more oﬃcially as follows:
(De Re) A consideration P is an apparent reason for S to φ iﬀ (i) it appears to S
that P and (ii) P would be an objective reason for S to φ if P were the case.
Alas, this view is unacceptable. It is easy to imagine cases where (a) someone knows
that P, (b) P is an objective deductive reason to believe Q because P entails Q, but (c)
the entailment is so arcane that the person gains no apparent reason to believe Q. The de
re view entails that as long as (a) and (b) are true, the person gains an apparent reason
to believe Q. This is wrong: subjects with weak mathematical abilities lack apparent
reasons to believe the most arcane theorems even if they know the relevant axioms.
There are some replies to this objection. But they are ultimately unconvincing.
To see the ﬁrst reply, consider the common distinction between reasons and enabling
conditions. The fact that P entails Q is not itself a reason to believe Q. It is a fact that
30This view is defended by Scanlon (1998) and Kolodny (2005).
31See Parﬁt (2011).
32This view is defended by Parﬁt (2001, 2011), Schroeder (2007), and Way (2009).
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enables P to be a reason to believe Q. The defender of the de re view might revise her
view by demanding the relevant enabling conditions to be apparent, and say:
P is an apparent reason for S to φ iﬀ (i) P's truth would be an objective reason
for S to φ given conditions C, (ii) it appears to S that R and (iii) it appears to S
that C.
But this view is too strong. Consider perceptual beliefs. Certain properties of perceptual
experiences enable them to provide apparent reasons for belief. Intrinsic features might
include the presentational character of experience. Relational features might include
the reliable connection between experience and reality. We do not need to represent
these enabling conditions to form rational perceptual beliefs.
The view is too strong even in some deductive cases. Having beliefs about entail-
ments is one way to be sensitive to logical relations between propositions. But it is not
the only way. Another way is to have the ability to competently infer one proposition
from another by using an inference rule. Instead of reasoning:
(i) ¬(P ∨ Q)
(ii) If ¬(P ∨ Q), then ¬P ∧ ¬Q
(iii) So, by modus ponens, ¬P ∧ ¬Q
one could directly infer (iii) from (i) by relying on one of the DeMorgan rules.
We cannot replace all rules by extra premises. Even axiomatic systems need rules,
and most people do not reason axiomatically. Of course, most people are not so compe-
tent that they can use any rules like they use modus ponens. But equally clearly, there is
a spectrum of acumen. Some people do have the native logical abilities to cleave reliably
to more intricate inferential patterns without forming beliefs about the entailments that
legitimate them. The revised de re theory cannot explain all the apparent reasons these
people can acquire.
There is a diﬀerent reply that de re theorists might pursue. They might embrace
the conclusion that knowing that P gives one some apparent reason to believe all of
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P's implications. But they might add that this apparent reason is defeated when the
implications are arcane, so that it is never rational to believe these implications.
But this reply does not withstand scrutiny. Apparent reasons must be defeated by
other apparent reasons if the defeat is to aﬀect degrees of rationality. In the earlier
case, it was the fact that the subject's logical abilities were limited that explained why
the subject could not rationally believe the most arcane consequences of certain axioms.
This fact is not one that itself must be apparent to prevent the subject from being able
to rationally believe these arcane consequences. People can be deceived about their
abilities, taking themselves to be geniuses when they are fools. By a ﬂuke, their incom-
petence might have happened to land them on correct results, so that they lack apparent
defeaters. But they are not rational. Incompetence alone can preclude rationality.
3.3.2 Treating, Competence and Appearance: A Better View
A better theory is worth seeking. But how can we avoid the problems with de re
views without overintellectualizing rationality? We can see how by considering the
most general description of the problem for de re views. The overarching problem was
that these views imply that a person can have P as an apparent reason to φ even when
that person cannot competently treat P like an objective reason to φ. We should proﬁt
from this observation.
Notice that it is possible to treat something like an F without having the concept
of an F. My cat can treat me like a vending machine without having the concept of
a vending machine. Similarly, one can treat a consideration like an objective reason
without having the concept of an objective reason. My cat can treat the sound of food
going into its dish like an objective reason to walk into the room containing the dish.
What is it to treat R like an objective reason to φ? To treat R like an objective
reason to φ of some kind is to be disposed to form attitudes or act in all or at least
most of the ways that would be correct if R were an objective reason to φ of that kind.
Barring a permissive theory of concept possession, this disposition is weaker than a de
dicto belief about objective reasons.
The obvious idea is to invoke this weaker notion in a new theory. Apparent reasons,
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I suggest, are apparent facts that we competently treat like objective reasons. More
oﬃcially:
Competent Treating (CT): A consideration P is an apparent reason for S to φ iﬀ
(i) it appears to S that P,
(ii) S treats P like an objective reason to φ, and
(iii) this treating manifests a relevant objective reasons-sensitive competence of
S's,
where the competence is a disposition of S's to treat P-like considerations like
objective reasons to do φ-like things only if they are objective reasons to do φ-like
things.
The core ideas are simple. For P to be an objective reason for one to φ, it is not enough
that P appears to be the case and would be an objective reason to φ if it were the case.
P must also be something that one is disposed to treat like an objective reason to φ.
The view captures the intuition that apparent reasons must look like objective reasons
from someone's perspective. But it does so without overintellectualization.
Of course, one might incompetently treat a consideration like an objective reason.
One might randomly treat Q and R like objective reasons to believe S. By luck, there
might be a proof of S from Q and R. But if this proof is arcane, it is not rational for
one to believe S on the basis of Q and R. This is why CT invokes competence, which is
indirectly deﬁned in terms of objective reasons and non-normative factors.
3.3.3 Grounding the Distinction: Competence and Performance
If we accept CT, we can better understand the diﬀerence between apparent reasons and
possessed objective reasons. CT predicts and explains this diﬀerence in two ways.
First, competences can be fallible. A competence to φ is not necessarily an infallible
ability to φ. So, one can competently treat P like an objective reason to φ even if P
wouldn't be an objective reason to φ if P were true.
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Secondly and more crucially, there is a competence/performance distinction. Having
a competence to succeed does not entail being in a position to succeed if one tries. Com-
petences are dispositions. Like other dispositions, there is a range of favorable conditions
for manifestation. Unfavorable conditions don't destroy competence. An archer, for ex-
ample, retains the competence to hit the bull's-eye even when some trickster creates
unexpected gusts that blow the arrow oﬀ target. An agent with the same competence
could be relocated to a systematically unfavorable environment and be hoodwinked
about its favorableness by a trickster. If so, this agent's skill is not destroyed. But it
won't yield reliability.
Like other competences, reasons-sensitive competences do not guarantee actual reli-
ability. So, in principle, one could competently treat a vast range of apparent consider-
ations like objective reasons even if they wouldn't be objective reasons if true. All we
need is for the circumstances to be both unfavorable and misleading.
So, CT predicts that apparent reasons can fail to be objective reasons. But an
indirect connection to objective reasons remains. While rationality does not give us the
ability to reliably φ for objective reasons, the capacities rational subjects display are
the same capacities that yield success in favorable cases. Rationality is a competence
to get connected to objective reasons in favorable environments, however unhelpful in
unfavorable ones.
3.3.4 Possessing an Objective Reason to φ
A consideration can be competently treated like an objective reason without being one.
Indeed, a consideration can be competently treated like an objective reason without
being objectively likely to be an objective reason. In these cases, the consideration is
only an apparent reason. If so, what more does it take to possess an objective reason R
to φ?
My answer involves a spin on CT that will sound familiar to epistemologists:
Apt Treating (AT): S possesses an objective reason R to φ iﬀ
(i) S correctly treats R like an objective reason to φi.e., R is an objective reason
102
to φ and S treats R like an objective reason to φ,
(ii) S's treating manifests S's relevant objective reasons-sensitive competence, and
(iii) the correctness of S's treating manifests that reasons-sensitive competence.
To see why AT is plausible, consider an example:
(Misﬁre) Bill is a competent but not infallible logician who can directly see many
entailments. It strikes him tonight that there is a proof of Q from P involving
certain steps, which he seems to see by exercising his competence. Alas, his fallible
competence misﬁres and yields a mistaken impression: there is not that kind of
proof of Q from P. As it happens, there is a proof of Q from P. But it is arcane
and far beyond Bill's direct grasp.
Here P is an objective reason to believe Q because there is a proof of Q from P. Bill
is competently attracted to treating P like an objective reason to believe Q: his logical
`vision' is a product of his mathematical competence. But Bill's vision misﬁres, as
fallible vision can. For this reason, Bill does not possess the objective reason to believe
Q that P actually constitutes, since he does not grasp the real proof of Q from P.
Here is why. While Bill's attraction to treat P like an objective reason to believe Q is
correct in the minimal sense that P is an objective reason to believe Q, the correctness of
Bill's attraction does not manifest his competence. The attraction is correct for reasons
that are beyond the reach of his competence. The attraction manifests competence, but
its correctness has nothing to do with that competence.
None of this is to deny that Bill might possess other objective reasons to believe Q.
We are only claiming that Bill does not possess the objective reason to believe Q that
P actually constitutes, since he cannot see the real proof. P is for Bill only an apparent
reason to believe Q: the connection Bill sees between P and Q is not the connection
that actually exists. There is an analogy with veridical hallucination: there appears
to Bill to be a connection and there is one, but the connection does not explain the
appearance.
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3.3.5 The R/J Distinction: A New Instance of an Old Pattern
We can now see that the distinction between rationality and justiﬁcation is a new
instance of an old pattern. Ernest Sosa has made us familiar with a triadic pattern of
evaluation for attitudes and activities that aim at some target. An attitude or act A is:
correct, when A hits the relevant target,
competent, when A manifests a disposition to hit the relevant target, and
apt, when A's correctness manifests the relevant competence.
What have interested us are treatings of considerations like objective reasons. The same
triadic pattern arises for these treatings. These treatings are:
correct, when the treated considerations are in fact objective reasons,
competent, when the treatings manifest a competence to treat only objective rea-
sons like objective reasons, and
apt, when the correctness of these treatings manifests this competence.
Apparent reasons are considerations that one competently treats like objective rea-
sons. Possessed objective reasons are considerations that one aptly treats like objective
reasons. Since apt treating entails correct treating, possessed normative reasons are ob-
jective reasons. It also falls out that possessed normative reasons are apparent reasons,
since apt treatings are also competent. But it doesn't fall out that all apparent reasons
are objective reasons. For competent treating is not necessarily correct treating.
My distinction between rationality and justiﬁcation is an upshot of these ideas:
(J) S has ex ante justiﬁcation to φ iﬀ φ-ing is supported by the balance of consid-
erations that S aptly treats like objective reasons to φ.
(R) It is ex ante rational for S to φ iﬀ φ-ing is supported by the considerations
that S competently treats like objective reasons to φ.33
33Ex ante justiﬁcation is justiﬁcation to believe, as opposed to justiﬁed believing ; similarly for ex
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Since apt treating entails competent treating, ex ante justiﬁcation entails ex ante ra-
tionality. But since competent treating doesn't entail apt treating, ex ante rationality
does not entail ex ante justiﬁcation. So while rationality is separable, the two are not
orthogonal. This is why unenlightened clairvoyants are unjustiﬁed. They fail to possess
objective reasons precisely because they lack apparent reasons.
The connection with Sosa's triadic pattern reinforces the objectivity of my distinc-
tion. The triadic pattern arises for any attitude or activity with an aim. Even if one
doesn't want to organize all of one's normative theorizing around this pattern, one can-
not deny that it is a real pattern. The connection also allows us to see how my view
improves on Sosa's virtue epistemology. My appeal to reasons-based competences yields
two improvements: (i) greater ﬁneness of grain, and (ii) a more obvious explanation of
why unenlightened clairvoyants, Truetemp, and the like are not only not rational but
unjustiﬁed. But the views are similar in spirit. One might say that my view is a
reasons-based virtue epistemology.
3.4 Extending the Distinctions to Epistemology
Extending my central distinctions to epistemology is now easy. We need only draw our
attention to the existence of objective epistemic reasons and apply the framework.
3.4.1 Objective Epistemic Reasons: Unpossessed and Possessed
What are objective epistemic reasons? Clear examples include pieces of evidence that
are not necessarily possessed by anyone. Call such pieces of evidence objective evidence.
Evidence in this sense is, as Tom Kelly puts it, a reliable sign, symptom, or mark of
that which it is evidence of.34 While many epistemologists ignore this kind of evidence,
the concept is a clear one that often features in our ordinary thinking.
Talk of objective evidence applies to items in many diﬀerent ontological categories.
ante rationality. Ex post evaluations also matter. I assume the orthodox view about the relationship
between the ex ante and the ex post. Elsewhere I defend this view against objections of the sort from
Turri (2010).
34Kelly (2006).
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But much of this talk is elliptical. Evidence must play certain roles: it must be able to
probabilify, to be explained, and to ﬁgure in our reasoning, for example.35 Plausibly,
only things with a proposition-like structure can play these roles. Hence, when we say:
(a) these ﬁngerprints on the gun are evidence that he is the murderer,
what we really mean is something like:
(b) the fact that these ﬁngerprints are on the gun is evidence that he is the
murderer.
Why call objective evidence `objective'? Because of its connection to objective probabil-
ity: a piece of objective evidence has an objective probabilistic connection to truth, by
being a reliable indicator of truth. `Objective' does not mean `public'. Many examples
of objective evidence are public. But a fact needn't be public to be objective evidence.
Here is an illustration. Facts about your current feelings are objective evidence for
certain conclusions about the broader mood you are in. Not all of our mental life is
transparent. Sometimes we must reason inferentially about it. There are better and
worse ways. In the case of feelings and moods, reliable correlations help to explain why
some ways are better than others. But facts about your feelings are private.
Epistemologists often ignore objective epistemic reasons, regarding them as irrele-
vant to justiﬁcation. But this is a mistake. Yes, we must possess epistemic reasons for
them to justify us. But it does not follow that what we possess cannot be an objective
epistemic reason. If the name on the driver's license is not yours, it cannot give you
legal permission to drive. That does not show that you need a diﬀerent kind of thing
to drive. You just need to bear a diﬀerent relation to the same kind of thing.
Here we ﬁnd another place where epistemologists get worried. Many assume that
we will have to analyze the relation of possession in terms of justiﬁcation or knowledge.
So, many assume that giving an account of justiﬁcation in terms of objective epistemic
reasons would be circular. But this is hasty. We can appeal to non-doxastic mental
35See Williamson (2000) for a now classic discussion of some of these roles.
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states, and to normative concepts more primitive than the concept of justiﬁcation. My
theory does this. My theory does appeal to one normative concept. But it is the concept
of an objective reason. Alternatively, one could directly ground the relation of possession
in non-doxastic mental states that meet certain reliabilist constraints, thereby avoiding
circularity.
Many epistemologists have thought that possession is a matter of access. Access need
not be understood in internalist terms. Does that mean that access must be understood
in terms of knowledge or justiﬁcation? No. Note that non-doxastic seemings can be
evaluated under the triadic scheme noted in the last section. A visual seeming, for
instance, can be
accurate, when what visually seems so is so,
adroit, when the seeming manifests the subject's visual ability, and
apt, when the seeming's accuracy manifests the subject's visual ability.
Apt non-doxastic seemings are not knowledge, since knowledge entails belief. Moreover,
these seemings cannot be justiﬁed or unjustiﬁed, though they can manifest a more
primitive sort of ability. Nevertheless, they aﬀord access to reality.
Access to objective epistemic reasons is not suﬃcient for possessing these reasons.
Having access to a fact E that constitutes objective evidence for P is not suﬃcient for
possessing E as good evidence to believe P. Here we can consider variations on the
counterexamples to de re theories. The fact that someone has Koplik spots is objective
evidence that this person has measles. But seeing that this person has Koplik spots is
insuﬃcient for one to have reason to believe that this person has measles. After all, the
connection between measles and Koplik spots has not always been apparent.36
Does this mean that one must also be justiﬁed in believing that E is objective
evidence for P to possess E as evidence for P? No. We found a path between de dicto
and de re views by attending to the notion of treating something like an objective
reason. We can invoke this notion again. If one is aptly attracted to treat the presence
36Adam Marushak alerted me to this example and its usefulness in this context.
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of Koplik spots as evidence that the person has measles, one possesses that piece of
objective evidence to believe that she has measles. This is what we need, beyond
access. More oﬃcially, then:
Objective Evidence Possession: S possesses objective evidence E to believe P iﬀ
(i) it aptly seems to S that E, and
(ii) S aptly treats E like objective evidence to believe P.
If one thinks that objective evidential relations can hold between false propositions, one
could relax the account by replacing `aptly' in (i) with `competently'. But my own
inclination is to say that E is not objective evidence to believe P when E is false.
That is compatible with allowing that one has other objective evidence for P when E
is false. Since `objective' doesn't mean `public', this could include the sheer fact that it
non-doxastically appears to one that E when there is a reliable link between appearance
and reality. So, it is not as if one is always unjustiﬁed in believing P on the basis of E
if E is false.
3.4.2 Apparent Epistemic Reasons
But if all reliable indication relations between appearance and reality are broken, we
should deny that the fact that one is appeared to in some way is objective evidence that
things are that way. One can, however, have apparent reasons in these cases. This falls
out of the account I oﬀered in the last section. The following is an upshot:
Apparent Evidence Possession: S possesses apparent evidence E to believe P iﬀ
(i) it appears to S that E, and
(ii) S competently treats E like objective evidence to believe P.
Here E could be some false proposition about the external world that appears to be
true in virtue of S's visual experience. Accordingly, one can possess an external world
proposition E as an apparent epistemic reason to believe P, despite E's being false.
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Can we explain why one has apparent epistemic reasons even when appearance-
reality correlations are annihilated? Yes. Recall the competence/performance distinc-
tion. My envatted brain retains my epistemic competences. Like other dispositions,
competences can be retained in inhospitable situations.
3.4.3 Rationality vs. Justiﬁcation in Epistemology
Given the distinction between apparent and possessed objective epistemic reasons, it is
easy to distinguish between substantive epistemic rationality and justiﬁcation. For ex
ante rationality and justiﬁcation, the distinction would go as follows:
(Re) It is ex ante epistemically rational for S to have doxastic attitude D(P) iﬀ
D(P)-ing is favored by the balance of S's apparent epistemic reasons.
(Je) S has ex ante epistemic justiﬁcation to have doxastic attitude D(P) iﬀ D(P)-
ing is favored by the balance of the objective epistemic reasons that S possesses.
Possessing an objective epistemic reason and being an apparent epistemic reason would
then be analyzed in the way that I suggested earlier, yielding the more precise:
(Re*) It is ex ante rational for S to have D(P) iﬀ D(P)-ing is favored by the
considerations S competently treats like objective epistemic reasons.
(Je*) S has ex ante justiﬁcation to have D(P) iﬀ D(P)-ing is favored by the balance
of considerations S aptly treats like objective epistemic reasons.
Because I am drawing a distinction that epistemologists in many diﬀerent camps should
acknowledge, I have not given necessary and suﬃcient conditions in descriptive terms
for being an objective epistemic reason or for being favored by an objective epistemic
reason. The distinction should be neutral on these issues.
I did suggest examples of objective epistemic reasonsviz., objective evidence. I
also suggested that favoring could be understood in terms of reliable indication. But
ultimately I want to be neutral on whether all objective epistemic reasons are evidence
and whether favoring must be understood purely in terms of reliable indication.
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3.4.4 Further Divergences: Structural Rationality
The diﬀerence between (Re) and (Je) doesn't exhaust the distinction between rationality
and justiﬁcation. Structural rationality was what meta-ethicists ﬁrst contrasted with
support by objective reasons. While many epistemologists reject coherentism about
justiﬁcation, confusion remains about the relation between structural pressures and
justiﬁcation.
Here is one illustration. Several epistemologists claim that merely believing that
one's belief was unreliably formed can defeat one's justiﬁcation.37 This is a mistake. It
is incoherent for one to host some belief while believing it to be reliably formed. But
the problem lies in the set of attitudes. If one's ﬁrst-order belief was reliably formed
and one has no reason to believe that it was unreliably formed, one should resolve this
conﬂict of attitudes by dropping that meta-belief and retaining the ﬁrst-order belief.
We can deny that one's ﬁrst-order justiﬁcation can be defeated by the meta-belief.
We can instead use requirements like the following to explain what is going awry:
(Epistemic Enkrasia) Structural rationality requires that if one believes that some
doxastic attitude that one holds is epistemically unjustiﬁed, one abandons that
belief.
We could follow Broome (1999) in taking `requires' to take wide scope over the con-
ditional, so that Epistemic Enkrasia is equivalent to a prohibition against a certain
conjunction of states. But even if we understand Epistemic Enkrasia in a narrow scope
way, we could agree that this requirement is rationally escapable in the sense that one
can permissibly exit this narrow scope requirement by abandoning the meta-belief.38
Exactly what are the requirements of structural epistemic rationality? This is a
huge question. What matters here is that these requirements can be rationally escaped
in a way that the requirements of justiﬁcation cannot. Of course, one could escape
certain requirements of justiﬁcation by losing certain evidence. But this escape will be
a non-rational process or a process that makes one epistemically blameworthy.
37See Goldman (1986), Plantinga (1993), and Bergmann (2006).
38See Lord (2011) on narrow-scoping and the distinction between exiting and violating a requirement.
110
3.4.5 Comparisons with Other Bifurcating Proposals
I have now illustrated how the distinction applies in epistemology. This is not the ﬁrst
time someone has tried to bifurcate epistemic evaluation. Why prefer my bifurcation?
A large reason is that it is an instance of a more general distinction that is defensible
across the board, drawing on insights outside of epistemology. Indeed, it follows from
simple reﬂections on objective reasons and our relations to them. Similar points do not
hold for bifurcation proposals that other epistemologists have advanced.
Consider Goldman (1988)'s distinction between strong and weak justiﬁcation. While
the examples he used to motivate this distinction do illustrate two diﬀerent properties,
there is a worry that weak justiﬁcation is not really a kind of justiﬁcation. Many
ethicists would balk, seeing weak justiﬁcation as mere excusability. By contrast, the
distinction between rationality and justiﬁcation can be gleaned by inspecting the nature
of rationality and justiﬁcation. It is no surprise that we already have separate words for
them.
Similar worries arise for attempts to distinguish between subjective and objective
justiﬁcation. Why is subjective justiﬁcation a kind of justiﬁcation? When our un-
dergraduates talk about subjective truth, they are not talking about a kind of truth.
Why think that talk of subjective justiﬁcation should be taken more seriously?
Other bifurcations are stipulations that fall out of certain frameworks of evaluation.
Ernest Sosa has separated two kinds of justiﬁcation on the basis of a distinction between
exercises of competence in hospitable environments and displays of competence in in-
hospitable environments.39 I like the underlying idea. But I dislike the labels, which
invite the objection that one of these properties is not a kind of justiﬁcation at all.
Similar remarks apply to the attempt to distinguish between personal and doxastic
justiﬁcation.40 There is a distinction between evaluations of persons and evaluations of
attitudes or acts. But it is not a distinction between two kinds of justiﬁcation. Rather,
it is marked by the distinction between evaluations like blameworthy, praiseworthy,
39See Sosa (1993).
40See Bach (1986), Engel (1993), and Littlejohn (2012).
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excusable, etc. and evaluations like wrong, justiﬁed, permissible, etc.
Some have recognized this fact and instead appealed to the distinction between
justiﬁcation and blamelessness. But blamelessness is too weak to be interesting. Denials
of responsibility establish blamelessness. But there is no important positive epistemic
property that is compatible with total insanity, though total insanity can make one
blameless.
Excusability is a stronger contender than blamelessness if we accept Gardner's pic-
ture and view excuses as expressions of our capacity for responsibility rather than denials
of responsibility. So understood, my inclination is to see excusability and rationality as
cognate notions (like Gardner). So if you want to appeal to excusability, you are my
ally.
But there are reasons to appeal to rationality rather than excusability. Many worry
that talk of epistemic responsibility presupposes an implausible doxastic voluntarism. I
don't share these worries, but they are pervasive enough to be worth sidestepping.
3.5 Implications for Epistemology
Having defended my distinction, I turn to consider some implications for epistemology.
Drawing the distinction in epistemology makes a diﬀerenceindeed, several diﬀerences.
3.5.1 How the Internalism/Externalism Debate Shouldn't Proceed
First of all, my distinction clariﬁes the terms of debates between internalists and exter-
nalists in epistemology and shows how these debates should not proceed.
Disagreements between internalists and externalists in epistemology are usually
framed as disagreements about a single propertyjustiﬁcation, most centrally. Peo-
ple assume we can apply the methodology of systematizing intuitions about cases to
make progress. Many internalists support their views by appealing to cases. Consider
BonJour's clairvoyance cases and Cohen's demon world.41 Similarly, many externalists
have tried to undermine internalism just by appealing to cases. Consider Goldman's
41See Cohen (1984) and BonJour (1985).
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forgotten evidence cases.42
Once the distinction between rationality and justiﬁcation is appreciated in its full
generality, this familiar way of conducting the disputes becomes unsatisfying. Internalist
intuitions are liable to conﬂate these phenomena. It is no surprise that almost every
epistemologist I quoted at the outset is an internalist. We can grant the internalist's
intuitions as right for rationality but argue that they undershoot the intended target.
Notice that this leads to no irenic dissolution of the debate. Instead, it leads to
an advantage for the externalist. Because justiﬁcation requires possessing objectively
good reasons and rationality does not, internalists about epistemic justiﬁcation are in
trouble. The property they care about may have a role. But it is irrelevant as such to
justiﬁcation.
Because some internalists uphold the value of epistemic blamelessness, they might
accept this verdict but see it in a diﬀerent light. They might insist that blamelessness
is what we really care about. But not all internalists will agree. Consider Jim Pryor:
Many philosophers share Cohen's intuition that it's possible for a brain in a vat,
if he conducts his aﬀairs properly, to have many justiﬁed. . . beliefs about his en-
vironment. . . . [T]his intuition survives the recognition that being epistemically
blameless does not suﬃce for being justiﬁed. It doesn't seem merely to be the case
that the brain in a vat can form beliefs in a way that is epistemically blameless.
It also seems to be the case that he can form beliefs in a way that is epistemically
proper, and that the beliefs...would be fully justiﬁed....43
Deeper arguments are needed. If our paradigms of blamelessness include lack of mus-
cular control..., subjection to gross forms of coercion by threats, and types of mental
abnormality,44 it is implausible that the envatted are just epistemically blameless. But
that just illustrates the need to separate blamelessness and excusability. The envatted
are better oﬀ than people bereft of the capacity for responsible thought (e.g., the mad).
But the claim that the envatted achieve more than epistemic excusability is a stronger
claim.
42See Goldman (1999a) and (2009) for two diﬀerent cases of this sort.
43Pryor (2001: 117).
44From Hart (1968)a target in Gardner's attack on the view that excuses are denials of
responsibility.
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3.5.2 A Challenge for Internalists
To defend that claim, internalists must establish that the epistemic domain diﬀers from
others in admitting of no distinction between apparent reasons and possessed objective
reasons. It is unclear that internalists can do this unless they deny that truth is the basic
epistemic goal. If a belief essentially aims at any properly epistemic target, objective
epistemic reasons are going to have something objective rather than merely apparent to
do with helping it hit that target. An epistemic reason R to believe P will be objectively
good to the extent that believing P for R makes it objectively more likely that one will
achieve the aim of belief with respect to P, and bad if it does not.45 If the aim is truth,
unreliable indicators of truth will not be objectively good epistemic reasons for belief.
Here we ﬁnd a reversal of the standard dialectic on the new evil demon problem.
Given a richer set of concepts, it is more natural to take the demon world to support
a reliabilist externalism about justiﬁcation, not to undermine this view. The demon-
worlder's reasons just don't look objectively good if the fundamental epistemic goal is
true belief or knowledge. This undermines Cohen's reply to reliabilists. Cohen insisted
that rationality is what obviously matters from the epistemic point of view. This is
false: it is unobvious how rationality matters from the epistemic point of view. This
conclusion echoes recent doubts about the signiﬁcance of rationality in meta-ethics.46
It is unclear why we necessarily have objective epistemic reasons to be epistemically
rational if we embrace the fundamental epistemic goals that many embrace. There are
contingent links. But these links are irrelevant to the issue at hand. The internalist
claims that the demon-worlder is epistemically justiﬁed, which entails that she possesses
objectively good epistemic reasons. That claim is not bolstered by contingent links.
Internalists owe us a deeper explanation.
45I formulate this in a proposition-relative way not only because this is the most natural way to
formulate it, but because formulating it in a global way leads to problems well-documented by Berker
(2013).
46See especially Kolodny (2005).
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3.5.3 Challenging Concessive Externalist Views
There are challenges for epistemologists other than internalists. While externalists deny
that mere beliefs and seemings are suﬃcient for positive justiﬁcation, they often concede
that these factors can defeat justiﬁcation regardless of their externalist features.
Our distinction casts doubt on this concession. There is no reason to assume that
the reasons to φ that are relevant to justiﬁcation are more objective than the reasons
against φ-ing that are relevant to justiﬁcation. Consider prudence: if there are powerful
objective prudential reasons not to perform some act, the mere fact that one's laziness
makes them seem weak doesn't defeat these reasons. The same goes for morality, law,
chess, etc.
It is more natural to deny that beliefs and non-doxastic seemings can as such defeat
justiﬁcation. They may aﬀect some belief's degree of rationality or aﬀect the overall
rationality of certain sets of doxastic attitudes. But they do not necessarily reduce the
justifying power of any objectively good reasons for particular doxastic attitudes.
Yet many externalists have not agreed. Bergmann (2006) and Plantinga (1993)
hold that believed defeaters are real defeaters. While Goldman (1979) had a uniform
reliabilist account of positive and negative justiﬁcation-relevant factors, he later holds
something closer to this concessive view. Discussing a case where someone believes
her visual powers to be impaired, he said: What she believes, then, is such that if
it were true, the beliefs in question. . . would not be permitted by a right rule system.
Satisfaction of this condition, I now propose, is suﬃcient to undermine permittedness.47
Something similarly troubling holds for other concessions to internalists. Externalists
will allow experiences per se to be defeaters. Consider Goldman (2011: 272) discussing
an example involving Sidney, who continues to believe
that it is sunny right now...despite the fact that he is walking in the middle of
a rainstorm. Surely his current perceptual experience is a defeater for this belief
[. . . ].
47Goldman (1986: 111).
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If we focus on fortunate subjects, this is plausible. Our visual experiences are reliable
indicators of the facts. But it easy to imagine subjects whose experiences are inaccessibly
unreliable. The intuition remains that Sidney's twin would be irrational if he kept the
belief while ﬁnding himself faced with experiences like the ones had by Sidney. Could
this render the twin's belief unjustiﬁed if it was previously justiﬁed? If the experiences
are unreliable indicators of the facts, it is hard to see why we should agree.
It is better to explain the defeat intuitions by appeal to rationality and apparent
reasons. Appearances of objective reasons against attitudes and acts are no less capable
of being misleading than appearances of objective reasons for attitudes and acts.
3.5.4 Light Shed on Puzzling Cases
My distinction also helps to resolve conﬂicting intuitions about some puzzling cases.
Checkered Experience. Consider cases of experiences with checkered etiologies:
(Fearful Sight) Before seeing Jack, Jill fears that Jack is angry at her. When she
sees him, her fear causes her to have a visual experience in which he looks angry.48
It is plausible that this experience's etiology undercuts its justifying force. Not only is
it plausible that Jill would not be ex post justiﬁed in believing that Jack is angry: it
is also plausible that the reason that experience provides for her to believe that Jack is
angry is defeated because of the defective etiology. The intuition has nothing to do with
Jill's access to the fact that her experience was merely caused by baseless fear. We can
stipulate that she is in no position to appreciate this fact. The intuitions remain.
We can explain the intuitions in a framework where justiﬁcation is understood in
terms of possessed objective reasons. While unpossessed rebutting defeaters have no
inﬂuence on whether one has an objective reason to believe something, unpossessed
undercutting defeaters do. In Fearful Sight, the fact that Jill's experience is grounded
in fear explains why that experience does not add to the stock of objective reasons she
48This is from Siegel (forthcoming). See also Siegel (2012).
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has. It is clear why: experiences that are merely products of baseless fear are unreliable
indicators of reality.
But it is unsatisfying to stop here. It is rational for Jill to increase her conﬁdence
that Jack is angry in Fearful Sight. My distinctions let us honor this intuition.
Rational Self-Doubt and Supposed Examples of Higher-Order Defeat. Our
distinction casts doubt on the ubiquity of higher-order defeat. Some alleged examples of
higher-order defeat rest on intuitions about the irrationality of not responding to certain
higher-order appearances. It is unclear that agents in these cases automatically acquire
objective epistemic reasons to modify their ﬁrst-order attitudes. Moreover, even if the
higher-order appearances are objectively good evidence for certain higher-order beliefs,
worries about conﬂation remain. Let's consider these points in reverse.
Higher-order evidence against one's ﬁrst-order competence generates no familiar kind
of undercutting defeat. Consider a case from David Christensen (2010: 187):
(Drugs) I am asked to be a subject in an experiment. Subjects are given a drug,
and then asked to draw conclusions about simple logical puzzles. The drug has
been shown to degrade people's performance in just this kind of task quite sharply.
[. . . ] I accept the oﬀer, and, after sipping a coﬀee while reading the consent form,
I tell them I'm ready to begin. Before giving me any pills, they give me a practice
question:
Suppose all bulls are ﬁerce and Ferdinand is not a ﬁerce bull. Which of the
following must be true? (a) Ferdinand is ﬁerce; (b) Ferdinand is not ﬁerce;
(c) Ferdinand is a bull; (d) Ferdinand is not a bull.
I become extremely conﬁdent that the answer is that only (d) must be true. But
then I'm told that the coﬀee they gave me actually was laced with the drug. My
conﬁdence that the answer is only (d) drops dramatically.
Clearly, one is irrational if one maintains the same degree of conﬁdence in (d). This
is Christensen's main intuition. Yet the objective probability that my belief in (d) is
true conditional on the ﬁrst-order evidence and the apparent fact that I took the drug
is no less than the objective probability that my belief is true conditional on just the
ﬁrst-order evidence. So, it is puzzling how the higher-order evidence has any bearing
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on what ﬁrst-order beliefs I have objective epistemic reasons to have. It is less puzzling
to think that there is a diﬀerent issue here, separate from defeat at the ﬁrst order.
We can reinforce this verdict by noting that intuitions of irrationality remain even
if the subjects in these cases are not defective in the ways the appearances suggest,
and even if the higher-order appearances are unreliable. Suppose that in a variation on
Drugs, the experimenters lied and never drugged the coﬀee. This has no eﬀect on the
intuition that it is irrational for me to have the same degree of conﬁdence in (d).
So there is a worry about conﬂation. Reasoning as the subject reasons in Drugs is
correct! How can the irrationality of his total mental state have any bearing on whether
he is permitted to reason in this way? The fact of irrationality has implications for
whether he could be epistemically praised for doing the epistemically right thing. But
just as there can be excusable wrongdoing, there can be praiseless and even blameworthy
rightdoing.49
Those who believe in the ubiquity of higher-order defeat need deeper arguments.
This is pressing, since they appeal to the irrationality of not responding to higher-order
appearances to argue against plausible claims about justiﬁcation. Schechter (2013), for
example, rejects single-premise closure for justiﬁcation on the basis of higher-order con-
siderations. We should consider alternatives before rejecting such principles!
Forgotten Evidence. Our distinction also resolves conﬂicting intuitions about cases
of forgotten evidence. Much of what we claim to know and justiﬁedly believe rests on
reasons that have faded from view. One would invite skepticism if one insisted that we
don't know or justiﬁedly believe in these cases. Externalists are right to insist on this.50
Nevertheless, there is a real tension in these cases that externalists neglect. They fail
to explain, for example, why it would be irrational to keep believing P with a similarly
high degree of conﬁdence when one is asked why one thinks that P and realizes that
one cannot bring to mind anything except the seeming that P.
49Cf. Zimmerman (1997).
50Again, Goldman (1999a) provides a classic illustration of how forgotten evidence cases raise troubles
for internalists; Goldman has extended this critique in his (2009) with a new kind of forgotten evidence
case (involving forgotten negative evidence rather than forgotten positive evidence).
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Our distinctions ease the tension. When memory seemings are reliable, the fact that
one seems to remember that P is a good objective reason for believing P. Still, when one
is pressed, this seeming can easily be destroyed, and the objective force of the reason
can cease to be apparent. When I consider whether I am justiﬁed in believing that
Elizabeth I was born in 1533, doubts may arise. Ignoring these doubts is irrational.
Still, it is incredible to think that justiﬁcation is so easily destroyed. So, it is better
to apply distinctions. When doubts arise, the force of the objective reasons one has will
cease to be apparent. So, it will be irrational to host the belief while the objective force
ceases to be apparent. But one could revert to trustwhereupon the force will become
apparent again. Hence, one faces no irreversible obligation to drop one's beliefs.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Let's take stock. I've defended a distinction between justiﬁcation and rationality.
My distinction fell out of a general distinction between possessed objective reasons
and apparent reasons. The distinction is grounded in a more fundamental distinction
between competently treating something like an objective reason and aptly treating
something like an objective reason. It is a consequence of the need to draw a compe-
tence/performance distinction with respect to our sensitivity to objective reasons.
One can see the distinction without seeing this more basic explanation. Examples of
objective undercutting defeaters aﬀord illustrations. These defeaters prevent apparent
reasons from being objective reasons by destroying the objective favoring relations they
apparently bear to relevant attitudes or actions. But one is still rationally required to
take these apparent reasons into account, since the objective undercutter is not apparent.
It is worth remembering that unpossessed undercutting defeaters diﬀer from un-
possessed rebutting defeaters. The fact that there is a mountain of objective evidence
against P that one has not yet discovered does not render one's belief that P unjusti-
ﬁed. This is because the objective reasons that one possesses continue to be objective
reasons, and are not outweighed by any other objective reasons that one possesses. To
outweigh a reason is not to destroy it. Only total undercutting destroys.
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This distinction explains why some rational beliefs are not justiﬁed beliefs without
making the requirements for justiﬁcation too strong. If an apparent reason that one has
is objectively undercut, one's relevant attitude cannot be justiﬁed by that reason. But it
is false that one is unjustiﬁed just because there is an unpossessed objective reason that
outweighs the objective reasons that one possesses. This is why justiﬁed wrongdoing is
possible, and why it is possible to have justiﬁed false beliefs.
It is a virtue of my version of the distinction that it does not make justiﬁcation so
demanding that we cannot have it unless our beliefs are true or constitute knowledge.
This is what we should expect on general grounds. Justiﬁedly doing the right thing is
best. But justiﬁed wrongdoing is still better than excusable wrongdoing.
The implications of these points for epistemology are signiﬁcant, as we have seen.
This is unsurprising. Parallel distinctions have caused important shifts in the dialectical
terrain in recent ethics. I have only scratched the most obvious surfaces in this paper.
Before drawing things to a close, it is worth considering how one might try to resist
my distinction. To do so, one must argue that there is something special about the
norms of epistemology that reduces the distance between objective and apparent epis-
temic reasons. How could one defend this conclusion? How could there fail to be an
appearance/reality distinction with respect to complying with a given norm?
There are many systems of norms for which the distinction applies undeniablye.g.,
legal norms, norms of etiquette and prescriptive grammar, and many moral norms. But
there are some cases where the distinction is hard to draw. Consider the norms of
loyalty that are constitutive of some relationships. The following example illustrates
why the distinction is hard to draw with respect to these norms:
(Disguise) A and B agreed to have a monogamous relationship. But A worries
that B would cheat if B got the chance. A decides to test this hypothesis. With
the help of some extraordinary costuming, A manages to dress up like a totally
diﬀerent person on whom B would have an instant crush. Disguised, A has been
showing up around B's workplace to make advances. B believes on the basis of
this misleading evidence that this is a fascinating person distinct from A. B now
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seems to be having a date with this person when A had planned to be out of
town....
Suppose now that A suddenly reveals the truth to B and demands an explanation. The
following would not be a convincing response on B's behalf: But look, I was not unloyal
to you. After all, it was you I just showed to a ﬁne evening!
Why is this unconvincing? Because whether we manifest loyalty is determined by
how we respond to the appearances. One really fails to manifest loyalty if it appears to
one that some option would involve disloyalty but one pursues the option anyway.
There is a further point. Suppose B is a loyal partner. Would it cast doubt on B's
loyalty if B had a romantic evening with someone who managed to look and act just
like A, and whom B rationally believed on this basis to be A? No. If A were unaware
that the person B was having the romantic evening with was dressed up this way, A
could reasonably demand an explanation. But B could show that there was no failure
of loyalty.
Are there other norms like this norm of loyalty? What is the basis for such norms?
Remember that all norms are value-based: the point of complying with a norm is to
respond to the value of something. Not all values are to be valued in the same way.
Some values call for an internal kind of valuing. They call for us to hold certain attitudes
in response to the appearances. Consider beauty. It calls primarily for admiration, and
whether we admire beauty is determined entirely by how we respond to the appearances.
Admiration thus diﬀers from external forms of valuing, such as instrumental promotion.
Are there values that fundamentally call only for internal recognition? Some have
thought so. Kant took the value of humanity to call most fundamentally for a kind
of recognition by the good will. One could imagine a structurally similar view about
epistemic value. One could imagine a theory of epistemic value that would aﬃrm that
accuracy is the fundamental epistemic value but hold that the fundamentally proper
response to this epistemic value is respect, not promotion. What is respect for accuracy?
Precisely what we manifest when we comply with requirements of epistemic rationality,
one might say.
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If accuracy is a fundamental epistemic value, I suspect one must be an epistemic
Kantian if one wants to collapse the distinction between apparent and objective epis-
temic reasons. The only other option is to insist that rationality has fundamental
epistemic value. But I think it is clear that we care about epistemic rationality because
we care about accuracy. It is better to agree that accuracy is the fundamental epistemic
value but to adopt a Kantian view about its value. This is an internalist way to make
epistemology truth-oriented.
This view might be defensible. But clearly, it will take something radical to collapse
the distinction between apparent and objective epistemic reasons. Such radical views
have yet to be defended. Accordingly, work remains for those who want to collapse the
distinction between epistemic rationality and justiﬁcation.
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Chapter 4
Veritism without Instrumentalism
Overview
It is attractive to view true belief as the fundamental epistemic value (Veritism).
Epistemologists often take this view to entail that all other epistemic items can only have
worth by standing in certain instrumental relationse.g., by tending to produce a high
ratio of true to false beliefs or by being products of sources with this tendency. Yet many
value theorists deny that all non-fundamental value is grounded in instrumental relations
to fundamental value (Instrumentalism). I argue that Veritists can and should reject
Instrumentalism. By doing so, they can solve a generalized version of the swamping
problem. Indeed, the moral of that problem is that Instrumentalism is false: if we
disagree, similar problems will confront any economical epistemic axiology. To make
things concrete, I sketch a non-Instrumentalist version of Veritism inspired by Thomas
Hurka's axiology and show that it avoids the swamping problem. While this is not the
only way to be a Veritist without being an Instrumentalist, it is a promising way that
needn't rest on psychologically exacting views about rationality or knowledge.
4.1 Veritism, Instrumentalism, and Fundamental Epistemic Value
[T]he proper appreciation of a beautiful object is a good thing, wrote G. E. Moore.1
Yet while beauty and its proper appreciation are both good, it is implausible that they
are equally fundamental goods. Plausibly, appreciating beauty is good because beauty
is good. After all, it is only good to appreciate what merits appreciation. Appreciating
trash is no good. So, although it is valuable, the appreciation of beauty seems to have
1Moore (1903: Ch. VI, 114).
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a parasitic or non-fundamental kind of value.2
This is an example of a more general fact. In all evaluative domains, some values
are more fundamental than others, in the sense that their value explains the value of
the others. So, for any domain, it becomes natural to ask the Fundamentality Question:
(FQ) Which value or set of values is the most fundamental in the domain?
Ethicists have long addressed FQ as it arises in the practical domain. Epistemologists
have recently taken interest in FQ as it arises in the epistemic domain. There are, after
all, many epistemic values: accuracy, rationality, justiﬁcation, coherence, knowledge,
etc. But it is doubtful that they are equally fundamental. We admire some of them
from the epistemic point of view because we admire others from the epistemic point of
view.
So, which of these values is fundamental? Many have found it attractive to think
that truth is at the bottom of it all. For plenty of items we value from the epistemic
point of view, it is plausible that we value them because we value accuracy in belief.
Inspired by this idea, one might favor:
(Veritism) True belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value.3
Many epistemologists have accepted Veritism, though it ﬁnds considerable opposition
in recent literature. I also accept the view. But I think opponents and proponents
alike understand it in an unjustiﬁably narrow way. Veritism is defensible if and only if
it is understood less narrowly. The aim of this paper is to explain and defend this claim.
The Narrow Assumption: Instrumentalism about Derivative Value. Many
epistemologists assume that there is only one kind of way in which we can explain
one epistemic value in terms of a more fundamental epistemic value. The explanation,
they assume, must proceed by invoking instrumental relations, so that for any X, X is
2I will be using `non-fundamental', `parasitic', and `derivative' synonymously throughout.
3While this view is held by many epistemologists, its most prominent defender in recent years has
been Alvin Goldman; see especially Goldman (1999b) and The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues" in
Goldman (2002).
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derivatively epistemically good only by (i) tending to produce fundamental epistemic
goods or (ii) being the product of something with feature (i).4 Call the kind of value
that something has just in virtue of (i) production value, and the kind that something
has just in virtue of (ii) mere product value. More oﬃcially, then, many epistemologists
have assumed:
(Instrumentalism about Derivative Value) All derivative epistemic value is just
instrumental epistemic value of either the production or mere product kind.5
As a result, many have presupposed that Veritism is trivially equivalent to:
(Instrumentalist Veritism) True belief is the sole non-instrumental epistemic value.
Everything else at best has some species of instrumental epistemic value.
None of this is trivial, however. Many value theorists have rejected Instrumentalism,
including some who are consequentialists about rightness. Accordingly, it is only natural
to wonder whether Veritism can take a less narrow form.
But what could derivative value be, if not instrumental value? The example with
which I opened provides one illustration. Appreciating beauty is good because beauty
is good. But this `because' signals no instrumental relation. Appreciating beauty does
4One might reserve `instrumental epistemic value' for (i). But I use it to capture the kind of
derivative value that something has just by standing in some instrumental relation. The product of
relation is just as much an instrumental relation as the caused by relation is a causal relation. Since
many epistemologists allow that (ii) can ground derivative epistemic value, it is only fair to deﬁne
Instrumentalism this way.
5While this thesis is typically presupposed rather than explicitly stated (and it is presupposed by
virtually everyone writing about epistemic value), Goldman and Olsson (2009) and Goldman (2012)
do explicitly favor a view that they call type instrumentalism. I intend the arguments in what follows
to cover this doctrine. See Appendix B for a detailed discussion of whether the type/token distinction
will help with the problems I'll be discussing; while I do think it makes a diﬀerence for some problems,
I don't, as I argue, think it aﬀects the points made in this paper.
It is, however, unclear to me whether Goldman (and Olsson) really do accept the sweeping version
of Instrumentalism I'm attacking here, for reasons I explain in the Appendices. They recognize the
category of extrinsic ﬁnal value, and some examples of this type of value are plausibly understood as
examples of derivative value that is not instrumental. To the extent that Goldman (and Olsson) would
accept that characterization, we may disagree less than it seems.
Even if that is so, the importance of separating Instrumentalism from Veritism is far from being
appreciated in the literature. As we'll see, Pritchard (2010, 2011) crucially assumes that Veritists must
be Instrumentalists, and many other discussions of the swamping problem also make this assumption
(e.g., Zagzebski (2004)). There is a widespread belief that Veritism is the source of the swamping
problem, but this is simply false, as I'll be arguing: if Veritists reject Instrumentalism about Derivative
Value, they can avoid the problem.
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not reliably cause more beauty to exist, and is rarely the product of anything beauty-
conducive. Luckily, we are not forced to appeal to instrumental relations. On a more
natural model, the instance of appreciation derives value from its object because (a) its
object is good and (b) it is the way to value that good object. The result is appealing:
appreciating beauty seems parasitically but also non-instrumentally good.
Here is another way to understand what is going on. For X's value to be explained by
Y's, X must stand in some relation to Y. Call such relations value derivation relations.
Instrumental relations comprise one species of value derivation relations. But not the
only species. In the case of beauty and its appreciation, the relation that mediates the
derivation is not any instrumental relation but rather the relation of being a way to value.
Hurka's Principle. Some ethicists have constructed axiologies that honor this idea.
Thomas Hurka, for example, defends a recursive account according to which there are
basic non-instrumental values such as beauty and pleasure, and a principle for grounding
derivative non-instrumental values in the basic ones:
(Hurka's Principle) When V is a non-instrumental value (in some domain), proper
ways of valuing V (in that domain) and their manifestations have derivative non-
instrumental value relative to V (in that domain).6
Given this principle, Hurka suggests that consequentialists about rightness can embrace
the non-instrumental value of virtue while also respecting the thought that virtue has
only a parasitic kind of value. They can do so by identifying virtues with proper ways
of valuing more fundamental values and by making use of Hurka's Principle.
Note that there are two applications of Hurka's Principle. Consider an example
to see both in play. Suppose Alice performs a charitable act because she cares about
charity for its own sake, while Beatrice performs the same act as a PR stunt. Alice's
6A worry: can't everyone agree that proper ways of valuing are valuable, since `proper' just means
`valuable'? Well, propriety is a kind of rightness. Rightness and goodness represent diﬀerent species
of normativity. There are long-standing debates about how they are related. The principle cannot be
trivial for this reason. It is non-trivial for this reason! And the principle does not only say that proper
ways of valuing are valuable. It says that they are derivatively valuable in a speciﬁc waywhich is
quite non-trivial.
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act has greater worth than Beatrice's, and this extra worth is not merely instrumental.
But the fact that Alice's act has greater worth is not just a brute fact. There is a
two-stage explanation of this fact: (i) Alice's act has greater worth by manifesting real
valuing of charity, and (ii) this valuing, in turn, is good because it is properly directed
at something good (viz., charity). In stage (i), the relation of manifestation is the value
derivation relation: the act inherits some of its glow from the valuing of charity that it
manifests. In stage (ii), the relation of valuing is the value derivation relation. Charity
is the more fundamental value.
Hurka's model is not the only model in value theory that rejects Instrumentalism.
Other value theorists have rejected it.7 I highlight Hurka's model only because it in-
spired the speciﬁc alternative to the instrumental model that I will defend. There are
surely other ways for Veritists to avoid Instrumentalism than the way that I will pursue.
I pursue this way mainly for purposes of detailed illustration. My fundamental point is
more abstract, though the hard work lies in ﬁnding detailed implementations.
A Caption of the View and the Plan. My view will appeal to the two-part pattern
illustrated above to explain why rational belief, justiﬁed belief, and knowledge have
worth from an accuracy-oriented perspective. On my view, relations like rationally be-
lieving and knowing are epistemically valuable because they manifest certain ways to
place value on accuracy in thought. I will understand the ways of placing value on accu-
racy in thought in a psychologically unexacting way: they need not be explicitly voiced,
conscious, emotional, or global in the way that character traits are global. Indeed, they
are things that children and animals can display, just by being disposed to think in
certain ways.
The view is compatible with many substantive pictures of the nature of rational
belief, knowledge, and other epistemic desiderata. I see the best pictures as simply
disagreeing about what it takes to place value on accuracy in thought. My own view is
that any way of placing value on accuracy in believing P involves a disposition to hold
7See Anderson (1993), Herman (1993), Kagan (1999), Korsgaard (1983), Moore (1903), Parﬁt (2011),
Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen (1999), Rashdall (1907), Scanlon (1998), and Zimmerman (2001).
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the belief that P only if it is likely to be accurate relative to the epistemic reasons. There
are several ways to place value on accuracy in thought because there are importantly
diﬀerent ways of understanding likelihood and epistemic reasons, which correspond to
diﬀerent epistemic desiderata. These ways and the corresponding desiderata qualify
as derivatively epistemically good from an accuracy-oriented point of view thanks to
Hurka's Principle.
With this capsule statement in mind, here is the plan. In 2, I explain why Veritism
should not be identiﬁed with Instrumentalist Veritism. Instrumentalist Veritism faces a
generalized version of the swamping problem. But this problem undermines Instrumen-
talism, not Veritism. For if we grant Instrumentalism, similar problems arise for any
economical epistemic axiology. I show in 3 how Veritism could take a less narrow form
and avoid the swamping problem. After answering objections in 4, I show in 5 why
the apparent alternatives either fail or collapse into my view.
Disclaimers. Before proceeding, let me make a few remarks about what I am not
doing.
Denying Instrumentalism is compatible with aﬃrming that some derivative epistemic
values are purely instrumental. Reliable types of processes have signiﬁcant instrumental
epistemic value, and reliabilists are right to place value on them.
Denying Instrumentalism is also compatible with the idea that some items might
have both instrumental epistemic value and a diﬀerent kind of derivative epistemic value.
Being instrumental to accuracy, I agree, is a necessary condition for some epistemic
virtues. I only deny that Instrumentalism can explain all the facts about derivative
epistemic value. I will sketch a diﬀerent model of epistemic value derivation. But I
intend this model to supplement the instrumental model, not replace it.
Furthermore, I am not arguing in this paper against reliabilism. Reliabilism is a
thesis about the nature of justiﬁed belief orin some permutationsknowledge. Instru-
mentalism is a thesis about how derivative epistemic value is grounded in fundamental
epistemic value. Reliabilism does not entail this thesis. Indeed, reliabilism does not by
itself entail any claims about the worth that any beliefs possess from the epistemic point
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of view. One would need to appeal to auxiliary assumptions about epistemic worth and
the relationship between derivative and fundamental epistemic worth to derive any such
conclusions.
Many have worried that reliabilists can only appeal to an Instrumentalist model of
derivative epistemic value. But I think this is wrong: there are sophisticated forms of
reliabilism that are not forced to accept a purely Instrumentalist model. Admittedly,
I will discuss a simple form of reliabilism when I introduce the generalized swamping
problem for Instrumentalism in the next section. But this is only as a nod to the
literature.
Finally, my focus is on epistemic value. Here I will not defend a non-consequentialist
view about epistemic rightness. Indeed, Hurka's view in ethics was intended to pro-
vide a way for consequentialists about ethical rightness to consistently uphold the non-
instrumental value of virtue. By accepting a richer axiology, consequentialists can up-
hold a less revisionary account of our duties. This idea is old, found in ideal conse-
quentialists of the early 20th century like Hastings Rashdall and G. E. Moore. While
I do reject consequentialism about epistemic rightness, this paper is not an argument
against it.
4.2 Instrumentalism and the Swamping Problem
Why should Veritists reject Instrumentalism? A large reason is that this is the best way
to avert a generalized version of the swamping problem. To bring this out, I will rehearse
the original swamping problem and explain why we should still take it seriously. I will
then explain why it undermines Instrumentalist Veritism. But I will argue that the
Instrumentalist half is the culprit. This is because any modest epistemic axiology that
embraces Instrumentalism will face a relative of the swamping problem, and Veritists
can easily solve the problem by rejecting Instrumentalism.
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4.2.1 The Old Problem (and Why It Remains Important)
Originally, the swamping problem was presented as a problem for a simple kind of
reliabilism. The following thoughts prompted the problem. The epistemic value of a
reliable type of belief-forming process per se is just instrumental epistemic value relative
to the goal of producing a high ratio of true to false beliefs. While reliable belief-forming
processes have great epistemic value, one also wants to evaluate their products. And
unfortunately, the following claim is plausible:
(A) A belief's having been produced by a reliable type of belief-forming process
does not as such make that belief epistemically better if that belief is already true.
(A) is made plausible by an analogy from Zagzebski (1999). The mere fact that some
good coﬀee came from a reliable type of coﬀeemaker does not make that coﬀee better.
But considered merely as such, a reliably produced true belief seems analogous to a
reliably produced cup of good coﬀee. Thus:
(B) If knowledge= true belief produced by a reliable type of belief-forming process,
then knowledge is not as such epistemically better than true belief.
But knowledge is as such epistemically better than true belief. Hence the problem.
Some might try to resist this argument by observing that we do sometimes place
greater value on products of reliable sources. For example, the market value of a good
watch produced by Rolex would be far higher than that of an unusual, qualitatively
identical watch produced by Casio. Doesn't this undermine the swamping argument?8
No. Intuition pumps like this do support the conclusion that some products of re-
liable sources are better than intrinsically similar products of unreliable sources. But
this conclusion does not undermine the reasoning behind the swamping problem. Here
is why. The key thought behind the swamping argument is this:
8For this type of reply, see Goldman and Olsson (2009) and Goldman (2012: Introduction). Gold-
man's ultimate reply contains some further details that I discuss in the Appendices.
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(*) A good F's having come from a reliable source of good Fs cannot as such make it
better.
The `as such' matters. It is consistent with (*) that other properties can contingently
accompany a good F's reliable ancestry and add value to that F. The Rolex/Casio exam-
ple is an illustration: Rolexes are status symbols. That is why the Rolex is preferable.
If it were not a status symbol (say, because we all had Rolexes), it would be irrational
to prefer the Rolex to a qualitatively identical but cheaper Casio.
Proponents of the swamping argument will agree that reliably produced good Fs are
sometimes better than unreliably produced good Fs. Zagzebski (1996), for example,
agrees that reliability is a necessary condition for complete epistemic virtue.9 Thus, she
agrees that some reliably produced true beliefs are better than mere true beliefs: some
reliably produced true beliefs will satisfy the other necessary conditions for manifesting
complete epistemic virtue, after all! What Zagzebski and others deny is that reliable
ancestry as such is suﬃcient to explain why knowledge as such is epistemically better
than true belief.
That was the problem all along. So, the conclusion (i.e., (B)) from the original
literature stands. It is insuﬃcient to observe that a reliably produced F is sometimes
better than an unreliably produced but intrinsically similar F. Zagzebski and others
will agree but deny that the explanation of why one is better than the other proceeds
via the bare fact of reliable ancestry. That was the point of the coﬀee analogy. The
analogy forces us to ask what else could make the diﬀerence, since reliable ancestry as
such seems insuﬃcient.
This isn't to deny that reliable processes have great epistemic value. The problem
has always concerned their products. As Jones (1997: 425) put it:
When we ask about the value of knowledge over mere true belief, we are asking not about
belief-forming methods but about their products. We have clear reason to care about
reliable methods of belief-formation, and the reliabilist is right to emphasize them. But it
is unclear, on reliabilism, why we should divide the desired products of belief-formation,
9See Zagzebski (1996: 165-194), and especially the sections entitled The Success Component of the
Intellectual Virtues and Montmarquet on the Virtues and Truth-Conduciveness.
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true beliefs, into those which were brought about by reliable methods and those that were
not. The epistemic instrumentalist gives us no way of evaluatively dividing true beliefs
into those which have been brought about by justifying methods versus those which have
not.
This challenge remains a serious one.
4.2.2 The Deeper Problem
The swamping problem runs deeper than this, however. It is easy to see that the problem
is not just a problem about knowledge or just a problem for reliabilists.
To see the ﬁrst point, note that reliabilists identify a belief's being justiﬁed with its
being formed by a reliable type of belief-forming process. Assume they are right for the
sake of argument. We can use the same coﬀee analogy to argue that justiﬁcation cannot
as such add epistemic value to true belief. That is bad: justiﬁcation as such does add
epistemic value to true belief! This is not a restatement of the problem about knowledge:
due to the Gettier problem, no reliabilist will equate knowledge with justiﬁed true belief.
There is an even more general structure that makes the problem not just of limited
interest to reliabilists. On any view on which
being justiﬁed : true belief :: being made by a good coﬀeemaker : good coﬀee
there is a worry that justiﬁcation cannot as such add epistemic value to true belief. So,
there is a worry for any view on which the epistemic value of justiﬁed belief consists
in its being the mere product of some type of source that is only instrumentally good
relative to true belief. Reliabilists are hardly the only epistemologists who accept this
assumption.
These observations lead to a general argument against Instrumentalist Veritism, as
Duncan Pritchard (2010, 2011) in eﬀect observed. Instrumentalist Veritism entails that:
(A) Items other than true belief are epistemically good iﬀ they (i) instrumentally
promote true (and not false) belief or (ii) are products of a type of source with
property (i).
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And the following is a natural generalization of the points about the coﬀeemaker case:
(B: Swamping Premise) If X has its source in something that is only instrumentally
good relative to property F and X already exempliﬁes F, the mere fact that X has
that type of source cannot as such make X better.
But according to Instrumentalist Veritism, justifying and rationalizing sources only have
instrumental epistemic value relative to true belief. So (A) and (B) will entail:
y. A true belief's being justiﬁed cannot as such make that belief epistemically
better.
z. A true belief's being rational cannot as such make that belief epistemically
better.
Now, Pritchard took this to undermine Veritism simpliciter. But this is only because
he presupposes Instrumentalism. Indeed, in setting up his argument, Pritchard (2011:
245) says he will assume that [a] good is fundamental...if its value is not instrumental
relative to further goods of the same type. This is equivalent to Instrumentalism.
If Pritchard were right to make that assumption, Veritism would suﬀer. It would
collapse into Instrumentalist Veritism, and the generalized swamping problem would un-
dermine it. But Veritists can reject Instrumentalism and view the generalized swamping
problem as an argument against it. To support this tactic, I will show that the Swamp-
ing Premise does not extend to other species of derivative value. This will show that
the problem is a local one for Instrumentalists. To drive the point home, I will show
that there are similar problems for all modest alternatives to Veritism that cling to
Instrumentalism.
4.2.3 Why Other Forms of Derivative Value Help
Let us ﬁrst understand why rejecting Instrumentalism can help Veritists. Doing so
can help them, I suggest, because other forms of derivative value are not subject to
swamping by the values from which they derive value. To see this, consider:
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(Stronger Swamping Premise) For no type of derivative value is it true that:
if X has its source in something that only has derivative value relative to property
F but X already has F, X's having that source as such makes X better.
This is false. Recall the phenomena that motivate Hurka's Principle. Alice performs
an act of charity because she values charity, while Beatrice performs the same kind of
action as a PR stunt. Plausibly, Alice's action is better than Beatrice's because it has
its source in real concern for charity. Yet just as appreciating beauty is good because
beauty is good, so valuing charity is good because charity is good. It is just that the
`because' here signals no instrumental explanation. Instead, the explanation goes by
Hurka's Principle.
Here is a case where an act derives value from a source that is only derivatively good
relative to another property that the act exempliﬁes. The source is (1) Alice's valuing
of charity, and the property exempliﬁed is (2) charity. Yet it is plausible that the sheer
fact that Alice's act has its source in (1) makes that act worthier per se. In a picture:
act
manifests has property of
valuing of charity charity
derives some value from
derives some value from
This would be impossible if the Stronger Swamping Premise were true. So it is false.
If the foregoing points are right, Veritism per se generates no problem: only its
conjunction with Instrumentalism does. If Veritists adopt a diﬀerent model of value
derivation, they can avoid swamping just as it was avoided in the case of charitable
action.
On the view I develop in 3, rational belief and knowledge gain epistemic worth
by manifesting ways of placing value on accuracy in thought. On this view, the case
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of knowing parallels the case of Alice's charitable action. Knowledge requires a belief
whose accuracy manifests a disposition to hold beliefs only if there is suﬃcient objective
and subjective evidence that they are true. This disposition just is a way to place
value on accuracy in thought. Ways of placing value on accuracy are epistemically good
because accuracy is epistemically good. But this `because' is not purely instrumental.
Paralleling Alice's case:
belief
manifests has property of
ways of placing
value on accuracy
in thought
accuracy
derives some value from
derives some value from
I'll explain the ways of placing value on accuracy in thought in 3. The tactic is what
matters now. Veritists can claim that true beliefs can gain epistemic worth by manifest-
ing ways of placing value on accuracy, just as charitable actions can gain moral worth by
manifesting valuing of charity. Both cases undermine the Stronger Swamping Premise.
So Veritists can avoid the swamping problem if they appeal to forms of derivative
value beyond the instrumental. But they must avoid the problem in this way. For
the restricted Swamping Premise is plausible. Instrumentalist Veritism is false. But
since it is plausible that epistemic evaluation is truth-oriented, we should only reject
the Instrumentalist half.
4.2.4 A General Problem for Instrumentalists
We can strengthen this advice by seeing that if Instrumentalism were true, other eco-
nomical epistemic axiologies would face relatives of the swamping problem.
Observe that there is another side to Zagzebski's analogy. We do not only think
that coming from a reliable coﬀeemaker per se cannot improve good cups of coﬀee. We
also think that coming from a reliable coﬀeemaker per se cannot improve bad cups of
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coﬀee. If you drink some vile coﬀee and cringe, it is not comforting to be told: Hey,
at least it was produced by a reliable coﬀeemaker. These facts support a more striking
sibling of the restricted Swamping Premise:
(Dud Principle) If X was produced by a source that is only good because it pro-
duces good Fs, that fact as such can't make X better if X is otherwise a bad
F.
Carter and Jarvis (2012) took this to undermine the intuitions behind the swamping
problem. For they thought that the Dud Principle would imply, crazily, that non-
factive epistemic propertiesmost saliently justiﬁcationare never epistemically valu-
able. But they were hasty: that crazy conclusion follows only if we grant Instrumen-
talism.
Like the original Swamping Premise, the Dud Principle concerns a kind of instrumen-
tal value. The crazy conclusion would not follow from the Dud Principle if non-factive
epistemic properties had a diﬀerent kind of derivative epistemic value. Only if the Dud
Principle extends to other kinds of derivative value is Carter and Jarvis's conclusion
fair.
But the Dud Principle does not generalize, for the same reasons why the Swamping
Premise did not generalize. Consider someone trying to perform a charitable act just
because this person values charity and failing only due to bad luck. Her eﬀorts remain
better than the failed eﬀorts of someone merely looking for a PR boost.
What the Dud Principle really suggests is that Instrumentalism is an incomplete
model. After all, it is not as if Carter and Jarvis can convince us that vile coﬀee is
better if it comes from an otherwise reliable coﬀee machine. Like the original Swamping
Premise, the Dud Principle captures a fact about products of merely instrumentally
good sources.
But it is then easy to see that any modest axiology that embraces Instrumentalism
will face a relative of the swamping problem. Suppose, for example, that knowledge
is one's fundamental epistemic good. Given Instrumentalism, how can one explain
the epistemic value of justiﬁed beliefs? One must claim that such beliefs are good
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by being products of knowledge-conducive types of processes. But the Dud Principle
will make it mysterious why justiﬁed false beliefs are epistemically good. From an
Instrumentalist point of view, they are duds just like bad cups of coﬀee from otherwise
reliable coﬀeemakers.
Expanding the stock of fundamental epistemic values doesn't really help. Even if one
adds justiﬁed belief, knowledge, understanding, and true belief to the list, there remain
epistemic values that (a) no one can reasonably take to be fundamental, but (b) admit of
no Instrumentalist explanation. Consider the epistemic value of trying one's best to form
beliefs accurately. This is a paradigmatically derivative value: trying to do something
good is generally admirable because it is intentionally directed at something good. But
if we accept Instrumentalism, it is hard to explain why it is derivatively epistemically
good. Merely trying to form one's beliefs accurately is not reliably instrumental to
accuracy, knowledge, justiﬁcation, etc. One might be an amateur whose best eﬀorts
can't reliably yield these results. But there remains something admirable in one's best
eﬀorts. This is not evidence of a new fundamental value. This value is paradigmatically
derivative.
Any modest epistemic axiology that endorses Instrumentalismeven a pluralist one
that places justiﬁed belief, knowledge, understanding, and true belief in the bedrock
of valuewill face a relative of the swamping problem. There are paradigmatically
derivative epistemic values that admit of no general Instrumentalist explanation. So,
everyone should reject Instrumentalism. Accordingly, it is not ad hoc for Veritists to do
so.
4.3 Veritism without Instrumentalism
Of course, work remains for Veritists. They must oﬀer us a more speciﬁc view that takes
advantage of our observations about forms of value derivation beyond the instrumental,
and explain how this view can capture central intuitions about epistemic value.
My view will secure these desiderata. I'll start by explaining two key ideas. The ﬁrst
idea is that there are more ways to value something than by instrumentally promoting
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it. This holds for accuracy as much as it holds for other values. The second idea is
the part of Hurka's Principle which says that manifestations of proper ways of valuing
X are derivatively valuable relative to X. With these ideas in hand, I'll suggest that
central epistemic values like coherent belief, rational belief, and knowledge can be viewed
as manifesting diﬀerent ways of placing value on accuracy, and as deriving accuracy-
oriented epistemic value thanks to Hurka's Principle. I'll then turn to answer some
objections in 4.
4.3.1 Other Ways of Valuing in General
Let's start with a more general fact. It is a truism that values are items that it is proper
to value. Given the truism, one should ask for any fundamental value V in any domain:
(FVQ) Which ways of valuing V are the proper ways in the domain?
Instrumentalists can be cornered into accepting a surprisingly narrow answer to FVQ:
(The Teleological Answer) For any fundamental value V, the only basically proper
way to value V is to instrumentally promote V.10
For suppose the Teleological Answer is false. Then there are basically proper ways
to value something good other than producing it. Since proper ways of valuing are
derivatively good, it follows that there are derivative values that are not instrumen-
tal values. This contradicts Instrumentalism. So, if the Teleological Answer is false,
Instrumentalism is false. Thus, if Instrumentalism is true, the Teleological Answer is
true.
But the Teleological Answer is implausible. There are many ways to value: being
dedicated to, protecting, respecting, being loyal to, taking delight in, etc. This answer
regards only one as basically proper to fundamental value. This is hardly a default
view. For some values, instrumental promotion is not the basically proper response.
If friendship were fundamentally to be promoted, we could properly spend less time
10I say `basically proper' because the instrumentalist can obviously allow that other ways of valuing
V are non-basically proper in virtue of helping to instrumentally promote V.
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caring about the friends we have and more time amassing friends or causing others
to have more friends. This misunderstands the value of friendship, as others have
stressed. We can properly value friendship without taking ourselves to have reasons to
produce more instances of friendship.11 Fans of the Teleological Answer could multiply
fundamental values in reply, and claim that loyalty, commitment, respect, dedication,
etc., are all fundamental values. But this pluralism is implausible. Besides violating
canons of parsimony, it fails to explain asymmetries. Dedication to one's friends matters
because friendship matters.
These points highlight an insight needed for a version of Veritism that rejects In-
strumentalism. The Veritist should capitalize on this insight and suggest that there are
more ways to place value on accuracy in thought than by producing a high ratio of true
to false beliefs by any means, including means that disrespect accuracy.
4.3.2 Ways to Place Value on Accuracy in Thought
How can we implement the insight? What are the ways to place value on accuracy in
thought? I understand the ways that are suited to play a role in traditional epistemo-
logical projects as diﬀerent ways to honor the following ideal of accuracy:12
(AI) It is correct to believe P iﬀ P is true.
AI is not a directly belief-guiding norm. But we can honor this norm indirectly. By
doing so, we place value on accuracy in our thinking. Coherent beliefs, rational beliefs,
and knowledge can be viewed as epistemically good from a truth-oriented point of view
by manifesting diﬀerent ways to place value on accuracy in thought.
11Cf. Scanlon (1998: 89): [T]he primary reason to be loyal to one's friends is not that this is
necessary for the friendship to continue to exist.... We would not say it showed how much a person
valued friendship if he betrayed one friend in order to make several new ones, or in order to bring it
about that other people had more friends.
12I make no claims about ways of valuing accuracy that are not suited to play a role in these projects.
Here I distance myself from responsibilists less conservative than Zagzebski. I also distance myself from
any standard kind of responsibilism, since responsibilists typically stress intellectual character traits.
My ways of valuing are not global like character traits. They are quite local. Here again I am close to
Hurka, who also stressed in his (2006) that virtues need not amount to character traits.
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I will discuss three ways that we can use to ground the epistemic value of coherent
belief, rational belief, and knowledge from an accuracy-oriented perspective: commit-
ment, respect, and compliance. I will draw comparisons with other ideals to illustrate
the more general pattern of evaluation. It is worth noting that the three ways of hon-
oring ideals that I will discuss are the ones intuitively missing in cases of recklessness,
negligence, and non-compliance, respectively. While I emphasize the connection with
these pre-theoretically important concepts in discussing the examples, the connection is
worth stressing separately to forestall the worry that the discussion is purely stipulative.
Commitment
To see the ﬁrst way to honor AI, consider other ideals, like this ideal of politeness:
(PI) It is correct to say Q to some casual interlocutor only if saying Q would not
make this interlocutor pointlessly uncomfortable.
Imagine that Edward is trying to make you pointlessly uncomfortable by saying Q. He
may fail: unbeknownst to him, Q may put you at ease. If so, he conforms to PI. Still,
he is clearly reckless with respect to PI, and manifests a lack of commitment to PI.
Being committed to an ideal is part of what it takes to honor it. Commitment
to an ideal in φ-ing is grounded in a disposition to φ only if one takes there to be
suﬃcient evidence that φ-ing is in conformity with that ideal. When we criticize people
for recklessness or hypocrisy with respect to some ideal, it is this we ﬁnd lacking.
Like any ideal, the ideal of accuracy also calls for commitment. To see what com-
mitment to AI requires, consider someone who takes himself to have conclusive evidence
that he believes P inaccurately but believes P anyway. He does not place suﬃcient value
on accuracy in his thinking. He might believe accurately anyway. But he fails to mani-
fest commitment to AI in believing P, like how Edward failed to manifest commitment
to PI in saying Q. This is why he doesn't fully honor AI.
Commitment to AI lines up with one interesting epistemic valueviz., structural
epistemic rationality. Complying with all the norms of structural epistemic rationality
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is the way to be committed to the ideal of accuracy. Coherent agents may fail to place
value on accuracy in some ways, but not by lack of commitment to the ideal of accuracy.
Respect
Coherence is not the whole of epistemic rationality. Epistemic rationality also has a
substantive side. Substantive epistemic rationality involves a stronger way to honor the
ideal of accuracy than commitment, though it does not require conformity.
To understand this, it will again prove helpful to compare other ideals. Consider the
ideal of politeness again. This time imagine Edna, who seems to succeed by her own
lights with respect to PI. She is conﬁdent that her interlocutor likes talking about X and
so intends to bring up X. Unfortunately, Edna neglects certain apparent evidence. She
has a seeming memory that X makes her interlocutor uncomfortable but disregards it
as misleading. This apparent memory might really be misleading. If so, Edna conforms
to PI. But she is negligent with respect to PI, and fails to respect PI in one natural
sense.13
Respect is another way to honor an ideal. To respect an ideal in φ-ing is to manifest
a disposition to φ iﬀ the apparent evidence indicates that φ-ing would be in conformity
with the ideal. When we criticize people for being negligent with respect to an ideal, it
is this we ﬁnd lacking. Like any ideal, the ideal of accuracy calls for respect. Consider
someone who mistakenly takes himself to have conclusive evidence for P by randomly
disregarding obvious evidence against P as misleading. While he might still believe
something true, he partly fails to place suﬃcient value on accuracy in believing P, just
as Edna partly failed to place suﬃcient value on politeness in bringing up X.
Respect for AI lines up with another interesting epistemic valueviz., substantive
epistemic rationality. Being substantively epistemically rational is the way to respect
the ideal of accuracy. Substantively rational thinkers may fail to place value on accuracy
in their thinking in other ways, but not by a lack of respect, in one intuitive sense of
`respect'.
13There are aﬃnities here with Darwall (1977)'s general notion of recognition respect.
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Compliance
Even if we are fully committed to some ideal and respect it, we may not honor it fully. To
honor an ideal fully, one must actually conform to it. Not all non-conformity manifests
disrespect or lack of commitment to the ideal. Imagine someone falsely telling you that
a topic does not make her uncomfortable. Perhaps she recognizes that you enjoy this
topic and wants to oblige you. If you bring it up, you fall short with respect to PI. But
not by disrespect or lack of commitment.
Of course, mere conformity is not a way to honor an ideal. Conformity can be
the lucky product of negligence or recklessness. If you fall short because you do not
fully honor PI, it is not just because of non-conformity. Rather, what you fail to do is
something you are sadly in no position to do: namely, to comply with the ideal.
What is it to comply with an ideal? It is to conform with the ideal by respecting it.
In cases like the one imagined, compliance is not open to you: only if it became apparent
that the topic makes your interlocutor uncomfortable would compliance be open to you.
This is why you are excusable. But compliance sometimes is open to us. When it is, it is
the most proper way to honor the ideal. Like other ideals, AI also calls for compliance.
Sometimes we can conform to AI by respecting AI, thereby complying with AI. When we
do, we believe accurately by believing rationally. This way of placing value on accuracy
lines up with another interesting epistemic valueviz., knowing. Knowing that P just
is a way to comply with the ideal of accuracy with respect to P.
4.3.3 Deriving Epistemic Value via Hurka's Principle
Let's summarize the connections from the last few subsections in a table:
Way of Valuing Manifested By Epistemic Property
Commitment Belief-Relative Likely Accuracy Coherence
Respect Appearance-Relative Likely Accuracy Substantive Rationality
Compliance Real Accuracy via Respect Knowledge
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Once we see that these central epistemic values reﬂect diﬀerent ways of placing value
on accuracy in thought, we are only a step away from an accuracy-oriented account of
their epistemic value. The other ingredient we need is Hurka's Principle.
Given Hurka's Principle, we can ground the epistemic value of other properties from
the perspective of accuracy. Consider substantive rationality. It requires sensitivity to
the apparent evidence bearing on one's accuracy. As I suggested in the last section, that
is a way to place value on accuracy in thought. If so, we can use Hurka's Principle to
explain the epistemic value of substantively rational belief in accuracy-oriented terms.
In a picture:
believing
rationally
respecting the
ideal of accuracy
the epistemic
value of accuracy
manifests a way of
whose value is grounded Hurka-wise in
The same story explains why coherence and knowledge have derivative epistemic value.
Being coherent is the way to be committed to the ideal of accuracy. Knowing is the
way to comply with the ideal of accuracy. Being committed to and complying with the
ideal of accuracy are epistemically proper ways to place value on accuracy in thought.
Accordingly, we can explain the epistemic value of coherence and knowledge from the
perspective of accuracy just like we explained the epistemic value of substantive ratio-
nality. In pictures:
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believing
coherently
being committed
to the ideal
of accuracy
the epistemic
value of accuracy
knowing
complying
with the ideal
of accuracy
the epistemic
value of accuracy
manifests a way of
whose value is grounded Hurka-wise in
There are epistemic values other than coherence, rationality, and knowledge. But I
hypothesize that every properly epistemic value that is not just instrumentally valuable
relative to the others that I discussed will be explicable in something like this framework.
In 4, I will address objections to this hypothesis. For now, I am happy to have derived
the epistemic value of three central properties from the perspective of accuracy.
4.3.4 Comparative Propriety and Rankings of Value
The story so far leaves open the ranking of epistemic values. Commitment, respect, and
compliance are all epistemically proper ways to honor AI. If so, coherent belief, rational
belief, and knowledge are all derivatively good from the perspective of accuracy.
Yet one would like to rank these epistemic values. Coherent belief, rational belief
and knowledge are not equally epistemically good. One wants to say that knowledge is
better than substantively rational belief, and substantively rational belief is better than
coherent belief. How should we explain these comparisons?
Although commitment, respect and compliance are all epistemically proper ways to
honor the ideal of accuracy, they are not equally proper. For any ideal in any domain, it
is most proper to comply with an ideal. If one must fail to comply, it is more proper to
do so with respect than without. If one must fail to respect an ideal, it is more proper
to do so while remaining committed to the ideal. These general diﬀerences explain why
knowledge > substantive rationality > coherence
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After all, for any ideal, compliance is a more proper way to honor an ideal than respect,
and respect is more proper than commitment. Since what is best from the perspective of
an ideal is explained by what is most proper to that ideal, we can say that knowledge is
best from the perspective of AI. So, compatibly with accuracy's being the fundamental
epistemic value, we can agree that knowledge is epistemically best.
This is not paradoxical. Compliance is the most proper response for any system of
ideals. This does not mean that there is a further ideal of compliance. In addition to
a given ideal X, one does not need another ideal that says: Comply with X!". There
are just ideals, and it is a conceptual truth about ideals that compliance is more proper
than mere respect and respect is more proper than mere commitment. In the epistemic
domain, the fundamental thing is AI. Just as compliance is not a further fundamental
ideal, knowledge is not a further fundamental value.
Is this illuminating? Yes. We can see the ranking of epistemic value as a special case
of a general propriety ordering for ways of recognizing ideals. So, the account is far more
illuminating than some view on which it is a bedrock truth that knowledge is better
than substantive rationality and substantively rationality is better than coherence.
Have I presupposed what I was trying to explain? No. I appealed to general truths
about the comparative propriety of certain ways of honoring ideals, not particular truths
about the comparative goodness of the states that manifest these ways of honoring the
ideal of accuracy. Was the appeal to truths about comparative propriety circular? Not
as far as I can see. Propriety is a deontic concept, not an evaluative one. It is not
trivial to draw a conclusion about comparative goodness from a comparative propriety
judgment.
4.3.5 Advantages
The version of Veritism I've sketched has many advantages. Let's consider them.
Among versions of Veritism, mine is the ﬁrst to explicitly honor the fact that value
derivations need not be grounded in instrumental relations. This yields advantages. The
Swamping Premise does not generalize to other forms of derivative value. Just as acts
that manifest ways of valuing ethical ideals are ipso facto ethically better, so instances
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of believing that manifest ways of valuing accuracy are ipso facto epistemically better.
My view inherits the broader virtues of Veritism. Veritism is a maximally simple
axiology. Parsimony is as much a virtue in axiology as it is elsewhere. Supplemented
with more sophisticated views about value derivation, Veritism also has great explana-
tory power. And its explanatory power is intuitive. It is intuitive that we care about
things like rationality because we care about accuracy.
Since I deny that the `because' must be understood instrumentally, I can vindicate
this intuitive claim more directly than Instrumentalists. Forming beliefs in a way that
appears likely to achieve accuracy does not entail reliable achievement of accuracy. Just
consider demon worlds, where our experiences are the same but the demon ensures
that they radically fail to match external reality. These worlds do suggest that some
epistemic values cannot be explained in terms of objective truth-conducivity. But this
does not show that not all epistemic values are truth-oriented. It just shows that truth
orientation should not be understood merely instrumentally.
Isn't rationality a way of subjectively promoting accuracy? Sure. But if we are
Instrumentalists, it is unclear why this is more than a merely apparently good thing.
Expected value is perhaps connected to obligation. But it is not a kind of value, just as
expected wealth is not a kind of wealth. Yet rationality does not just appear to have
epistemic value. It has real epistemic value, even in demon worlds. The only way to
explain this short of an error theory is to view the subjective promotion of accuracy
as constituting something further : a way to place value on accuracy.
4.4 Five Objections Answered
A theory can have many virtues while facing conclusive objections. Having sketched my
theory and explained its virtues, I will now answer ﬁve major objections.
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4.4.1 Too Demanding?
I claimed that coherence, rationality and knowledge are epistemically valuable in virtue
of manifesting certain ways to place value on accuracy in thought. But must people re-
ally place value on accuracy in thought to believe coherently, rationally, or knowingly?
Isn't this overly demanding?
Reply. This objection is itself nourished by overly demanding assumptions. In partic-
ular, it assumes that placing value on accuracy in thought is more demanding than it
is.
It is plausible that when we think carefully by heeding all the apparent evidence
bearing on the accuracy of our beliefs, we are placing value on accuracy in our thinking.
This ﬁts under a more general pattern. When we reason carefully and heed the apparent
evidence bearing on whether we would conform to any standard by φ-ing, it is plausible
that our φ-ing exhibits respect for that standard. It is plausible, then, that respecting
accuracy is not psychologically demanding.
This idea is not strained. If Alfonso thinks carelessly and forms beliefs iﬀ they are
comforting, it is entirely natural to fault him for placing insuﬃcient value on accuracy
in his thinking. Still, when we do so, what we are calling for is something more modest
than love or passion for accuracy. Love, passion and the like are not the only forms of
valuing. They did not ﬁgure in my account. We need not view respect, commitment or
compliance as constituted by emotions or states with any fancy qualitative feel.
They are just ways to be attuned to diﬀerent factors that bear on the accuracy
of particular beliefs. The ways to place value on accuracy that I invoked consist in
forms of sensitivity to truth-oriented reasons: the reasons are belief-relative in the case
of commitment, appearance-relative in the case of respect, and fact-relative in the case
of compliance. In this unexacting sense, even children may place value on accuracy in
thoughte.g., by being disposed to abandon their beliefs when and because they are
probably inaccurate and to have beliefs when and because they are probably accurate.
This is not implausible.
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Indeed, ways of valuing accuracy could simply be grounded in competences. This is
true, at any rate, if competence is understood as epistemically good because its exercises
constitute ways to place value on accuracy. Consider Greco (1999: 289):
[S]ubjective justiﬁcation can be understood in terms of the dispositions a person manifests
when she is thinking conscientiously.... [B]y `thinking conscientiously', I do not mean
thinking with an explicitly voiced purpose of ﬁnding out the truth. Neither do I mean
thinking with this as one's sole purpose. Rather, I intend the state that most people are
in as a kind of default modetrying to form one's beliefs accurately.
Properly framed, this could be a version of my picture.
4.4.2 Doesn't the View Then Collapse into Familiar Views?
My reply dovetails with another objection. Doesn't this reply show that my view col-
lapses into familiar views? Aren't the properties that subvene my ways of placing value
on accuracy just familiar ones from other theories of rationality and knowledge?
Reply. This objection misses the point of my view. I can agree that my ways of
valuing accuracy are grounded in familiar properties from other accounts of the nature of
rationality and knowledge. My view is not about the nature of rationality or knowledge,
but about why these properties are epistemically good from the perspective of truth.
What matters for this purpose is that what constitutes these properties constitutes
something furtherviz., ways to place value on accuracy.
Here we see what is new. My view captures unappreciated truth-oriented unity in
epistemic value by its appeal to Hurka's Principle and the ways of placing value on accu-
racy in thought. These ideas are not familiar in epistemology, since most epistemologists
assume without argument that all derivative value must be grounded via instrumental
relations to fundamental value. So, the key part of my view collapses into no familiar
tack.
One might try to restate the objection: But if ways to place value on accuracy
are grounded in familiar properties, then ways to place value on accuracy will only be
epistemically valuable if these familiar properties are epistemically valuable. But it is
your job to explain why these familiar properties are epistemically valuable!
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I reply that they are epistemically valuable because they constitute ways of valuing
accuracy, which in turn derive epistemic value from the perspective of accuracy via
Hurka's Principle. This sounds question-begging only if we are hoodwinked by a fallacy.
Consider a beautiful painting. It is grounded in a bunch of atoms. These atoms are
not beautiful. If they have value, it is because they ground something else. We should
not insist that the atoms must have antecedent value and worry that the painting is
trash because we cannot ﬁnd this antecedent value. Their value can be explained in a
trickle-down fashion: they ground the painting and it is valuable, so they are valuable.
Downwards causation may be incredible. But downwards value inheritance is the norm.
4.4.3 What About Other Epistemic Values?
One might concede my account of the epistemic value of coherence, rationality, and
knowledge but worry that the approach cannot stretch farther. How can it ground all
epistemic values, including rich ones like open-mindedness and intellectual courage?
Reply. I have a two-pronged response. First, I think these rich properties have a
special glow partly by having extra value that is not properly epistemic. Beliefs that
exhibit these properties might be somewhat epistemically better than mere true beliefs.
Butsecond prongmy framework can explain their properly epistemic value.
A warm-up to the ﬁrst prong. Epistemic value theorists often try to explain too
much by not distinguishing two things we could mean by `epistemic value'. I would
separate
(a) being good from the epistemic point of view
from
(b) being good simpliciter and also epistemic.
There are parallels. Consider talk of a good chess strategy. This may pick out
(c) something that is good from the point of view of chess strategy
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or
(d) something that is good simpliciter and also a chess strategy.
If your chess strategy will humiliate your opponent, it exempliﬁes (c) but not (d).
Similarly, something might be epistemically superb but of little worth absolutely.
Must the chess expert explain the goodness of chess strategies from the Point of
View of the Universe? No. It is similarly hard to see why the epistemologist must
explain which epistemic items matter from that point of view. A theory of epistemic
value should not make it impossible to understand why certain epistemic properties
are desirable from the Point of View of the Universe. But this is a weak constraint.
If we reject Instrumentalism, there is no reason to believe that Veritism violates this
constraint.
Intuitions voiced in the literature on epistemic value often conﬂate (a) and (b). Once
we remove obstacles to seeing how knowledge and understanding can possibly have value
simpliciter, we must recognize that intuitions about (b) are best left for non-epistemic
axiologists to explain. A theory of what is valuable from the epistemic point of view
need not explain them, just as the chess strategist need not vindicate chess fanaticism.
With this in mind, I approach some items with suspicion. Consider understanding.
While special in absolute terms, its signiﬁcance from the epistemic point of view is
unclear. Note that while (A-C) are defensible epistemic requirements, (*-**) aren't:
(A) Don't believe P while also believing that your evidence for P is insuﬃcient.
(B) Don't believe P while also believing that you lack justiﬁcation to believe P.
(C) Don't judge that P while also believing that you don't know that P.
(*) Don't believe P while also believing that you do not understand why P.
(**) Don't have beliefs about X while also believing that you don't understand
X.
Of many facts I know, I am sure I do not understand why they are so. Of many topics
about which I have beliefs, I am sure I do not understand them. Sometimes this is
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not my fault. We may hope to understand the facts. But intelligibility is up to them.
They may be unintelligible. We exhibit no epistemic ﬂaw if we take some facts to obtain
while ﬁnding them incomprehensible. By contrast, we exhibit a ﬂaw if we judge while
admitting that we do so irrationally, unjustiﬁedly, etc.
So it is unclear that a theory of epistemic value must explain our thirst for under-
standing. Still, understanding has some accuracy-oriented value. Like Pritchard (2010:
75-6), I think one cannot understand a topic without having many rational true be-
liefs about it. I just suspect that whatever value understanding has beyond this is not
properly epistemic.
I am less moved yet by other items that are sometimes claimed to have some truth-
disconnected epistemic value. Some point to features like open-mindedness and intellec-
tual courage.14 While the goodness of these features is not wholly truth-disconnected,
I am unconvinced that their extra value is properly epistemic. This is not ad hoc:
being willing to take the ideas of others seriously is good, but it can be epistemically
counterproductive. The same goes for the intellectual courage associated with ﬁnding
alternatives to common views even when they face no serious objections.
Again, it is important not to misunderstand the claims here. I'm not claiming that
epistemic value theorists can wholly ignore the non-epistemic value of broadly epistemic
properties. Epistemologists should not make it impossible to understand how these
properties could be non-epistemically valuable. But the main challenge to the possibility
of understanding this is the swamping problem, and I explained how to avoid it.
I am also not claiming that epistemologists shouldn't be interested in the nature of
understanding, intellectual courage, open-mindedness, and so on. These properties are
broadly epistemic properties. It is just that some of their glow is not properly epistemic.
4.4.4 Trivial Truths and the Valuing of Accuracy
There is a diﬀerent objection worth discussing in connection with the last. Many have
objected that accuracy cannot be the fundamental epistemic value because the best way
14Cf. Montmarquet (1987: 484-5) and Baehr (2012).
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to promote that value would be to do absurd things like memorizing telephone books.
But accuracy-ﬁrst views need not encourage such nonsense. My view, for example,
only implies that when one is taking a stance on some proposition, it is epistemically
desirable to hold a doxastic attitude that manifests certain ways of honoring the ideal
of accuracy:
(AI) It is correct to believe P iﬀ P is true.
AI is logically weaker than:
(AI+) One ought to believe P iﬀ P is true.
Granting AI+, we would be epistemically obliged to memorize telephone books, count
blades of grass, and the like. But AI calls for no such thing: AI only implies that if P
is true, it is correct to believe that P. The claim that it is correct to believe truths does
not imply the claim that it is incorrect to not believe truthsi.e., obligatory to believe
truths. But only that second claim yields the absurd conclusions.
This reply is preferable to the common one. Many suggest that we trade AI+ for:
(AI-) For any important proposition P, a person ought to believe P iﬀ P is true.
While (AI-) avoids bad implications about trivial truths, it creates new problems. It
fails to explain why it can be as epistemically criticizable to have wildly irrational beliefs
about phone numbers as about philosophy. (AI), by contrast, renders all inaccurate
beliefs equally incorrect. So, beliefs that equally disrespect (AI) are equally epistemically
ﬂawed.
4.4.5 Does Hurka's Principle Really Generalize?
While Hurka's Principle is intuitive for value simpliciter, one might worry that it doesn't
generalize to insulated domains like epistemology, aesthetics, grammar, and so on.
Sometimes I hear the following version of this worry: Suppose I love the rules of pre-
scriptive grammar. My love has no grammatical value. Yet doesn't your generalized
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version of Hurka's Principle predict otherwise?
Reply. But this is not a counterexample to the generalized version of Hurka's Principle.
To see this, let me underline a crucial part of the principle:
When V is a non-instrumental value in some domain, proper ways of placing value
on V in that domain have derivative non-instrumental value.
Is it grammatically proper to love the rules of grammar? No. But if so, Hurka's
Principle does not predict that love for the rules of grammar is grammatically good.
For the principle cannot predict that love for X is valuable in any domain unless it is
also true that love is a proper response to X in that domain. This is what the underlined
part says.
What about the epistemic domain? Respect, commitment, and compliance in my
sense are epistemically proper ways to honor AI. If so, I can use Hurka's Principle
compatibly with denying that loving the rules of grammar is grammatically good.
The fact that our principle appeals to domain-relative propriety does not trivialize
it. Instrumentalism is inconsistent with our principle. So, our principle is clearly non-
trivial: it conﬂicts with orthodoxy! Might one insist that `proper' means `valuable' and
insist that the principle is circular for this reason? No: this insistence rides roughshod
over non-trivial issues. Propriety is a kind of rightness. Rightness and value represent
diﬀerent species of normativity. There are long-standing debates about how rightness
and value are related. So, Hurka's Principle is not circular in linking propriety and
goodness.
4.5 On the Competition
I have displayed the advantages of my view and answered a host of objections. But
even if a view has only advantages and avoids objections, it is only worth endorsing if
it outperforms the competition. Does my view do so?
As we saw earlier, no modest form of pluralism about fundamental epistemic value
that clings to Instrumentalism can avoid every relative of the swamping problem. With
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Instrumentalism dropped, there is no reason related to the swamping problem to prefer
these forms of pluralism. Since parsimony is a virtue, we should prefer my view.
What about other forms of monism? Granting Instrumentalism, they too will face
relatives of the swamping problem. If the desire to avoid the swamping problem attracts
one to a knowledge-ﬁrst epistemic axiology, one is short-sighted: this view will face re-
lated problems, as we saw earlier. One could embrace a non-Veritist version of monism
while also rejecting Instrumentalism. But because I am optimistic about the analyz-
ability of knowledge, I doubt that the main monist alternativei.e., the knowledge-ﬁrst
viewis well-motivated on other grounds.
4.5.1 What About Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology?
Still, this does not exhaust the alternatives.
One alternative is virtue epistemology of the sort defended by Ernest Sosa. On
this view, beliefs gain epistemic value by manifesting the epistemic agent's competence.
While competence here is reliabilist, it is also agent-level in a way that reliable processes
need not be. Owing to this diﬀerence, Sosa's model makes a narrower prediction than
the process reliabilist's: only beliefs that manifest the agent's epistemic competence gain
extra epistemic worth. This can seem to give Sosa a more principled response to the
swamping problem. Apt belief is an achievement, while products of reliable processes
are not necessarily achievements and may be mere products.
Compare this with my view. On my view, beliefs gain epistemic worth by manifesting
certain ways of placing value on accuracy in thought. Structurally, the views are simi-
lar: in both cases, the belief derives epistemic worth by manifesting a truth-connected
person-level feature. Verbally, the feature diﬀers: it is a reliabilist competence in one
case, and a way of placing value on accuracy in thought in the other. But one might
think Sosa has the advantage, since his feature sounds less lofty. Why prefer my view?
I have two responses. First, this question rests partly on a false dilemma. I would
view some kinds of competent belief as constituting ways to place value on accuracy in
thought. Since I do not understand ways of placing value on accuracy in thought in a
demanding way, there is no divide between Sosa and me here.
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The diﬀerence rests not in the demands we make, but in our views of epistemic value
derivation. On my view, it is only because some competences constitute ways to place
value on accuracy in thought that their manifestations have derivative epistemic value.
Sosa explains why manifestations of competence have epistemic value without regard to
whether they constitute ways to place value on accuracy in thought.
This brings me to the second response. It is crucial for the success of virtue epis-
temology that competences be able to ground ways of placing value on accuracy in
thought. We can see this by seeing why Sosa's picture leaves us with no convincing way
to understand the diﬀerence in epistemic worth between the ﬁrst-order beliefs of the
clairvoyant and those of the sighted. While there are subtleties in Sosa's view that give
him advantages over other reliabilists, the advantages are insuﬃcient for the purposes of
epistemic axiology. Perhaps clairvoyants have animal knowledge and achieve something
epistemically. The question is whether Sosa can explain the diﬀerence in epistemic worth
between the clairvoyant's ﬁrst-order beliefs and those of sighted children. We will see
that Sosa's animal/reﬂective distinction does not help: there is a ﬁrst-order diﬀerence.
Sosa could instead revise his account of ﬁrst-order competence in a way that John
Greco has recommended. But the revision is attractive because it turns competences
into the sorts of things that plausibly ground ways of valuing accuracy. The revision is
not motivated unless viewed as conceding that the reliabilist part of the view does not
do the axiological work. So, there is a dilemma: this form of virtue epistemology either
(i) is lacking in explanatory power or (ii) collapses into a version of my view.
4.5.2 First Horn
Competences for Sosa are reliable belief-forming dispositions of the agent relative to
favorable conditions in the actual world. This account predicts symmetry between the
ﬁrst-order beliefs of clairvoyants and the ﬁrst-order beliefs of sighted subjects. Their
beliefs can equally manifest reliable belief-forming dispositions. If the facts of epistemic
value are explained by such competences, the ﬁrst-order doxastic attitudes of clairvoy-
ants must be equal in epistemic value to the parallel attitudes of sighted perceivers.
But even if we agree that the doxastic attitudes of clairvoyants have some epistemic
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worth, it is implausible that the degree is the same. We might agree that the clairvoyant
knows. We are doing epistemic axiology now. Our objection is just as well expressed as
one about the diﬀerence in epistemic worth between two instances of knowledge.
Some reliabilists try to deem the clairvoyant incompetent by adding a `no defeaters'
clause to their theory. But the best versions of this strategy count as defeaters factors
that should look irrelevant from a purely reliabilist perspectivee.g., mere beliefs or
appearances about the quality of one's belief-forming processes.15 I am with John Greco
in ﬁnding this unprincipled: Reliabilism insists on a reliabilist account of evidence in
favor of belief. . . . [H]ow can the same theory plausibly understand evidence against
belief diﬀerently? Such a strategy seems at best ad hoc.16
Sosa's tack diﬀers.17 He thinks clairvoyants might have animal knowledge and holds
that what they lack is reﬂective knowledge. Reﬂective knowledge is understood as apt
belief that one aptly believes, where aptness is understood in the same externalist way
at both orders. What clairvoyants lack is an externalistically parsed grasp of the status
of their ﬁrst-order beliefs. This gives Sosa's explanation more unity than the defeat
strategy.
But the explanation falls short axiologically. Consider a child seeing a red apple on
the table in good light and then judging that there is a red apple on the table. This
child might lack the conceptual resources to form a belief about the propriety of her
ﬁrst-order belief. Indeed, she might lack the mental state concept BELIEF and the
ability to engage in any second-order reﬂection. Nevertheless, her perceptual beliefs
about the apple are epistemically worthier than those of the clairvoyant 400 miles away
15Some reliabilist accounts of defeat are supposed to address clairvoyance. But they encounter trou-
bles in modiﬁed cases. Consider the alternative reliable process account of defeat. On this account,
having a defeater for one's belief that p consists in having available to one an alternative reliable process
that, if used in addition to or instead of the one actually used, would have led to one's not believing
p. Goldman (1986: 112) suggests that this addresses Norman the clairvoyant, claiming that Norman
could reliably reason as follows: `If I had a clairvoyant power, I should surely ﬁnd some evidence for
this. Since I lack any such evidence, I apparently have no such power.' As Lyons (2009: 124) observes,
this doesn't go far enough: [I]t is not diﬃcult to modify the counterexample so that it precludes such
a reply. We can just stipulate that Norman is so bad at reasoning about such matters that there is
no [alternative] process that is both reliable and available to him. This doesn't seem to change the
intuitive verdict.
16Greco (2009: 1589).
17I rely on Sosa (1991)'s discussion of clairvoyance. Since then he hasn't explicitly discussed it.
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who equally reliably forms beliefs about the child's surroundings. This diﬀerence is not
at the reﬂective level.
Some might bite the bullet, claiming that the child's beliefs are on a par with the
clairvoyant's. But the reply is costly, and it underestimates the scope of the problem.
Many adults lack much of a reﬂective stance on their perceptual beliefs and so have
little reﬂective perceptual knowledge. The fact that some are in a position to gain
reﬂective knowledge is irrelevant to the quality of their actual beliefs. By analogy:
suppose I believe something for bad reasons, though I am in a position to believe for
good reasons. That I can do better is irrelevant to the quality of my actual beliefs.
The real diﬀerence is not at the second order. If one wants to explain the diﬀerence
between clairvoyants and the sighted, the story should come at the ﬁrst order.
4.5.3 Second Horn
John Greco has oﬀered a story by enriching the account of complete ﬁrst-order compe-
tence. But his proposal faces his own objections to liberal defeat strategies unless his
view is understood as a version of my view. To see this, consider the details. Greco
(2010: 43) ﬁrst suggests that we analyze epistemic responsibility in terms of the intel-
lectual dispositions that one manifests when one is motivated to believe the truth:
S's belief that p is epistemically responsible if and only if S's believing that p is properly
motivated; if and only if S's believing that p results from intellectual dispositions that S
manifests when S is motivated to believe the truth.18
He then analyzes epistemic virtue in terms of reliability and epistemic responsibility:
S's belief that p is epistemically virtuous if and only if both (a) S's belief that p is
epistemically responsible; and (b) S is objectively reliable in believing that p.19
The unjustiﬁed clairvoyant, Greco suggests, fails condition (a).
18Greco (2010: 43).
19Greco (2010: 43).
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But Greco's explanation confronts his own objection to the process reliabilist's appeal
to an unreliabilist kind of defeat. Greco insists that reliabilists cannot treat positive
and negative justiﬁcation-relevant properties diﬀerently without a uniﬁed explanation
of why both matter. He faces a similar question. He says that epistemic responsibility
is a virtue. But we must ask him why. What uniﬁed story can deem both objective
reliability and motivation to believe the truth as epistemic virtues?
Greco has oﬀered no answer. By contrast, my view provides a simple explanation of
why being motivated to believe the truth is epistemically virtuous. It is a way to place
value on accuracy in thought, and it matters from the epistemic point of view because
accuracy matters (via Hurka's Principle). This conﬁrms my prediction of convergence.
Indeed, there is not just convergence but collapse. For the best explanation of why
the dispositions constitutive of being motivated to believe the truth are epistemically
virtuous is that they ground epistemically proper ways of valuing accuracy. There is no
general reliabilist explanation. If there were, there would have been no need to revise
the account!
Thus the second horn: revising the account of ﬁrst-order epistemic virtue is princi-
pled only if underpinned by a view of epistemic virtue like mine. So, virtue epistemology
either cannot explain all the facts of epistemic value or collapses into my view.
4.5.4 A Middle Way Between Reliabilism and Responsibilism
Reliabilist virtue epistemology is not the only kind of virtue epistemology. The main
alternative is responsibilism. Since responsibilism is typically deﬁned as a view that
emphasizes the role of intellectual character traits, I doubt that it can succeed. I doubt
that any enduring traits of intellectual character are necessary for justiﬁcation, ratio-
nality, knowledge, or other items of traditional epistemological interest. Since I agree
with existing critiques, I will not dilate on these doubts.20
Here is what matters. The common distinction between reliabilist and responsibilist
virtue epistemology is not exhaustive. There is much unoccupied space between, since
20In particular, I agree with many of Dougherty (2011)'s criticisms of responsibilism.
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there are pictures of virtue that virtue epistemologists ignore. Hurka (2001) understands
virtues as ways of valuing more basic values. But ways of valuing are neither faculties
nor character traits. While I have not understood them (as Hurka (2006) does) as
occurrent states, I have understood them as less than character traits or faculties.
So, my view could be understood as a new version of virtue epistemology. For my
purposes, the label is inessential. But it highlights a direction for future research and
positions my view in an illuminating way with respect to the competition. Examined
from this perspective, one can also see that it strikes a golden mean between two ends
of the spectrum. It inherits some advantages from existing traditions in virtue episte-
mology while avoiding their ﬂaws. This is another reason to suspect it is on the right
track.
4.6 Conclusion
Let's take stock. I argued that Veritists can and should reject Instrumentalism. This
is the moral of the swamping problem. We can see that it is the moral by seeing that
if Instrumentalism were true, the points that led to the swamping problem would lead
to related problems for other economical epistemic axiologies. This should not convince
us that a radical form of pluralism is true. It should convince us that Instrumentalism
is false.
I have shown that Veritism is defensible once we abandon Instrumentalism. Veritists
can avoid the swamping problem if they reject Instrumentalism. As I argued in 2, the
kind of derivative value generated by Hurka's Principle is immune from swamping. A
charitable act that manifests the agent's valuing of charity is as such better than a
similar act performed just as a PR stunt. This is plausible despite the fact that the
goodness of valuing charity is parasitic on the goodness of charity.
Of course, this fact would be useless if we could not apply Hurka's Principle to the rel-
evant cases in the epistemic domain. But we can. I argued that central epistemic values
like structural rationality, substantive rationality, and knowledge essentially manifest
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certain ways to place value on accuracy in thought. None of this is an overintellectual-
ization. To think otherwise is to implicitly overintellectualize the modest achievement
of placing value on accuracy in thought. It is natural to fault subjects for failing to
place suﬃcient value on accuracy in thought, and plausible that people who disregard
the evidence are open to criticism precisely because they fail to place suﬃcient value on
accuracy in thought.
So, there is a straightforward way for Veritists to avoid the swamping problem and
provide explanations of the epistemic value of central epistemic properties like rationality
and knowledge. Since it is antecedently attractive to think that epistemic evaluation is
fundamentally truth-oriented, I think we should continue to be attracted to Veritism.
4.7 Appendix A: Must Reliabilists Be Instrumentalists?
I argued that Veritists should reject Instrumentalism. I do not take this to be an argu-
ment against reliabilism. Indeed, I have defended a sophisticated version of reliabilism
elsewhere. My views are not inconsistent. Let me explain why. Instrumentalism is an
axiological thesis about how non-fundamental value is grounded in fundamental value.
Reliabilism is a ﬁrst-order account of the nature of justiﬁed belief orin some permu-
tationsknowledge. Reliabilism does not by itself entail any claims about the worth
that any beliefs have from the epistemic point of view. One must appeal to auxiliary
assumptions to get such conclusions.
Obviously, many have worried that reliabilists are forced to appeal to Instrumentalist
explanations of the value of knowledge. This worry was behind much of the early
literature on the swamping problem. But this worry is mistaken, for several reasons. For
one thing, a reliabilist might consistently hold that knowledge is a further fundamental
epistemic value. Reliabilism and Veritism are independent. No ﬁrst-order account of
knowledge entails that knowledge is not fundamentally epistemically good. For another,
even if reliabilists agree that knowledge is not a fundamental epistemic value, it is unclear
why they are forced to appeal to Instrumentalist explanations.
There are two reasons why it is unobvious. To see the ﬁrst, let's distinguish two
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diﬀerent types of theory that might be called reliabilist. Strong reliabilist theories
identify a belief's all-things-considered justiﬁedness with (i) its having come from a reli-
able process and (ii) there being no alternative reliable process available to the believer
that would lead to her abandoning the belief. It might be true that strong reliabilist
theories are forced to appeal to instrumentalist explanations. But reliabilists do not
always hold theories of this strong kind. Although Goldman (1979) upheld a strong
account, he later adopted a more concessive picture of defeat and all-things-considered
justiﬁcation. Goldman (1986) allowed, for example, that beliefs about the unreliability
of one's belief-forming processes can defeat justiﬁcation regardless of their historical
properties; Goldman (2011) has allowed that experiences can defeat regardless of their
historical properties.
Call a theory a weak reliabilist theory if it only entails that a necessary condi-
tion for a belief's being justiﬁed is its having its origin in a reliable process. Some of
Goldman's later views exemplify weak rather than strong reliabilism. Moreover, many
virtue epistemologists agree that reliability is a necessary condition for justiﬁed belief
and knowledge. They simply add that there is something else important that helps
to explain why justiﬁed belief and knowledge have the value that they have. Indeed,
even the virtue epistemologists who have persistently pressed the swamping problem
are reliabilists in the weak sense. Zagzebski (1996) explicitly agreed that reliability is
a necessary condition for complete epistemic virtue and distanced herself from virtue
epistemologists such as Montmarquet who reject this claim. Even so, Zagzebski rejects
Instrumentalism.
So it is simply false that reliabilists must appeal to Instrumentalist explanations,
since weak reliabilists can avoid these explanations. But we can go even deeper. I think
some strong reliabilists can consistently reject Instrumentalism. My own view about jus-
tiﬁed belief is a strong reliabilist view. I hold that justiﬁed beliefs are beliefs that one
holds because one possesses suﬃcient epistemic reasons. But I add that the possession
and suﬃciency of objective epistemic reasons can be grounded purely reliabilistically.
This view meshes with my non-Instrumentalist story about the epistemic worth of jus-
tiﬁed belief. I can give a top-down, constitutive explanation: the reliabilist properties
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that ground believing for objective epistemic reasons have a non-instrumentally truth-
oriented kind of value by constituting something else that has such value. Believing
something for suﬃcient epistemic reasons plausibly just is a way to place value on accu-
racy in thought. Placing value on accuracy in thought also has some non-instrumentally
truth-oriented epistemic value, thanks to Hurka's Principle. Since whatever constitutes
something valuable inherits its value, forming doxastic attitudes because one has suﬃ-
cient epistemic reasons inherits this value. But forming doxastic attitudes for suﬃcient
epistemic reasons is constituted by reliabilist properties. So, these properties also have
a non-instrumental epistemic value because of what they constitute, beyond their in-
strumental epistemic value.
Is this circular? No. It is an example of a common direction of value inheritance.
The atoms composing a painting are good because the painting is good. If we look at the
atoms singly, it is hard to see why they matter. But that only shows that we must look
up at what they constitute to grasp their value. The same holds for the epistemic value
of the reliabilist features that constitute believing for objective epistemic reasons. The
only reason to believe that a strong reliabilist picture is inconsistent with the rejection
of Instrumentalism involves a fallacy. It is the same fallacy that would deem a painting
valueless because the atoms that constitute it are, considered singly, valueless. If we
reject this fallacy, we can embrace strong reliabilism but reject Instrumentalism.
4.8 Appendix B: Does Type Instrumentalism Make a Diﬀerence?
Goldman and Olson (2009) are not just reliabilists but self-styled instrumentalists. They
claim to avoid the swamping problem. I mentioned some doubts about this claim earlier.
They take the problem to rest on the assumption that true beliefs come from reliable
sources cannot be better than true beliefs that are products of unreliable sources.
But as we saw, the key assumption is more ﬁne-grained. The key assumption is
that the mere fact that a good item comes from a reliable source cannot as such make
it better. This assumption is compatible with the claim that some reliably produced
true beliefs are better than true beliefs. Even Zagzebski agrees. Zagzebski (1996) agrees
162
that reliability is a necessary condition for complete epistemic virtue. It follows that she
agrees that some reliably produced true beliefs are better than mere true beliefs, since
some reliably produced true beliefs satisfy the other necessary conditions for manifesting
complete epistemic virtue. Goldman and Olson have not, accordingly, addressed the
fundamental problem.
Goldman (2012) has recently made some further suggestions, however. He claims
that type instrumentalism is the key to avoiding the swamping problem. Type instru-
mentalism is the view that a token instance of an instrumentally valuable type of source
can have a kind of instrumental value merely by being a token of that type, irrespective
of whether that token produces anything good. I agree that type instrumentalism may
help to explain how the epistemic value of token processes. But it is unclear how this
view helps with the fundamental problem. This is because the fundamental problem
was never about the value of the processes but rather about the value of the beliefs that
are their products. Type instrumentalism by itself makes no headway on this issue.
Goldman discusses this further problem after emphasizing the importance of type
instrumentalism. But the key moves in this discussion are not consequences of type
instrumentalism. Indeed, some of Goldman's examples are suggestive of something
other than an Instrumentalist model. Given the points made in Appendix A, this is not
really a problem for him qua reliabilist: reliabilists are not forced to be Instrumentalists.
The driving example is a work by Rembrandt. It seems that the sheer fact that the
painting is Rembrandt's work makes the painting better. But this does not vindicate
Instrumentalism, as virtue epistemologists will be keen to insist. While we should agree
that a painting by Rembrandt is better simply in virtue of being the work of Rembrandt,
we should not agree that a cup of coﬀee is better simply in virtue of coming from a well-
functioning coﬀeemaker. What is the diﬀerence? The diﬀerence is simple, according
to virtue epistemologists: Rembrandt's work manifests the person-level abilities of an
agent. It is a doing of Rembrandt's that manifests his painterly ability. The explanation
is not an instrumental explanation. If virtue epistemology has anything in common
with virtue ethics, it is its ability to appeal to this type of explanation. As I have
repeatedly suggested, Goldman does not need to conﬁne himself to Instrumentalist
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explanations. Given his recent eﬀorts to synthesize evidentialism and reliabilism, he
could easily appeal to the model suggested at the end of Appendix A. But even if he
dislikes that model, there are probably other forms of value derivation to which he can
appeal, especially given the many sophisticated turns that reliabilism has taken over
the years. So, Goldman and I need not disagree.
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Chapter 5
Rationality and Fundamental Epistemic Value
5.1 A Puzzle about the Value of Rational Belief
Consider Alpha, who inhabits a world like ours. Alpha knows just about everything
there is to know about this world, and Alpha's beliefs and reasoning are ﬂawless in
other epistemologically interesting respects. Now compare Beta. Beta's mental life is
internally just like Alpha's. Any experience, apparent memory, or intuitive seeming that
Alpha has is equally had by Beta. Alas, Beta is a victim of skeptical disaster. Beta
inhabits a world whose only other occupant is a demon. This demon ensures that Beta's
beliefs about extra-mental reality are radically false.
While Beta is less accurate, reliable, and knowledgeable than Alpha about the con-
tingencies of extra-mental reality, most epistemologists will agree that there is some
property of epistemic worth that Beta's beliefs share with Alpha's. Diﬀerent epistemol-
ogists just have diﬀerent labels for it. Some externalists will deny that Beta's beliefs
about extra-mental reality are as justiﬁed or warranted as Alpha's. But they will have
some term of appraisal for these beliefs of Beta's, like rational or blameless".1 My
term is rational, and I will call Beta's rational beliefs about extra-mental reality Beta's
relevant beliefs to save words.
Beta's relevant beliefs appear to retain genuine worth from the epistemic point of
view. This appearance is not a mere byproduct of our imaginatively placing ourselves
in Beta's shoes. Even if we occupy a third-person perspective and attend to Beta's
1See Littlejohn (2012) for the ﬁrst option. See Goldman (1988) and Littlejohn (2009) for something
best understood as the second option. Others have proposed that while Beta's beliefs are unjustiﬁed,
Beta herself has some good epistemic property. This leads some to distinguish between doxastic
and personal justiﬁcation; see Bach (1986) and Engel (1992). Littlejohn (2012, 2009) also favors this
distinction, though he would call Beta's beliefs rational.
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radical unreliability with respect to questions about extra-mental reality, it remains
plausible that Beta's relevant beliefs have epistemic worth. So the epistemic worth
of Beta's relevant beliefs seems to go beyond merely expected value relative to Beta's
perspective. Let us give this appealing thought a more oﬃcial statement:
Retention of Worth: Even in bad worlds like Beta's, rational beliefs about
extra-mental reality retain some genuine worth from the epistemic point of view.
While many epistemologists can share this intuition, few have tried to explain how it
could be true. If it is true, it calls for explanation: it is not a brute fact. But Retention
of Worth is harder to explain than one might think. Two common assumptions make it
hard to explain.
To see the ﬁrst common assumption, note that many epistemologists think there
is a fundamental epistemic valuei.e., some epistemic value in terms of which we can
explain the epistemic value of everything else. The typical candidates are true belief and
knowledge. Most epistemologists think that properties like rational belief and justiﬁed
belief are only derivatively signiﬁcant relative to the fundamental epistemic value. This
is plausible: we seem to care about rational beliefs because we care about something
else, like truth or knowledge. Hence the ﬁrst assumption:
Derivativeness: Rational beliefs are only derivatively epistemically good.
There is a second common assumption that is sometimes conﬂated with Derivativeness.
To see it, note that most epistemologists view the fundamental epistemic value as an
epistemic goal. It is supposed to be something that we ought epistemically to produce
as an end. Most epistemologists take it to follow that derivative epistemic values can
only have epistemic value in virtue of standing in instrumental relations of two sorts:
(i) in virtue of being types of things that tend to produce the end (production values),
or (ii) in virtue of being products of types of sources that are likely to produce the end
(product values).2 Hence the second common assumption:
2One might reserve `instrumental epistemic value' for (i). But I use it to capture the kind of
derivative value that something has just by standing in some instrumental relation. The product of
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Instrumentalism: Derivative value in any domain is just instrumental value in
that domain, of either the production or mere product kind.3
Good belief-forming processes are supposed to have the ﬁrst kind of instrumental value,
and their products are supposed to have the second kind of instrumental value.
Given these assumptions, it is hard to see how Retention of Worth could be true.
The problem is simple, I will argue in 2: if Derivativeness and Instrumentalism are
true, Retention of Worth is false. There is no satisfactory Instrumentalist explanation
of Retention of Worth. All the obvious explanations fail. So, if Retention of Worth is
true, one of the other claims must go.
I think we can and should explain Retention of Worth by rejecting Instrumentalism.
Reﬂection on the worth of rational belief reveals that not all derivative epistemic value
is just instrumental epistemic value of either the production or mere product kind. We
can reject that claim without diﬃculty by looking beyond epistemology, as I showed in
the last chapter. Non-epistemic value theorists have rejected Instrumentalism, and there
are epistemic analogues of their ideas. Given these views, we can explain Retention of
Worth consistently with Derivativeness.
Is it overkill to reject Instrumentalism to explain Retention of Worth? No. As
we saw in the last chapter, there is a much more general problem for Instrumentalism
the swamping problem. While the problem was initially presented as a problem for
reliabilists, it is easy to show that any economical epistemic axiology that embraces
Instrumentalism will face a relative of the problem. Some theoristse.g., Carter and
Jarvis (2012)conclude from this fact that the intuitions that drive the swamping
problem are ﬂawed. But they arrive at this conclusion by presupposing Instrumentalism.
There is nothing amiss with the intuitions behind the swamping problem. The moral is
that Instrumentalism is false.
relation is just as much an instrumental relation as the caused by relation is a causal relation. Since
many epistemologists assume that (ii) can generate derivative epistemic value, it is only fair to deﬁne
Instrumentalism this way.
3I borrow the term from Jones (1997), one of the ﬁrst to give the swamping problem a detailed
presentation. Like me, Jones regards Instrumentalism as the root cause of the swamping problem. It
is a shame that his points are neglected in the new literature that blames the problem on reliabilism
or Veritism.
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You might think that we could live with the conclusion that rationality is a fun-
damental epistemic value. You might think that we could learn to live with a modest
form of pluralism about fundamental epistemic value: besides true belief or knowledge,
rational belief is also on the list of fundamental epistemic values. But as we saw in the
last chapter, the reasoning that supports placing rational belief on the list of funda-
mental epistemic values also supports radically inﬂating that list in ways that no one
should tolerate. If we reject Instrumentalism, we can keep our list of fundamental epis-
temic values sparse. The view I defended in the last chapter provides an illustration.
This view has a uniﬁed explanation of the derivative epistemic value of rational belief,
justiﬁed belief, coherence, knowledge, and more. The crucial upshot for the purposes
of this chapter is that rational beliefs matter in exactly the same way that these other
epistemic properties matter. This depuzzles the epistemic worth of rational beliefs.
This upshot will bring out another lesson that I discuss near the end of the paper.
Many epistemologists think that reliabilists about justiﬁed belief have a unique ability to
explain why justiﬁed belief matters owing to the instrumental link that their view forges
with true belief. But this thought depends essentially on Instrumentalism. As it turns
out, Instrumentalism actually makes it harder to explain the value of justiﬁed belief.
Without Instrumentalism, there is no reason to think that reliabilism has this advantage,
and good reason to think that non-reliabilists can secure a truth-oriented explanation
of the epistemic value of both justiﬁed and rational belief. This undermines one major
argument for reliabilismthough I would independently embrace a sophisticated version
of reliabilism for other reasons.
With these themes in mind, here is how I will proceed. I will begin by explaining more
carefully why it is hard to give a plausible instrumentalist explanation of the value of ra-
tional belief, considering and rejecting two more sophisticated forms of Instrumentalism
that I will call Counterfactual Instrumentalism and Ingredient Instrumentalism. I will
then proceed to remind the reader of the main result of the last chapter: namely, that
Instrumentalism is generally-ill equipped to explain derivative epistemic value. Even if
there were a necessary instrumental connection between rational belief and true belief,
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we could not explain the derivative value of rational belief! This fact provides indepen-
dent support for thinking that the lesson of our puzzle about the value of rationality is
that we should reject Instrumentalism. Having reminded the reader of this fact, I will
turn to show how the alternative model of epistemic value derivation that I sketched
in the last chapter can provide the same explanation of the value of rational belief that
can and should be given of the value of justiﬁed belief and knowledge. I will go farther
than I did in the last chapter and also show why non-Veritists (e.g., knowledge-ﬁrst
epistemic axiologists) can provide the same style of uniﬁed story. The story is robust.
I will then conclude by discussing the broader upshots for epistemology, and especially
for long-standing debates between reliabilists and internalists.
5.1.1 Disclaimer
Before I proceed, a disclaimer is in order. In this paper, I am not discussing the familiar
new evil demon problem for externalist accounts of justiﬁcation. The focus is rather on
how to explain the intuition that rational beliefs about non-mental reality have genuine
epistemic worth even in the demon world. This intuition presupposes that these beliefs
can be rational in such worlds. We can separate the question of worth from the question
about the mere presence of the property of rationality. Indeed, we could in principle
agree that the demon-worlder is rational but conclude that this undermines the worth
of rationality as such, perhaps by analogy with Kolodny (2005)'s skepticism about the
normativity of rationality.
I agree that the correct response to the new evil demon problem is to distin-
guish between justiﬁcation and rationality. Cohen (1985)'s dismissal of this response is
hastythough I will not dispute it here. But even if we are externalists and agree that
the demon worlder's beliefs are rational, we are left with unanswered questions about
the epistemic worth of these rational beliefs. Everyone needs to answer these questions,
internalists included. This is especially salient because some internalists accept both
Instrumentalism and Derivativeness (e.g., BonJour (1985)).
169
5.2 Instrumentalism ∧ Derivativeness → ¬Retention of Worth
The ﬁrst claim I want to defend is that Instrumentalism and Derivativeness entail the
negation of Retention of Worth. There is a simple argument for this claim, but the work
lies in knocking down more sophisticated Instrumentalist replies. As we will see, it is
not diﬃcult to show that the main possible Instrumentalist replies are unsuccessful.
To get us started, the Simple Argument can be stated as follows:
1. If Instrumentalism and Derivativeness are true, rational beliefs have real epis-
temic worth in a world w only if they tend to instrumentally promote fundamental
epistemic value in w or are products of types of sources that tend to do so in w.
2. Beta's relevant beliefs do not tend to instrumentally promote fundamental
epistemic value in Beta's world and are not products of types of sources that
instrumentally promote fundamental epistemic value in Beta's world (assuming
Derivativeness).
3. So, if Instrumentalism and Derivativeness are true, Beta's relevant beliefs do
not retain real epistemic worth in Beta's world. (From (1 and 2))
Since the consequent of (3) is in eﬀect the negation of Retention of Worth, (3) is equiv-
alent to:
3 restated. If Instrumentalism and Derivativeness are true, Retention of Worth is
false.
This argument is valid and (3) is just a consequence of (1) and (2). So if the argument
fails, either (1) or (2) must be false. Accordingly, if one is both an Instrumentalist and
a fan of Derivativeness, what can one say against (1) and (2)?
Here are the main candidate replies:
A. Subjective Instrumentalism. While rationality is not objectively instru-
mental to true belief or knowledge in Beta's world, it is subjectively instrumental
to true belief in Beta's world: rationality maximizes expected accuracy relative
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to Beta's perspective. But this is all we need to explain Retention of Worth. So,
(2) is false: Beta's relevant beliefs do in a relevant sense instrumentally promote
fundamental epistemic value in Beta's world.
B. Counterfactual Instrumentalism. What makes a belief-forming disposition
instrumentally epistemically good is that it would be instrumental to fundamental
epistemic value in favorable conditions. But Beta's belief-forming processes are
epistemically good in that way and Beta's relevant beliefs are also epistemically
good by manifesting those dispositions. Hence, (1) is false: although rationality
does not instrumentally promote fundamental epistemic value in Beta's world,
Beta's rational beliefs about extra-mental reality have real instrumental epistemic
worth in an extended sense even in Beta's world.
C. Ingredient Instrumentalism. Even if X is not suﬃcient for promoting
fundamental value, X can remain instrumentally good in an extended sense. Nec-
essary ingredients of suﬃcient conditions for promoting fundamental values are
instrumentally good in a natural sense. But rationality is necessary for knowl-
edge, and knowledge is a plausible candidate for a fundamental epistemic value.
So (1) is false: although Beta's relevant beliefs are not suﬃcient for promoting fun-
damental epistemic value in Beta's world, they still have a kind of instrumental
value in Beta's world.
Unfortunately, none of these replies is ultimately plausible.
5.2.1 The Irrelevance of Subjective Instrumentalism
Let's consider reply (A) ﬁrst. It is true that rationality subjectively promotes the goal
of believing accurately even in bad worlds. So, it is plausible that rationality promotes
expected epistemic value in Beta's world. It is also plausible, then, that in the subjective
sense of `ought', Beta ought to have the beliefs that Beta has. The trouble is that these
claims are irrelevant to Retention of Worth. Retention of Worth concerns the real
epistemic worth of Beta's relevant beliefs. Expected value is not a kind of real value,
just as expected wealth is not a kind of wealth.
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The Subjective Instrumentalist might reply that it is just obvious that Beta's relevant
beliefs lack any real epistemic worth: they obviously only have expected epistemic value
relative to Beta's perspective. But this reply is implausible.
We can look squarely at the fact that Beta's relevant belief-forming processes are
unreliable and still ﬁnd it plausible that there is genuine worth in the output beliefs,
not just apparent-worth-relative-to-Beta's-perspective. If the Subjective Instrumentalist
were right, the only explanation of why we ﬁnd this plausible would be confusion: we
imagine ourselves into Beta's shoes and get deceived, temporarily thinking that Beta's
relevant beliefs are objectively promoting fundamental epistemic value. We are not
guilty of that. We think that in spite of Beta's unreliability, Beta's relevant beliefs
retain genuine worth from the epistemic point of view.
Some of the Subjective Instrumentalist's claims are true but unhelpfully so. The
subjective `ought' just is the `ought' of rationality. It is trivially true that Beta ought
rationally to be rational. But the question that we are askingHow can Beta's relevant
beliefs retain real epistemic worth?is not answered by this trivial claim. We are not
asking about whether there is a sense in which Beta ought to hold the relevant beliefs.
So, Subjective Instrumentalism does not address our question, and it does not yield
a plausible error theory. This is not to deny that there is a sense of `ought' in which
Beta ought to be thinking as Beta is thinking. Beta ought rationally to be thinking
that way. Beta ought subjectively to be thinking that way too: the subjective `ought'
coincides with the `ought' of rationality. But these facts do not help. So, reply (A) is
ultimately unhelpful.
5.2.2 The Failure of Counterfactual Instrumentalism
Framed properly, reply (B) can appear more helpful than reply (A). To bring out the
appeal, we can consider Ernest Sosa's view about subjects like Beta.4 For Sosa, the
belief-forming dispositions that constitute epistemic rationality are competences. Sosa's
notion of competence is broadly reliabilist: what makes a belief-forming disposition a
4See Sosa (1991, 1992, 2003) for this, and Sosa (2007, 2010) for a great discussion of competence.
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competence is some instrumental relation to true belief. But Sosa's view diﬀers impor-
tantly from other versions of reliabilism: by using competence as the core notion, Sosa
can appeal to the competence/performance distinction.
Competences are dispositions. Like other dispositions, there is an understood set
of favorable conditions for their manifestation. If you take a box of matches into a
room without oxygen and strike them, none will light. That does not show that none is
ﬂammable. If you take an archer into a hurricane, she will not hit any targets. That does
not show that she is an incompetent archer. The reliability of competence is relative
to favorable conditions. Sosa exploits this idea, suggesting that worlds like Beta's only
illustrate that reliability of this sort is necessary for rationality.
One might agree with these claims about the necessary conditions for rationality
but wonder how they explain why Beta's relevant beliefs have worth from the epistemic
point of view in Beta's world. To address this question, Sosa appeals to an analogy with
a temperature control device:
Suppose it is taken oﬀ the shelf in the display room for a demonstration, and a
situation is simulated wherein it should activate the cooling trigger, and then a
second situation is simulated wherein it should activate the warming trigger. In
such a test the device might either perform well or not. But the quality of its
performance is not to be assessed through how well it actually brings about the
goods that it is meant to bring about in its normal operation. For in the display
room it brings about neither the cooling nor the heating of any space.... What we
are doing is quite obvious: we are assessing whether it performs in ways that would
enable it to bring about the expected goods once it was properly installed....5
Sosa's analogy suggests that something can be derivatively good in a way worth calling
instrumental in some situation even if the situation is not one where it is conducive
to a more fundamental good. One might conclude that this yields a satisfactory Instru-
mentalist explanation of why Beta's relevant beliefs retain epistemic worth.
But this conclusion is incautious. The analogy with the temperature control device
only works inmild deception examples.6 Mild examples feature people in worlds that are
5Sosa (2003: 1756).
6Foley (2004) makes a point related to the one to follow. He tries to argue that Sosa's account of
the nature of rationality is defective. I think Sosa's account of the nature of rationality is right at some
level. I am only objecting to the ability of Sosa's point to explain the epistemic worth of rational belief.
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otherwise favorable who become victims of deceptione.g., people like us whose brains
get envatted by evil neuroscientists. In the worlds of these examples, unreliability is not
the norm. Here the temperature control device yields an analogy:
(1) hosting rational beliefs about the world in favorable conditions in w :
(2) hosting rational beliefs about the world in unfavorable conditions in w ::
(3) activating cooling trigger in display room in w :
(4) activating that trigger when properly installed in w
But the analogy dissolves when we consider extreme deception examples, where decep-
tion is the norm in the world and all nearby possible worlds. Beta's world was supposed
to be such an example. Indeed, we could even imagine that there is a law of nature
which ensures that Beta's relevant beliefs will be never be true. Sosa's strategy suggests
that when we regard Beta's relevant beliefs as good from the epistemic point of view,
what we ﬁnd good is that these beliefs are formed in ways that would be reliable if Beta
were in a completely diﬀerent kind of world.
But the original analogy does not support this picture. Imagine a qualitative replica
of the temperature control device in a distant world with such diﬀerent laws of nature
that it could never reliably control the temperature of anything there. Imagine that the
same holds for all nearby worlds. Should we say that the device still exhibits a good
feature in the world it inhabits because if it were suitably installed in some very distant
world it would reliably control the temperature?
This is implausible. So the analogy does not extend. The ﬁrst half of the new
analogy would have to be:
(1*) hosting rational worldly beliefs in extremely bad world w :
(2*) hosting rational worldly beliefs in a normal case in distant good world w*
This does not align with the second half of the original analogy. It must change:
(3*) activating cooling trigger in unfavorable world w with its diﬀerent laws :
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(4*) activating that trigger when properly installed in distant favorable world w*
But there is nothing good in w corresponding to (3*). If there are no conditions in w
or any nearby worlds in which a mechanism would reliably bring about success, it is no
good feature of that mechanism in w that it would bring about such success in a distant
world w*. It would be a good feature in w*. But we are asking what is good in w. If
anything, this analogy makes it harder to understand how Retention of Worth could be
true, not easier.
This is not to deny that a belief-forming disposition is rational in a world like Beta's
only if there is another favorable world where it is reliable. It is not to deny that being
formed by dispositions that would be reliable in the actual world is necessary for a belief
to be rational. It is just to deny that these necessary conditions explain the epistemic
worth of rational beliefs about extra-mental reality in bad worlds. The analogy suggests
that they don't explain this worth.
Counterfactual Instrumentalism provides no satisfying explanation of Retention of
Worth. There might be a good analogy between the temperature control device and
people from an otherwise good world who become deception victims. But there is no
good analogy between the temperature control device and Beta, who inhabits a distant,
wholly bad world surrounded by similar worlds. The comparison makes it harder to
understand why Retention of Worth is true.
5.2.3 The Failure of Ingredient Instrumentalism
The earlier strategies are the most obvious ones for Instrumentalists to pursue if true
belief is the candidate for fundamental epistemic value. But even if Instrumentalists
accept Derivativeness for rationality, they might deny that true belief is the only can-
didate. Knowledge is a contender after Williamson (2000). A new strategy is possible
with knowledge on the table: Ingredient Instrumentalism, which tries to proﬁt from
rationality's status as a necessary condition for knowledge.7
7`Ingredient' does not mean `independent factor', so this idea is consistent with Williamson's attack
on composite analyses of knowledge. Various ingredients for a dish can be blended together by cooking
so that none can be factored out of the cooked dish. In any case, I just use the term for vivid
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The plausibility of Ingredient Instrumentalism depends on the status of this argu-
ment:
The Ingredients Argument
a. Necessary conditions for more basic goods retain instrumental value qua ingre-
dients for these goods even when the other necessary conditions are missing.
b. If (a) is true, then rational beliefs can retain instrumental epistemic value as
ingredients for knowledge even when other necessary conditions (e.g., truth) are
missing.
c. If the consequent of (b) is true, then rational beliefs about extra-mental reality
retain real instrumental epistemic value even in bad worlds like Beta's.
d. So, Beta's relevant beliefs retain real epistemic value. (From (ac))
If successful, the Ingredients Argument undermines (1) in the Simple Argument: while
Beta's relevant beliefs do not yield knowledge and are not products of dispositions that
would be knowledge-conducive in Beta's world, these beliefs retain a kind of instrumental
value in Beta's world.
But the Ingredients Argument does not explain why Beta's relevant beliefs retain
epistemic value. The ﬂaw in the argument resembles the ﬂaw in the attempt to support
Counterfactual Instrumentalism by analogy with the temperature control device.
To see the ﬂaw, consider when (a) looks plausible. (a) looks plausible when we
imagine a kind of world where the other necessary ingredients stand a chance of existing.
Imagine one has half the ingredients for some great dish. It is plausible that even if
one is missing the other ingredients, one's ingredients retain instrumental value. This
is plausible because the other necessary ingredients stand a chance of existing in worlds
like one's ownand presumably do exist.
Suppose, on the other hand, that your friend says of some seemingly useless things:
If we were just to have some further ingredients, we could use these objects to make
suggestiveness.
176
a neat thing X. So let's buy them. You reply: But the other ingredients for X can't
exist in a world like this one! Your friend replies: That doesn't matter. They are still
instrumentally good in our world as ingredients for X, even if we can't use them in a
world like ours to make X. This reply is absurd.
There is a similar problem with using the Ingredients Argument to explain the value
of Beta's relevant beliefs. By stipulation, Beta's relevant beliefs cannot be converted
into knowledge: these beliefs are false products of processes that the demon guarantees
to be unreliable. By stipulation, this is true of all nearby possible worlds. From an
Instrumentalist point of view, Beta's relevant beliefs are like the objects that your
friend wants to buy. So, the Ingredients Argument fails.
Necessary ingredients for goods do retain instrumental value in worlds where the
other ingredients stand a chance of existing. But this does not support the claim that
Beta's rational beliefs retain instrumental value as ingredients for knowledge worlds like
hers. In such worlds, the other necessary ingredients stand no chance of existing.
5.3 What Should We Conclude?
Three major strategies for securing an Instrumentalist explanation of Retention of Worth
fail. The core problem is simple. There are only two general approaches appealing to
instrumental relations that could explain why rational beliefs have real epistemic value:
The Production Strategy. Rational beliefs have derivative epistemic value
by being things that produce fundamental epistemic values like true belief or
knowledge.
The Product Strategy. Rational beliefs have derivative epistemic values as
products of types of sources that are conducive to more fundamental epistemic
values.
Beta's case makes both strategies look implausible. In Beta's world and nearby worlds,
rational beliefs are guaranteed to be reliably false and rational belief-forming dispositions
are guaranteed not to be conducive to more fundamental epistemic values.
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We found it unhelpful to reply that Beta's rational belief-forming dispositions and
beliefs are subjectively conducive to fundamental epistemic value. We also found it
unhelpful to reply that Beta's rational belief-forming dispositions would be conducive
to fundamental epistemic value if Beta were in another world. This helps only if the
analogy with the temperature control device extends. It does not, as I demonstrated
above.
Since the Ingredients Argument also failed, it is hard to see how one could resist the
Simple Argument. I think the simple appearance is not misleading: Instrumentalism
and Derivativeness are inconsistent with Retention of Worth. Since Retention of Worth
is what we want to explain, we should reject either Instrumentalism or Derivativeness.
How should we choose? Some pluralists about fundamental epistemic value might
add rationality to the stock of fundamental epistemic values.8 But I think Derivativeness
is not what we should reject. There is, as we saw in the last chapter, a clear and uniﬁed
story about how epistemic properties have derivative epistemic value once we take note
of how non-epistemic value theorists reject Instrumentalism. Since this story is simpler
and more explanatory than pluralism about fundamental epistemic value and avoids
other problems for Instrumentalism, it is ceteris paribus preferable.
Moreover, there are deeper reasons to reject Instrumentalism, as we saw in the last
chapter. Ironically, Instrumentalism makes it impossible to understand the epistemic
value of properties and states that are instrumentally connected to true belief. I will
now proceed to brieﬂy remind the reader of the case for this point.
5.4 Reminder: Independent Reasons to Reject Instrumentalism
Why does Instrumentalism leave us generally ill-equipped to explain derivative epistemic
value? Because, as I argued in the last chapter, Instrumentalism is responsible for a
generalized version the swamping problem.
The problem, remember, was ﬁrst raised as a problem for a naïve reliabilism. It
begins with the observation that
8See, e.g., Brogaard (2009), DePaul (2001), Kvanvig (2005), and Zagzebski (2004).
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(*) a belief's having been produced by a reliable belief-forming process does not
as such make that belief epistemically better if that belief is already true.
(*) is made plausible by an analogy. The mere fact that some good coﬀee came from a
reliable coﬀeemaker does not make that coﬀee better. Given (*), it follows that:
If knowledge = true belief produced by a reliable type of belief-forming process,
then knowledge is not as such epistemically better than true belief.
The problem does not end here. It arises for states other than knowledge and for
theorists other than reliabilists. Reliabilists will identify a belief's being justiﬁed with
its being formed by a reliable type of belief-forming process. We can use the same coﬀee
analogy to argue that justiﬁcation cannot as such add epistemic value to true belief.
That is also a bad conclusion. But this is not a restatement of the problem about
knowledge. Knowledge is not justiﬁed true belief.
The problem is more general than this. On any view on which being justiﬁed :
true belief :: being made by a good coﬀeemaker : good coﬀee, there is a worry that
justiﬁcation cannot as such add epistemic value to true belief. So there seems to be a
worry for any view on which the epistemic value of justiﬁed belief consists in its being
the mere product of something that is only instrumentally epistemically good. It is
natural to suspect that Instrumentalism is the cause of the problem.
Of course, one might blame this problem on Veritism rather than Instrumentalism.
But this would be a mistake, as we saw in the last chapter. For there is another
side to the coﬀeemaker analogy. We do not only think that coming from a reliable
coﬀeemaker cannot improve good cups of coﬀee. We also think that coming from a
reliable coﬀeemaker cannot improve bad cups of coﬀee. Now, suppose for the sake of
argument that knowledge is the fundamental epistemic value. How could one explain
the epistemic value of justiﬁed beliefs? One must claim that such beliefs are good in
virtue of some instrumental connection to knowledge. But the then it will be puzzling
why justiﬁed false beliefs are epistemically good.
Even if one regards justiﬁed belief, knowledge, and understanding as fundamental
epistemic values, there will remain epistemic values that are clearly derivative but admit
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of no Instrumentalist explanation. Consider, again, the epistemic value of trying one's
best to form beliefs accurately. This is a paradigmatically derivative value. But it is not
reliably instrumental to any plausible FEVs. There is something admirable in one's best
eﬀorts, even if they always fail. This suggests that any reasonably pluralist view that
endorses Instrumentalism will face a relative of the swamping problem. So, as we saw,
Veritism isn't the cause of the problem. Instrumentalism is the cause of the problem.
This provides independent reason to think that rejecting Instrumentalism is a rea-
sonable response to our puzzle about the value of rational belief. This is important for
two reasons. First of all, without this independent argument, it would be unclear why
we should not simply embrace a pluralist view that adds rationality to the list of funda-
mental epistemic values and deny Derivativeness. But as we have seen, the very same
argument that recommends adding rational belief to the list of fundamental epistemic
values also supports inﬂating that list in ways that no one should tolerate.
Another reason why the independent argument is important is that it undermines
a diﬀerent kind of response to our puzzle. Someone who is convinced of Derivativeness
might simply deny on Instrumentalist grounds that rational beliefs really do retain worth
in worlds like the demon world. And they might proceed to try to tell an error theory,
perhaps along the lines of Kolodny (2005). This move comes with a cost, of course.
Retention of Worth is extremely intuitively plausible. Indeed, it seems very clear that
there is something very bad from the epistemic point of view about irrational beliefs
even in a world like the demon world. By seeing that there are quite general reasons to
reject Instrumentalism, we see that there is no reason to accept this cost.
5.5 The Value of Rational Belief Depuzzled
Of course, without a model of how epistemic value derivation works other than the
Insrumentalist model, we are left with a puzzle. But I showed in the last chapter how
we can provide a uniﬁed story about derivative epistemic value that avoids swamping
problems. As we will now see more explicitly, this framework also reveals how we can
give the same account of the value of rational belief that we can and should give of
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other epistemically signiﬁcant kinds of belief. There is no need for a new story: we
already needed a diﬀerent story than the Instrumentalist story, and that alternative
story applies with no diﬃculty to the case of rational belief. This solves our puzzle.
Recall our alternative principle for grounding derivative value:
Hurka's Principle: If V is a fundamental value, ways of placing value on V and
their manifestations have derivative value (relative to V).
Value derived via Hurka's Principle is, as we saw in the last chapter, immune to swamp-
ing. As a reminder: suppose Gamma performs an act of charity because she values
charity, while Epsilon performs the same kind of action as a PR stunt. Gamma's action
seems better than Epsilon's. Yet just as appreciating beauty is good because beauty is
good, so valuing charity and manifesting this valuing is good because charity is good.
Here an act derives value from a source that is only derivatively good relative to an-
other feature the act has. The source is (i) Gamma's valuing of charity. The property
exempliﬁed is (ii) charity. The fact that Gamma's action has its source in (i) makes
that action worthier, though it has property (ii).
How do we apply Hurka's Principle in the epistemic domain? The view defended
in the last chapter provides one illustration: the beliefs we admire from the epistemic
point of view as manifestations of ways to place value on accuracy in thought, and are
derivatively valuable relative to accuracy via Hurka's principle. What are these ways to
place value on accuracy? They are, I suggested earlier, diﬀerent ways of honoring the
following norm of accuracy:
(AI) It is correct to believe P iﬀ P is true.
Now, there are four increasingly demanding ways to honor any norm N:
commitment to N is a disposition to φ only if φ-ing seems relative to one's beliefs
to conﬁrm to N;
weak respect for N is a disposition to φ only if φ-ing seems, relative to how
things appear in a non-doxastic sense, to conform to N;
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strong respect for N is a disposition to φ only if φ-ing is objectively likely,
conditional on how things appear in a non-doxastic sense, to conform to N;
to comply with a norm N is to conform with N by respecting it in the strong
sense.
The following connections are, I argued in the last chapter, plausible:
one is coherent iﬀ one manifests full commitment to AI;
one's belief is substantively rational iﬀ this belief manifests weak respect for AI;
one's belief is justiﬁed iﬀ this belief manifests strong respect for AI;
one's belief is knowledge iﬀ one complies with AI in holding this belief.
There is unity here: rational belief, justiﬁed belief, and knowledge all manifest diﬀerent
ways of placing value on accuracy in thought. Given this unity in the nature of these
kinds of belief, we can provide a uniﬁed explanation of their epistemic value. We can
oﬀer the following kind of story, which I illustrate with rational belief:
1. Rational beliefs manifest one way to place value on accuracy in thought.
2. Accuracy has fundamental value in the epistemic domain.
3. Manifestations of ways of placing value on fundamental values have derivative
value. (From Hurka's Principle)
4. So, rational beliefs have derivative value in the epistemic domain.
The same kind of story can (and should) be told about the epistemic value of justiﬁed
belief and knowledge. We just appeal to more demanding ways of placing value on
accuracy. This is an important result: it shows that no new story is needed to explain
the epistemic worth of rational beliefs.
Although I am a Veritist, my explanatory strategy could be exploited by proponents
of other fundamental epistemic values. If one prefers a knowledge-ﬁrst approach, one
could appeal to the following fundamental ideal rather than (AI):
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(KI) It is correct for one to believe P iﬀ one knows that P.
The structure of the explanations remains the same. We can distinguish between com-
mitment to, strong and weak respect for, and compliance with KI. The ﬁrst three ways
of honoring KI would correspond, as before, to structural rationality (or coherence),
substantive rationality, and justiﬁcation.
Since knowledge is the fundamental epistemic value on this picture and it thus does
not have derivative epistemic value, we would not claim that knowledge is valuable
in virtue of the fact that it constitutes compliance with KI. Indeed, that would not
be plausible anyway unless one embraced the KK principle. But there is a distinct,
derivative epistemic value that we could claim corresponds to compliance rather than
mere conformity with KI with this version of the framework: reﬂective knowledge. I take
it to be a virtue of my explanatory strategy that, when combined with a knowledge-ﬁrst
epistemic axiology, we get an explanation of why reﬂective knowledge is better than mere
ﬁrst-order knowledge. This is not something well-explained by existing frameworks.
Indeed, there is a familiar worry that Ernest Sosa's account of the distinction between
ﬁrst-order knowledge and reﬂective knowledge provides no satisfying story about why
reﬂective knowledge is epistemically better.9
Anyhow, what matters is that my conclusion is robust. Take either of the main
candidates for the fundamental epistemic value, and we can provide a uniﬁed story
about derivative epistemic value that solve the puzzle about the value of rational belief,
revealing that no new story is needed to explain its value.
5.6 Implications for Epistemology
If sound, the overarching argument in this chapter has some important implications
for epistemology. The most important ones aﬀect some common thoughts about the
truth connection in epistemology and the advantages of reliabilist views over non-
reliabilist views. Reliabilist forms of externalism in epistemology are often thought to
have a unique ability to give truth-oriented grounds for epistemic evaluation. Indeed, the
9See Fumerton (2004) for this complaint.
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ability to secure a truth-oriented picture of epistemic evaluation is sometimes understood
as the deﬁning feature of externalist views. Consider Ernest Sosa:
Central concepts of epistemologyknowledge, for example, or epistemic justiﬁ-
cation or intellectual virtuederive in one way or another from that of truth.
Assigning such a central role to truth makes one an externalist in epistemology.10
It is commonly thought that this advantage yields a further unique ability: externalists
can explain why we admire the beliefs we admire from the epistemic point of view by
citing the instrumental connection between epistemic normativity and truth. Richard
Fumertonhimself no externalistexpresses the thought nicely:
The reason epistemologists want justiﬁed beliefs has something to do with hav-
ing true beliefs. At the same time, we must understand justiﬁcation in such a
way that we allow the possibility of justiﬁed false belief. How do we establish a
connection between justiﬁcation and truth without making it impossible to have
a justiﬁed false belief? The [reliabilist's] answer is to focus on the processes that
produce beliefs. [According to the reliabilist], [t]he beliefs that are good from
the epistemic perspective are those that are produced by reliable belief-forming
mechanisms.11
The argument behind this thought is simple:
The Truth Promotion Argument (TPA)
1. Justiﬁed beliefs are good but not fundamentally good from the epistemic point
of view.
2. (1) is true only if having justiﬁed beliefs is objectively conducive to having true
beliefs.
3. So, having justiﬁed beliefs is objectively conducive to having true beliefs.
4. But only externalists can accept (3).
5. So, only externalists can explain how (1) is true.
10Sosa (2001: 641).
11Fumerton (1995: 97).
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TPA obviously depends on Instrumentalism, since (2) is questionable without it.
Curiously, the externalists who favor TPA will agree that there is some epistemically
admirable kind of belief that is not connected to truth in this way. They will just give
it a diﬀerent name than justiﬁed belief, like rational belief. The question for them is
simple: why do beliefs of this kind retain genuine epistemic worth in worlds like Beta's?
This question admits of no optimistic answer if Instrumentalism is true. The exter-
nalists who advance TPA might conclude that rational beliefs are not epistemically good
as such. They might claim that they are contingently epistemically good at best and
epistemically worthless in worlds like Beta's. Yet once we realize that Instrumentalism
cannot even explain why beliefs that are instrumentally related to truth are epistemi-
cally good, this becomes an unattractive route to take. It would be better to ﬁnd an
alternative model that provides a uniﬁed explanation of the value of rational belief,
justiﬁed belief in the externalist's sense, and knowledge.
The upshot is that TPA collapses. (2) is false. There are truth-oriented explanations
of the value of justiﬁed belief and rational belief that do not appeal to the idea of in-
strumental conducivity to true belief. Indeed, my truth-oriented account did not appeal
to instrumental relations at all in explaining the epistemic value of any epistemically
admirable kinds of belief.
Once we appreciate this, the terrain shifts. There is no good argument from the
epistemic value of justiﬁed belief to the truth of reliabilism or any kind of externalism
about justiﬁed belief. The only argument that could privilege reliabilism here would
assume Instrumentalism. But Instrumentalism makes it harder to explain the value of
justiﬁed belief even if we agree that justiﬁed belief is necessarily a product of truth-
conducive sources. It doesn't make it easier.
Indeed, reliabilists are not the only ones who can vindicate the idea that we value
justiﬁed belief from the epistemic point of view because we value accuracy from the
epistemic point of view. Internalists who equate justiﬁed belief with rational belief
can vindicate that idea too. Obviously, none of this is to say that we should become
internalists about justiﬁcation, or that there are no good arguments for externalism.
There are many good arguments for externalism about justiﬁcation. But they have
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nothing to do with the idea that epistemic value is about instrumentally promoting
true belief and demoting false belief. This cannot be what divides internalists and
externalists. Internalists and externalists alike should reject the idea.
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